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Abstract 
 
 What explains the variations in refugee status granting among states? How is refugee 
status determined? The purpose of the study is to analyze if politics affect refugee status granting 
to asylum-seekers. Despite the political implications revolving around refugee issues, forced 
migration studies are still a neglected topic in international relations research.  However, 
scholarly works that focus on forced migration often overlook broad political themes, and do not 
thoroughly examine how politics affect refugee status rates across countries. This dissertation 
examines state responses to forced migration. It quantitatively investigates the research questions 
across countries between 2000 and 2013.  It argues state interests affect refugee recognition 
rates. Specifically, it hypothesizes that bilateral relations between states and the domestic politics 
of the host state affect refugee recognition rates.  This study finds rival host states grant refugee 
status recognition rates greater than non-rival host states. The results also find refugee status 
rates increase in dyads that are in alliances compared to dyads that are not in similar pacts. It also 
finds asylum rates decrease as bilateral trade increases.  Most of the models show the more 
democratic a state becomes, the less asylum is granted. However, the results also demonstrate 
democracies grant asylum slightly more than non-democracies, and autocracies grant asylum less 
compared to non-autocracies. However, opposite results are found for democracies and 
autocracies that are not signatories of the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol. The 
study also finds minimal support for refugee recognition rates decreasing during years of 
national, executive elections. While the results did not find support for all hypotheses, this study 
concludes that on average, political and commercial relations between states affect refugee 
recognition rates.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
political science, international relations, politics, refugees, migration 
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Chapter One:  Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction to Study 
 
Each year, thousands of individuals are forced to leave their countries of origin for fear of 
being persecuted, civil war, natural or man-made disasters, and other reasons. However, refugees 
are inherently political (Betts and Loescher 2011). Not only do refugees often flee for political 
reasons, but these forced migrants also cross international borders. This is in opposition to 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) who are displaced within their home regions.  Despite these 
political implications, forced migration studies and refugee issues are still a neglected topic in 
international relations research.  However, scholarly works that focus on forced migration often 
overlook broad political themes, and do not thoroughly examine how politics affect refugee 
status rates across countries. For example, many of these studies examine why individuals 
migrate, or use the individual unit of analysis. According to Betts and Loescher (2011) what is 
needed is a “ ‘top-down level’ of analysis in order to understand the macro-level structures that 
influence states’ and other international actors’ responses to forced migration. Analyzing these 
macro-level structures is crucial because it is often the choices of states and other political actors 
that determine outcomes for the displaced” (3-4).  As a result, this research fills a gap in the 
literature. This dissertation examines state responses to forced migration. The purpose of this 
study is to quantitatively investigate the politics of granting refugee status to asylum-seekers 
across states.  It argues state interests affect refugee recognition rates. Specifically, it 
hypothesizes that bilateral relations between states and the domestic politics of the host state 
affect refugee recognition rates.   
Chapter One begins with the background of the problem, and the general overview of the 
problem investigated in this research.  Next, the research questions and objectives are presented.   
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The following section provides a brief explanation on how bilateral relationships between states, 
and a host state’s domestic politics affect refugee status granting. The chapter then proceeds with 
a brief discussion of the methodology, followed by the significance of the study. While some 
scholars evaluate the political motivations behind asylum granting, most works are theoretical, 
qualitative, or region specific.  Instead, this study provides a large-N analysis in order to evaluate 
if generalized trends exist with asylum granting. Next, the limitations of the study are discussed, 
followed by the definition of terms.   The chapter concludes with an overview of the remaining 
chapters in the dissertation.   
1.2 Background of Problem 
 
 Forced migration is a growing problem worldwide.  According to the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2015 held another displacement record.  There 
were 65.3 million displaced persons, up 5.8 million from 2014, including 21.3 million refugees 
and 2.0 million new asylum claims (UNHCR 2016). This is in comparison to 2014, where there 
were 19.5 million refugees, and 1.7 million new individuals submitting applications for asylum 
(UNHCR 2015a).  To put current numbers in perspective, if all 65.3 million displaced were a 
nation, it would be the 21st largest country in the world (UNHCR 2016).  In 2015, roughly 
34,000 people were displaced everyday, or 24 people every minute (UNHCR 2016).  The current 
number of total displaced individuals surpassed post-World War II displacement numbers. 
Figure 1 shows the global refugee population numbers from 1990-2014.  While we saw a decline 
in refugee populations during the 1990s, we are currently witnessing rapid increases in the 
number of refugees worldwide.  
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Figure 1: Global Refugee Population 1990-2014 
 
Source: The World Bank 
 Ongoing conflicts and generalized violence in Syria, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, 
Afghanistan, and other countries are responsible for the millions of forcibly displaced.  
Furthermore, record numbers are the result of changes with traditional patterns of forced 
migration.  Individuals leave in greater numbers and for reasons outside of persecution, such as 
climate change or state failure.  States are also more restrictive in providing asylum compared to 
twenty years ago (Betts, Loescher, and Milner 2012, 5).1  However, regardless for reasons of 
flight, state responses to forced migrations are inconsistent.  States respond differently to 																																																								1	During the Cold War, most asylum-seekers were forced to leave Communist states or other forms of authoritarian  
regimes. Many host governments, particularly Western democratic states, were more likely to grant refugee status, 
or have an “open-door” policy, towards asylum-seekers leaving authoritarian states. This was partly due to Western 
interest in order to show the failings of Communist regimes.  Similarly, African states were more “hospitable” 
towards other African refugees displaced during the African decolonization wars between the 1950s and 1970s, 
compared to current African asylum-seekers and refugees who are often treated with hostility. See also  
economist.com. 2013. “Flight to Nowhere.” March 2nd.  http://www.economist.com/news/international/21572753-
refugees-plight-worsening-their-numbers-grow-and-their-nature-changes-flight (April 20, 2015).	
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asylum-seekers depending on their nationalities.2 Therefore, it is imperative to analyze the causes 
behind why such responses are inconsistent.    
What explains these discrepancies? How is refugee status determined? What are the 
protection gaps found with asylum implementation?3  This study argues asylum granting is not 
just the result of altruism or generosity.  State interests and politics also motivate responses to 
forced migrants.4  Specifically, bilateral relations between states, as well as domestic and 
international politics, influence compliance.   The research contributes to the current literature. 
Several scholars explored the political motives behind asylum policies. However, as Rosenblum 
and Salehyan (2004) mention, studies on asylum are mostly theoretical or qualitative (680).   
Similarly, forced migration studies frequently use the individual unit of analysis, or only 
examine the reasons why individuals migrate (Bates 2002; Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003; 
Moore and Shellman 2004; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Schmeidl 1997).  Little research 
incorporate large-N analyses, or use refugees as the independent variable.  While some scholars 
made similar interest-based arguments (Betts 2013; Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004; Teitelbaum 
1984), in order to fully examine if politics influence asylum policy implementation, research 
must quantitatively consider refugee recognition rates across countries.   
The study draws on the research conducted in Survival Migration:  Failed Governance 
and the Crises of Displacement (Betts 2013).  Betts analyzes government response to African 
forced migrants who left fragile and failed states.  He also examines when individuals will leave 
fragile states, and the domestic and international influences that shape the disparities found with 
host country responses.  Specifically, Betts examines when host governments will be likely to 																																																								2	An asylum-seeker is an individual who has applied for asylum outside of his or her country, but whose claim has 
not been processed yet.  A refugee is often defined as an individual who has received such a claim. Asylum is a form 
of protection granted by a state to individuals who have left their home countries as a result of fear of persecution. 
3 Meaning how do states enact obligations under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol. 
4 Forced migrants are individuals who have been coerced to leave their home countries or regions.	
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expand on the United Nations’ Convention definition to individuals who may fall outside of the 
traditional refugee framework.5   Through the use of six case studies, he argues irregular 
responses to forced migration are the result of positive and negative incentives that shape elite 
interests.  Strong political and economic bilateral relations between states will deter host states 
from granting refugee status to asylum-seekers from allied sending states. Domestic politics also 
influences inconsistent refugee recognition rates among states.  However, the research expands 
from Betts (2013) by analyzing the questions of interests across countries and time.  This will 
allow us to discern if refugee policies are the result of state and elite interests as a whole.  The 
analyses also do not discriminate on reasons of flight,6 and examines all countries. 
1.3 Statement of the Problem 
  Interests affect when states will grant or deny asylum.  Most states are signatories of 
international and regional conventions relating to the status of refugees.  Despite this, why do 
variations in asylum granting among states exist?  If asylum claims are to be fairly assessed, then 
there should not be discrepancies in refugee status granting.  However, empirical evidence 
suggests that various factors, such as an asylum-seeker’s nationality, affect the likelihood of 
granting or denying asylum in the host state.  In many cases states make refugee status granting 
extremely difficult.  While such preventions may be the result of burden, security issues, or 
exercising national sovereignty, such concerns may also be used as a defense for state interests.  
This is especially evident in cases in which states suddenly shifted from an open-door approach 																																																								
5 The traditional refugee framework refers to those individuals who leave their countries of origin for reasons stated 
under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. According to the Convention (and the 1967 
Protocol), a refugee is defined as, “A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or 
who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”  In this case, migrants that leave failed states 
traditionally fall outside of the mandate. 
6 There are currently no datasets, which include reasons why individuals leave across states and across time.  
However, we can often assume the reasons by certain countries and years. 
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to more restrictive policies.7 In the worst cases, states deport refugees back to the sending states, 
despite still having a legitimate fear of persecution.8   
States have genuine security concerns. However, other factors may affect state responses 
to asylum-seekers.  Host states normally compromise parts of their sovereignty in order to 
control both regular immigration and forced migration (Hathaway and Foster 2014).  States must 
balance their own rights and human rights (Mathew 1994).  More so, refugees are regularly seen 
as a burden or security issue (Betts 2009a; Milner 2009). However, states may welcome asylum-
seekers despite the burden it places on the host state. Empirical evidence shows states also grant 
asylum to individuals that do not necessarily have a fear of persecution. Therefore, it is equally 
important to ask, what incentives drive refugee hosting?  One such incentive regards the 
nationalities of asylum-seekers.   
Some states are more likely to grant asylum to certain nationalities over others, although 
the asylum-seekers from different states are forced to leave for similar reasons.  Similar to Betts 
(2013), this research questions what drives these inconsistencies.  Gaps found within refugee 
protection are often the result of governments responding differently to groups of forced 
migrants.  Protection gaps are also due to states constraining the operations of the United 
																																																								
7 For example, for many decades, India has had an open-door policy towards Tibetan refugees, and is even home to 
the Tibetan government-in-exile. However, this hospitality has currently shifted towards more restriction. For the 
past few years, countries within the region are beginning to improve diplomatic and bilateral relations with China.  
As a result, countries where Tibetan asylum-seekers normally settle in, such as India and Nepal, are being	more	
hostile and unwilling to accept these asylum-seekers from Tibet and other regions in China.  Granting these 
individuals asylum is admitting they are being persecuted, or living in unsafe conditions in a state from which they 
are trying to mend or enhance relations. Needless to say, doing so could have grave repercussions among diplomatic 
relations between states.  For further analysis on treatment regarding Chinese and Tibetan asylum-seekers in Asia, 
see Vaughn, Bruce. 2011.  “Nepal: Political Developments and Bilateral Relations with the United States.” 
Congressional Research Service https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34731.pdf and Hathaway, James. 2005.  The 
Rights of Refugees under International Law.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 242. 
8 Also known as refoulement. Non-refoulement means that a refugee cannot be returned to his or her country of 
origin if he or she still has a legitimate fear of persecution.  It is a key principle in the Convention, as well as in 
international refugee law. 
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Nation’s High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) within their borders as the potential 
country of asylum.9  The inadequacies of refugee protection warrant further investigation. 
This research argues state interests and incentives affect refugee status determination.   The first 
variable of interest, bilateral relations, examines how diplomatic and economic relations with the 
refugee sending state affects refugee status granting to these asylum-seekers.  Granting refugee 
status is admitting the individual cannot live safely in his or her home state. As a result, strong 
relations between states will motivate governments to deny asylum claims.  Bitter relations 
between them will increase the likelihood of granting refugee status.  Domestic politics also 
affect refugee decisions.  For example, scholars often argue that democracies are more 
cooperative in the international community compared to autocracies.  Due to their liberalist 
ideals, democracies should then exhibit greater levels of openness towards forced migrants 
compared to autocracies.  However, democratic states can equally be persuaded against such 
sentiments.  Routine elections may place domestic pressure on state elects to deter refugee status 
recognition when the general voting population is critical of immigration.10 This research looks 
at how these factors affect refugee recognition rates based on the countries of origin.  Similarly, 
international agencies can be constrained at the national level.  Often times, UNHCR is asked to 
oversee asylum and grant refugee recognition rates.  However, state interests may also influence 
their work.  
1.4 Purpose and Methodology of Study 
																																																								
9 This research uses country of asylum and host country synonymously.	
10 Although there is a difference between immigrants and refugees, often the overall negative sentiments are shared 
between both. For example, an AP poll found that among Americans sampled, 46 percent of Americans believed we 
take in too many immigrants from Latin America and 54 percent believes we take in too many from the Middle East. 
While other groups were not found to be as high, 55 percent of those sampled believe the U.S. does not have a moral 
obligation to offer asylum. See “THE AP-GfK POLL 
December, 2015”  http://ap-gfkpoll.com/main/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/AP-GfK_Poll_December-2015-
topline_mideast-immigration.pdf  Accessed April 5th, 2016.	
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Given the lack of large-N statistical analyses on refugee recognition rates, the purpose of 
this study is to quantitatively examine how politics drive refugee recognition rates across all 
countries.  Chapter Three further details the research design and methodology. This research uses 
directed-dyad year as the unit of analysis for years 2000-2013.  These are the years available 
from UNHCR’s population statistics database at the time of this research.  The main dependent 
variable is refugee recognition rates.  As Section 3.3.1 will show, refugee recognition rates are 
normally calculated by dividing the total number of asylum seekers granted full Convention 
status by the total number of accepted (those who received full and complementary status where 
applicable) and rejected cases.  This research also uses a second dependent variable, the total 
recognition rates, as described in Section 3.3.2.11  The total recognition rates describe the rate of 
asylum-seekers who receive refugee status recognition and those that received complementary 
protection. In other words, the numerator pools these two numbers. It is important to mention 
that there is no standard definition with regards to what defines complementary protection.  
However, simply put, complementary recognition status is a form of protection for individuals 
that may have fled their home country for other humanitarian reasons.  These individuals 
generally fall outside of the 1951 Convention recognition. Therefore, complementary protection 
often refers to individuals who do not receive full refugee status (Convention status), but have 
received other forms of protection on a humanitarian or temporary basis.  These forms of 
protection, do not afford individuals the same rights given by Convention status recognition.  
Section 3.3.2 claims that complementary protection is on the rise.  As mentioned earlier, 
Betts (2013) found that sometimes states “stretch” the refugee Convention definition for forced 
migrants if it is in their interest to do so.  It is often the case that states give complementary 																																																								
11 UNHCR often includes both refugee recognition rates and total recognition rates in their reports.  	
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protection for individuals who should receive full refugee status recognition instead.  The 
research does not provide an exhausted overview of complementary or other forms of protection. 
However, the total recognition rates are also included in order to provide robustness checks.  For 
example, states may grant asylum-seekers lower levels of protection in lieu of full Convention 
recognition.  Analyzing the two rates together will isolate the effect that the independent 
variables have on the main dependent variable, refugee recognition rates.  For example, the first 
hypothesis claims receiving states will be more likely to provide asylum to individuals fleeing 
rival states compared to non-rival states.  If the results find rival dyads provide refugee status 
rates more than non-rival dyads, and refugee status rates are greater than the total recognition 
rates, it is safe to assume rival dyads provide refugee status more than non-rival dyads.  
However, if the total recognition rates are greater than refugee recognition rates, these dyads 
grant complementary status more than refugee status.  Similarly, many studies do not measure 
both refugee recognition rates and total recognition rates with the exception of Neumayer 
(2005a). However, Neumayer (2005a) only analyzes Western European host states.   
The main independent variables of interest for bilateral relations are rival dyads, 
alliances, and bilateral trade.  Regime-type and national executive election years measure how 
domestic politics in the host state affect asylum rates.  Two binary variables measure the host 
state’s regime. The first variable regards autocracies and non-autocracies.  The second variable 
refers to democracies and non-democracies.  It is important to mention that a non-democratic 
state does not necessarily imply the state is autocratic and vice versa. For example, a non-
democratic regime could be defined as an “anocracy.”  While there is no standard definition for 
anocracy, these regime-types are usually politically unstable.  They are neither fully democratic, 
nor fully autocratic. Often regimes in transition are anocracies.  However, this study focuses on 
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democracies and autocracies, and does not include anocracies as a separate independent variable. 
The research also examines how increases in levels of democratization affect refugee status 
granting. Finally, year of executive elections in the host state investigate how elections affect 
asylum rates.   
Because the dependent variable is a percentage, and the unit of analysis is directed-dyad 
year, this study uses a fractional response model alongside the generalized estimating equation.  
The use of this equation is explained further in Chapter Three.   A recent study by Moorthy and 
Braithwaite (2016) explore how alliances and rivalries affect refugee hosting across states. 
However, their main dependent variable uses refugee stock numbers, as oppose to the actual 
refugee recognition rates. This study avoids using the refugee stock numbers. These numbers are 
population numbers, and do not provide asylum rates. Reasons for avoiding the use of refugee 
stock numbers as the dependent variable are described in further detail in Chapter Three.   
 1.5 Significance of the Study 
This study contributes both to international relations and refugee studies scholarship. It 
provides theoretical and methodological contributions to past works.  Despite empirical 
evidence, much political science research ignores how politics affect asylum granting and 
refugee hosting.  Most works are qualitative or regional focused.  Instead, this study analyzes 
asylum-granting trends across all countries.  However, currently there is a surge in research 
investigating state responses to forced migration.  Nevertheless, several works focus solely on 
the Syrian refugee crisis, or only focus on particular host states, such as Turkey or the European 
Union.12   
																																																								12	See for example the most recent ISA Conference Program:  
http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/Baltimore%202017-s/Baltimore%202017%20-%20Full%20Program.pdf	
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Additionally, the investigation has implications for both policy and the international 
relations literature. The international relations literature rarely investigate the variations of state 
responses to forced migration (Betts 2009a; Betts 2009b). The academic neglect is puzzling. 
Forced migration is understood within the context of the state system (Betts 2014; Betts and 
Loescher 2011).  Refugees will always exist as long as there are borders, states, and citizenship 
(Betts 2009a; Haddad 2003). Refugee exoduses also affect various sources of international 
politics ranging from non-state actors, international security, the role of international institutions 
and cooperation, and challenges with state sovereignty (Betts 2009a; Betts 2014; Goldenziel 
2014; Loescher 1993; Loescher and Milner 2005; O’Sullivan 2012; Weiner 1992).  Forced 
migration research overlooks political motives.  Thus this research also fills the gap in the 
literature by expanding on works regarding international institutions and regimes, international 
cooperation, and the role of politics.  
1.6 Limitations of Study 
 
As previously mentioned, the dissertation evaluates all countries, and does not employ a 
regional focus.  While the purpose of the study is to investigate how politics affect asylum 
granting at the global level, case studies and regional-focused research can provide a more 
detailed examination.   The dependent variable also contains limitations.  Currently, UNHCR is 
the only agency that provides a database of refugee status determination rates across all 
countries.  However, the applications filed for asylum are not thoroughly described.  In other 
words, we do not know specifically why an individual applied for asylum in a host state.  
(However we can make assumptions based on the country of origin and year).  Limitations are 
also found with the years studied.  The years available for the data are currently only from 2000-
2013.  Therefore, this study has a relatively small t.  Similarly, a lot of applications were not 
	 12	
decided in the same year in which the individual applied.  As explained in Chapter Three, asylum 
rates describe successful decisions, not successful applications (Neumayer 2005a, 51).   
1.7 Definition of Terms 
 
“The Convention” denotes the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.  
Similarly, “Convention signatory” or “signatory states” describe states that have signed the 1951 
Convention and/or the 1967 Protocol.  Although the Protocol is an independent instrument, most 
states are signatories of both.  However, both St. Kitts and Nevis and Madagascar are signatories 
of only the 1951 Convention. Venezuela, the United States of America, and Cabo Verde are 
signatories to the 1967 Protocol only.  The differences between the 1951 Convention and the 
1967 Protocol are described in Chapter Two. 
Article One of the 1951 Convention defines a “refugee” as a person who “owing to a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of 
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UNHCR 2010a). 
However, as mentioned earlier and as Chapter Two will show, often states “stretch” this 
definition for asylum-seekers who may fall outside of these categories.  Similarly, an “asylum-
seeker” an individual who has applied for asylum outside of his or her country, but whose claim 
has not been processed yet (UNHCR 2010b, 35). Refugee recognition rates are the rates for 
individuals applied for asylum, and receive full Convention recognition.  Total recognitions rates 
combine both full Convention status recognition and complementary status, meaning protection 
status for other humanitarian reasons. These rates are described in further detail in Chapter 
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Three. “Complementary status,” “humanitarian status,” and “other forms of protection” are used 
interchangeably, especially in Chapter Four.  
1.8 Dissertation Map 
  
 The following chapters describe how politics affects refugee status granting to asylum-
seekers.  Chapter Two covers the theory and literature review.  It argues that variations in asylum 
granting between states are the result of bilateral relations and the domestic politics of the host 
state.  The chapter begins with a very brief, historical overview of refugee protection in order to 
provide context with how institutions were put in place to protect refugees leading up to the 1951 
Convention. Most states are signatories of the 1951 Convention. However, the majority of 
refugees are confined to a small group of states; most of which are located in the Global South.  
As a result, burden sharing is one of the greatest challenges facing unequal refugee asylum rates 
and refugee hosting.  Unequal levels of burden sharing are often due to state interests.  The rest 
of Chapter Two describes the literature regarding how bilateral relations and domestic politics 
affect refugee population numbers.  Chapter Three defines the methodology and the specific 
variables for the analysis.  The methodology chapter underscores the importance of using asylum 
rates as the dependent variable, as opposed to the standard refugee stock variables often used in 
quantitative research regarding refugees.  The methodology chapter also explains the choice of 
the estimation equation used for the analysis.  Because the dependent variable is a rate, and the 
unit of analysis is directed-dyad year, these factors must be taken into account. Chapter Four 
describes the results found after the analysis.  The findings of the results did not support some of 
the hypotheses.  The meanings of these findings are described in further detail in Chapter Five.   
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Chapter Two:  Theory and Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
  The previous chapter highlights how refugee studies scholarship overlooks the role state 
politics have in refugee status granting.  Additionally, studies ignore why variations in refugee 
status granting exists across host states.  This study argues international politics matter.  The 
relationship between the potential host state and the sending state influences the likelihood of 
granting asylum.  The domestic politics of the host state also shape responses to forced migrants.  
  This chapter begins with a brief overview of the history of refugee protection. Despite 
measures put in place to protect forced migrants, empirical evidence suggests refugee status 
granting varies across states. Next, the chapter provides a review of the literature.  It describes 
how bilateral relations between states and the host state’s domestic politics affect refugee 
recognition rates.  Beginning with Section 2.4, the hypotheses are presented at the end of each 
section.  Granting asylum to individuals implies they cannot live safely in their country of origin.  
States do not wish to harm their relations with other states; however, rival states use refugees to 
undermine their enemies. It is hypothesized rival states will grant refugee recognition to asylum-
seekers more than non-rival dyads in order to undermine their enemies.  However, it is expected 
that potential host states will provide refugee recognition less to asylum-seekers from alliances.  
Similarly, a host state’s domestic politics affect refugee recognition rates.  Often times, voters 
have negative views on migration.  Therefore, it is hypothesized democracies will grant asylum 
less compared to autocracies.  Authoritarian leaders are not bound by routine elections.  
Furthermore, case studies show that African states with once open-door asylum policies became 
more restricted to refugee hosting when the host state began to democratize. This study 
hypothesizes increases in democratization in host states will decrease asylum rates.  These case 
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studies also depict that refugee deportations took place during national elections.  It is also 
expected that refugee recognition rates will be lower in years when executive elections take 
place.  Chapter Two ends with a brief conclusion.   
2.2 Background and Brief Overview of Refugee Protection  
 
  Individuals have been forced to flee their home regions for hundreds of years.  When the 
French Protestant Huguenots fled religious persecution in France, it eventually laid the 
foundations for what would be the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Orchard 
2014).   Signed in 1598, The Edict of Nantes afforded the Huguenots civil rights in France 
without fear of persecution.  In 1685, Louis XIV replaced and revoked the Edict of Nantes with 
the Edict of Fontainebleau. As a result of the Edict of Fontainebleau, the Huguenots were 
persecuted in France. French Protestant schools were banned, and the Huguenots were forced to 
convert to Catholicism. Louis XIV also prohibited the Huguenots from leaving France.  
However, the Huguenots who were able to leave the country sought refuge in the surrounding 
states.  As a result, the receiving states were placed in a dilemma. State leaders had to figure out 
a way to host the Huguenots without possibly engaging in conflict with France (Orchard 2014, 
1).  As Orchard (2014) mentions, states eventually protected the Huguenots under their domestic 
laws.  The Huguenots became classified “as a distinct category of migrants, ones who, because 
they could no longer count on the protection of their own state, should be allowed to leave that 
state and receive protection elsewhere” (Orchard 2014, 1).   
  Since the Huguenots were forced to migrate out of France, the origins of the refugee 
regime began to slowly surface. After the First World War, the international community 
attempted to protect the two million or so displaced individuals. At first, protection measures 
were difficult, as many of the displaced had no forms of identification. For example, when 
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Russians sought to leave the Soviet Union, the Soviet government denationalized these 
individuals (Hathaway 2005, 83).  Political tensions continued, and mass migrations showed no 
signs of stopping.  As a result, the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(LNHCR) was created in 1921.  The office provided refugees with the “Nassen Passport” in 
order to afford refugees proper documentation to flee to other League of Nations member states 
(Betts 2009a).  Later, the 1933 Convention Relating to International Status of Refugees 
attempted to promote international cooperation with refugee protection between states.  The 
1933 Convention contained an important addition to the treaty by including the principle of non-
refoulement, but only eight states ratified and seven did so with reservations (Hathaway 2005, 
88).13  This eventually led to the foundations for the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. Hence, although modern refugee law can be traced back almost 100 years to the 
League of Nations, the UNHCR was not officially formed as an agency until 1951 (Goodwin-
Gill 2014).  In the same year, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was completed 
at a conference in Geneva, and officially entered into force in 1954 (Goodwin-Gill 2014, 37).14 
The 1951 Convention, though, contains geographic restrictions, as it pertains only to Europeans 
displaced as a result of World War II (specifically, it refers to those displaced before January 1st 
1951).  However, global conflict became widespread during the 1960s.  The African continent in 
particular found itself torn by decolonization wars.  As a consequence, the 1967 Protocol was 
entered.  The Protocol removes both temporal and geographic restrictions, but it does not amend 
the 1951 Convention (Goodwin-Gill 2014; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007). The 1967 
Protocol is considered to be an “independent instrument” (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007, 																																																								13	Non-refoulement means that a refugee cannot be returned to his or her country of origin if he or she still has a 
legitimate fear of persecution.  It is a key principle in the Convention, as well as in international refugee law.	14	For the complete definition of what constitutes a refugee according to the treaty and what defines persecution 
please reference footnote five and Section 1.7. 
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508).15  This brief summary shows that the 1951 Convention is vital not just for refugee 
protection, but also for human rights in general.  There are currently 145 countries that are 
signatories to the 1951 Convention, 146 signatories to 1967 Protocol, as seen in Figure 2.   
Figure 2: Current Map of Signatory States 
 
Source: UNHCR 
  However, despite the number of signatories, states are being restrictive with refugee 
hosting and asylum granting.  Similarly, some non-signatory states host some of the most 
important refugee populations. For example, India hosts Tibetan refugees and the Tibetan 
government in exile.  Are treaties merely scrapes of paper, or do they influence state behavior? 
Do states interests affect behavior?  If individuals have been forced to leave for reasons of 
persecution or other humanitarian reasons, there should not be too many inconsistences with 
regards to how states grant asylum and host refugees. Empirical evidence suggests otherwise.  																																																								
15 For example, on the one hand, United States has acceded only to the Protocol.  On the other hand, states like 
Madagascar, are parties to the 1951 Convention only. 
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Figure 3: Refugees per Capita by Country of Asylum mid-2015 
 
Source: UHCHR Mid-2015 Statistics 
Figure 4: Refugees by Country of Asylum mid-2015.  
 
Source: UNHCR Mid-2015 Statistics  
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  Suhrke (1998) argues that burden sharing across states is extremely problematic and 
challenging to implement with refugee hosting. She claims refugee protection also suffers from 
the free-rider problem.  Although states want international stability, most states also want to 
decrease the number of refugees and asylum-seekers in their own territories.  As a result, while 
some states admit their fair share of refugees in their territories, other states do not, but will still 
benefit from the regional stability that derives from refugee hosting (Suhrke 1998, 400). 
Suhrke’s argument underscores the issues surrounding asylum policy complexities, such as how 
international organizations struggle to increase cooperation with states and refugee hosting.  
Figures 3 and 4 above show unequal distributions of the world’s refugees per capita and 
destination.  These figures show that most of the world’s refugees are in the Global South.  
  Although refugee protection measures are set in place, and international organizations 
attempt to increase cooperation between states, there are other factors influencing asylum 
granting in potential host states.  For example, Neumayer (2005a) analyzes asylum rates in 
Western Europe, and finds asylum granting is often based on arbitrary decisions. According to 
Neumayer, asylum rates vary depending where asylum-seekers file for asylum.  In other words, 
part of his analysis examines the host state themselves and how country specific elements, such 
as the host state’s political and economic factors, affects asylum granting.  Neumayer’s work 
emphasizes that asylum applications are sometimes not processed based on their merits, but other 
reasons may influence the likelihood of granting asylum. More so, the nationalities of asylum-
seekers affects whether they will be granting refugee status in the host state. As a result, unequal 
distributions of refugee hosting are not only found with refugee populations as a whole, but also 
with the nationalities of the refugees themselves. The problem of burden sharing hints at the 
notion that state interests may help to explain the unequal distributions of refugees in host states. 
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More so, it highlights how state interests affect refugee status determination. States will only 
cooperate if it is in their interest to do so.  
  Thielemann (2006) claims refugee burdens are unequal among Western states, and 
mentions there are generally two reasons that might explain the unequal distributions of refugee 
burdens.  Normative based motivations, such as solidarity with other countries and refugees, may 
explain why states decide to host refugees. However, we “can expect interest-based motivations 
to be paramount for most (if not all) states” (Thielemann 2006, 14). This research departs from 
Neumayer (2005a) and other similar studies, because while the research analyzes how state 
interests affect refugee hosting, this study examines how domestic politics and bilateral relations 
between states may be contributing to these unequal asylum recognition rates. The next section 
analyzes how refugee status determination and state interests are linked. 
2.3 Refugee Status Determination and State Interests  
Section 2.2 explains how the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol were implemented.  
However, both the Convention and Protocol contain several limitations. First, the meaning of 
persecution is narrow.16  It relates to individuals having a fear of persecution based on political 
reasons, race, religion, nationality, and belonging to a particular social group.  Therefore, 
individuals forcibly displaced as a result of natural disasters, climate change, or state failure do 
not traditionally fall under the Convention definition.  Second, belonging to a “particular social 
group” is also an ambiguous term. For instance, women may classify as a particular social group, 
but categorizing gender as a social group varies between states.  As a result, women who file for 
asylum on the grounds of gendered based persecution often have their claims denied (Querton 
2012).   Nonetheless, protection for displaced persons is effective only if states commit to 
																																																								16	Please refer to the Convention definition of “refugee” in Section 1.7. 
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ensuring such protection.  The following measures allow for proper refugee protection: the 
application of international and regional conventions, allowing UNHCR to work unrestrained 
when needed, through other forms of protection, such as third country resettlement, and through 
the proper implementation of refugee status determination.   
Refugee status determination (RSD) is the procedure where individuals who applied for 
asylum meet “the eligibility criteria under international or regional refugee instruments, national 
legislation or UNHCR’s mandate” in order to be officially recognized as a refugee (UNHCR 
2005, 1).  States are primarily responsible for RSD (UNHCR 2015b, 51).   In several cases, 
governments and UNHCR jointly determine refugee status for asylum-seekers.  However, in 
many cases, UNHCR is solely responsible for RSD in host states.  The agency is normally in 
charge of RSD in non-convention signatory states, or where effective national procedures on 
asylum are lacking (Stainsby 2009).17  Recently, UNHCR is taking a greater role, and 
documenting asylum applications in record numbers (UNHCR 2015b).  RSD may be done in an 
individual basis, or declared prima facie during mass flights when governments and agencies 
find themselves with little capacity to handle claims individually.   
  However, while actual asylum procedures vary due to the differences at the national and 
regional levels, the goal remains the same—to identify individuals “who should benefit from 
recognition of their refugee status” (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007, 532).  As Türk and Dowd 
(2014) stress “Consistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the 1951 
Convention needs to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its 
terms in their context and in light of its object and purpose,” (280).  However, discrepancies in 
																																																								
17 For example, UNHCR often determines refugee status in Asian states, because most countries in the region are 
not signatories of the 1951 Convention, or the 1967 protocol.  UNHCR also single-handily handles asylum cases in 
Egypt. Although Egypt is a Convention signatory, it does not have any government procedures regarding refugee 
status determination. 
	 22	
asylum granting also lend to variations in refugee recognition rates between states, and to gaps in 
refugee protection.  Gaps in refugee protection are one of the greatest challenges facing forced 
migrants.  Gaps in international refugee law arise when protection is non-existent, not applicable, 
not adequate, or not appropriately applied (Türk and Dowd 2014). Protection gaps affect both 
those seeking asylum, and individuals with legal refugee status.  Türk and Dowd (2014) 
acknowledge that states have granted refugee protection to individuals who fall out of the 
traditional refugee framework.18  However, states often narrowly dissect the Convention 
definition, and hold conflicting views with regards to who legally qualifies for refugee status 
(Türk and Dowd 2014, 280).  For example, the authors mention refugee recognition rates among 
Afghan asylum-seekers in 2011 varied across European countries.  They found the Netherlands’s 
refugee recognition rate for Afghan asylum-seekers at 3%, in contrast to Austria’s 33% refugee 
recognition rate for Afghans (281).   Article 3 in the 1951 Convention states that “The 
Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees without 
discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin” (UNHCR 2010a).  Therefore, states 
should not discriminate refugees based on their country of origin.  However, as Türk and Dowd 
(2014) claim, empirically this has not been the case. Similarly, during the Gulf War, Saudi 
Arabia recognized Iraqis displaced by the war, but refused to let other forced migrants through 
their borders and grant asylum, such as the Somalis (Hathaway 2005, 239).  Hathaway (2005) 
also claims India showed preferential treatment to Tibetan refugees compared to migrants from 
Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, and (up until recently) the United States has shown preferential 
treatment to Cuban refugees compared to those fleeing Haiti (239).   
																																																								
18 See footnote five. 
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As previously mentioned, UNHCR is currently taking a greater role with asylum 
granting.  The UNHCR also has independent authority to shape the behavior of states 
(Goldenziel 2014).  Using the example of the 2003 Iraqi refugee crisis, Goldenziel (2014) 
examines how UNHCR influenced Syria and Jordan (both non-signatory states) to comply with 
international refugee law.  The agency was originally met with backlash; however, it enforced 
compliance with Iraqi refugees when the agency provided humanitarian assistance (Goldenziel 
2014, 467).  Specifically, UNHCR enticed states to host refugees by delivering economic 
incentives.  More so, it lured the cooperation of wealthier donor states, such as the United States 
by also providing cover through “minimizing the visibility in assisting Iraqi refugees fleeing the 
war they wrought” (467).  The United States also wanted to hide their aid to Syria, because it 
seemed to contradict “their other foreign policy objectives” (467); thus, the U.S. funneled their 
funds through UNHCR instead.  The Iraqi government also channeled money through UNHCR 
in order to prevent itself from seeming unstable (467).   
Similarly, Hartigan (1992) illustrates how UNHCR influenced elite interests in Mexico 
and Honduras. Originally, both Mexico and Honduras were hesitant to provide asylum to Central 
American migrants displaced as a result of regional civil wars during the 1980s. However, 
UNHCR influenced state policy makers by offering funds and pursuing security and international 
legitimacy interests.   By matching humanitarian norms with their particular state interests, 
UNHCR helped to shift Mexican and Honduran asylum policies.  
  While UNHCR influenced potential states to cooperate with regional refugee crises, this 
research maintains the findings of Haritgan (1992), Goldenziel (2014), among others, are 
isolated cases.  In the case of the 1980s refugee crisis in Central America, Mexico and Honduras 
provided asylum to other Central Americans.  In other words, it hosted refugees from the same 
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region, many of who have similar cultural and religious backgrounds.  During the U.S. led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, both Jordan and Syria were openly opposed to U.S. intervention. While 
individuals are currently fleeing for reasons of violence and regional instability, many migrants 
flee for other reasons, such as state failure.  Furthermore, individuals flee to non-contiguous 
states with different ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds.  Many migrants also stay 
displaced for long and indefinite periods of time.  These situations make international 
cooperation more difficult, and challenge the work of UNHCR. Governments can also suppress 
UNHCR’s work in the host state. While there are cases where UNHCR influenced state 
cooperation with refugee and asylum-seeker populations (Hartigan 1992, Goldenziel 2014), the 
agency often does not work autonomously, and cannot solely enforce policy changes at the state 
level. Governments must first grant UNHCR permission to work within its borders (Loescher 
2001).  Once the agency begins work, it may be constrained by the state in which it operates 
(Betts 2013; Goldenziel 2014).  Many times, the UNHCR finds itself sandwiched between its 
own interests and that of the state.  One the one hand, if UNHCR does not take state interests 
into account, it may find itself sidelined (Betts, Loescher, and Milner 2012).   
  In the worst cases, host countries expel UNHCR agents.  For example, Botswana 
banished its UNHCR representative after the organization spoke out against the country’s human 
rights abuses towards Zimbabwean refugees (Betts 2013, 82 and 192).19   On the other hand, if 
the agency takes state interests too much into account, it jeopardizes its principles.  One of the 
criticisms against UNHCR regards the notions of “due process, and appeal or review” (Goodwin-
Gill and McAdam 2007, 53).  For instance, in regards to due process, RSD applications should 
be processed in a timely and non-discriminatory manner.  Likewise, asylum-seekers have the 																																																								19	Libya also expelled UNHCR workers in 2012.  See 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/06/201068125618708673.html 
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right to appeal if the application was rejected, and should be provided with sufficient information 
as to why the application was rejected (UNHCR 2003, 1.2 and 7.1).  Often this is not the case.  
Roesch et al (2014) found RSD by UNHCR officers in Tunisia failed to adhere to due process.  
Refugee status determination has also been assessed subjectively, as opposed to objectively, 
which “undermines confidence in the system” (Kagan 2003, 375).20   
UNHCR is accused of being both state-centric and state-led (Ullah 2014, 95).  The 
agency often acts under state supervision, and is constrained by state preferences (Betts 2013).  
As the case of Botswana above shows, the state is the main actor and enforcer with refugee status 
determination.  In other words, state interests influence status determination.  More so, when 
international agencies such as UNHCR are in charge of refugee status determination, states could 
influence agencies to deny asylum to certain asylum-seekers if it is in their interests to do so.  
Governments may allow UNHCR to help oversee refugee populations, and aid with asylum 
application processing within their borders.  However, the state may place limits on how the 
agency works, and restrict UNHCR’s influence on refugee recognition rates.  
  Goldsmith and Posner (2005) claim states often act rationally in order to maximize their 
interests.  However, Goldsmith and Posner (2005) do not thoroughly explain “which interests 
matter, how they are formed, or how we are to discover them” (Hathaway and Lavinbuk 2006, 
1406).  More so, Hathaway and Lavinbuk (2006) stress that international law research should 
focus on how international law matters, and importantly, under what conditions (1407).   The 
following sections describe how state interests affect asylum granting in states. Bilateral relations 
																																																								
20 Kagan claims that in one case, RSD by a UNHCR officer in Cairo came to different status determinations for a 
Sudanese mother and her son.  Although both accounts were extremely similar, and testified to the same events, the 
officer recognized the mother at first instance, but rejected first instance status determination for the son, as well as 
his appeal (Kagan 2003, 376).	
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between states, as well as domestic politics drive or deny asylum.  These interests affect whether 
states will comply with international law.   
2.4 Bilateral Relations 
This section analyzes the role of bilateral relations between asylum and sending states, 
and its effect on refugee hosting and recognition rates.  The foreign relations between host 
countries and refugee sending states influence asylum (Teitelbaum 1984; Zolberg, Suhrke, and 
Aguayo 1986).  In other words, the foreign policy goals of countries impact refugee recognition 
rates for asylum-seekers. Refugees are often geopolitical pawns. For example, granting asylum 
may create unfavorable relations with the sending state (Weiner 1992).  Doing so is to admit 
individuals cannot safely live in their country of origin; therefore, states with favorable bilateral 
relations are less likely to grant asylum.  Similarly, states with negative relations are more likely 
to grant asylum, and increase refugee-hosting numbers.  One example regards the Cuban 
Adjustment Act, which allows Cubans to become permanent residents after legally residing in 
the United States after one year.  Cubans also have access to a special immigration lottery 
program, which is not available to other nationals.  These special privileges given to Cuban 
asylum-seekers and refugees originally stemmed from Cold War politics, and the bitter relations 
between the United States and Cuba.21   The United States and other Western countries were 
more likely to offer asylum to individuals fleeing Communist states in order to discredit 
communism (Betts 2009a).  Likewise, the United States denied asylum to those fleeing states 
with favorable relations, such as post-Allende Chile, and El Salvador and Guatemala during the 
1980s (Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1986, 155).  For example, only 2% of asylum applications 
from El Salvadorans during the 1980s were approved in the United States (Gammage 2007).   																																																								21	Cuba’s latest out-migration crisis was in the winter of 2015, where many Cuban migrants began crossing through 
Central America in order to reach the United States when relations with Cuba began to improve.	
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 The following variables analyze the bilateral relations between states: rivalries, alliances, 
and bilateral trade.  These variables examine the political and commercial relations between 
states, and how they influence refugee status determination rates.  We should find that positive 
relations between states would make asylum granting to individuals from allied states more 
difficult. Negative relations will provoke states to grant asylum to individuals from adversarial 
states.  This section illustrates that political and economic motives drive or deny asylum rates 
depending on the nationalities of asylum-seekers. 
2.4.1 Rivalries 
Rival states often use opportunities to weaken an opposition state (Moorthy and 
Brathwaite 2016).  The case of Guinea exhibits the Guinean president’s negative perceptions of 
Liberian and Sierra Leonean leaders influenced the government’s decision to host Liberian and 
Sierra Leonean refugees.  More so, Guinea allowed its refugee camps to be used as a base by 
Liberian rebels in opposition to Liberian president, Charles Taylor.  Although Guinea is an 
extreme case, it is not rare for countries to host rebel groups and refugees in order to undermine 
rival states.  For instance, Pakistan has been generous with hosting Afghan refugees, but it has 
been especially keen on receiving Afghans fighting against the Afghan government.  Many (but 
not all) Arab nations host Palestinian refugees, and Libya hosted Chadians who fought against 
the Chadian government (Zoldberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1986, 156). 
  Throughout most of the 1990s, Guinea hosted thousands of refugees, most of whom were 
fleeing violence and conflict in neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone.  The Guinean government 
had an open asylum policy (Milner 2009).  In 1999, Southern Guinea became UNHCR’s largest 
refugee program in Africa, hosting about 500,000 refugees (Milner 2009, 135).22  Guinea also 
welcomed UNHCR’s assistance.  For the most part, Guinea allowed the agency to encourage the 																																																								
22 Specifically, this was the Guékédou settlement.	
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refugees to be self-sufficient, in contrast to other African states (Milner 2009, van Damme 1999).    
However, when neighboring conflicts began to spill over into Guinea, the Guinean government 
began to restrict asylum granting.  Blaming the violence on foreigners, Guinea’s leader, Lansana 
Conté, ordered refugees to be detained, especially those who settled in the capital of Conarky 
(Milner 2009).  Interestingly, these restricted policies were short-lived.  When violence in 
Guinea diminished around 2001, both Guinea and UNHCR, continued to host refugees from the 
region (Milner 2009, 143).   
  Nevertheless, one question arises from this situation.  Despite the violent spillover from 
neighboring wars, and blaming Guinea’s instability on its foreign population, why did Guinea 
continue to host refugees when the violence subsided?  Further analysis depicts that Guinea’s 
seemingly hospitality is nothing more than the result of political and foreign policy motives.  The 
rivalry between Lansana Conté and Charles Taylor provided Guinea an incentive to host 
Liberian refugees (Milner 2009; Smith 2006).  Similar to Western states during the Cold War, 
Conté hosted Liberian refugees in order to underscore the failings of the Charles Taylor regime 
(Milner 2009, 158). Guinea’s poor diplomatic relations with Liberia made the government 
particularly eager to provide safe spaces for the Liberians United for Reconciliation and 
Democracy (LURD), the rebellion group against Charles Taylor. 
  The LURD became “the largest armed group in Southern Guinea in 2000-2004,” (159).  
Guinean officials also consistently stopped Liberian asylum-seekers at the border, and handed 
them over to the LURD (Human Rights Watch 2002).  The LURD eventually used asylum-
seekers to transport arms “up to 20 times before being allowed to seek asylum in Guinea” 
(Milner 2009, 151).  Guinea also allowed the LURD to use the Kouankan refugee camp as its 
rebel base (Human Rights Watch 2002).  Guinea breached international law it when allowed 
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refugee camps to be used a rebel base, and when it forced individuals to transfer arms. This 
shows part of Guinea’s true motives for hosting refugees from neighboring states.  Part of 
Guinea’s interest to take in refugees was to hopefully topple Charles Taylor and the Liberian 
government.  Guinea’s tense relations with Liberia provided strong incentives to host thousands 
of refugees, even after the government blamed the country’s violence on them.   
 Guinea engaged in a similar approach with Sierra Leonean refugees.  In 1991, the guerrilla unit 
known as The Revolutionary United Front (RUF), formed by Foday Saybana Sankoh and 
assisted by Charles Taylor, plagued Sierra Leone with terror and insecurity. Eventually, the RUF 
controlled most of Sierra Leone, and ousted the president, Ahmad Kabbah, in 1997 during a 
coupe.  Kabbah fled to Guinea.  Because of the RUF’s ties to Charles Taylor, the Guinean 
government was intent to host Kabbah, as well as individuals fleeing the Sierra Leonean civil 
war.   
  Guinea’s course of action with refugees from both Sierra Leone and Liberia illustrate the 
political motives behind its so-called open-door policy.  Hosting refugees from neighboring 
Liberia and Sierra Leone was “an important political statement for Conté” (Milner 2009, 158).  
Despite conflict and instability spilling over to Guinea, it did not restrict refugee hosting in terms 
of numbers, although it did with quality.  Guinea was not the only country to open its borders to 
refugees in order to show the deficiencies of rival states. However, the Guinean case exhibits the 
non-humanitarian motives for hosting refugees.  While Guinea did not directly engage in war 
with Liberia and Sierra Leone, there were diplomatic strains between Conté, Charles Taylor, and 
the new government formed under the RUF.  This case illustrates that poor diplomatic relations 
incentivized Conté to host refugees from rival states.  When bilateral relations between states are 
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tense, states will be more likely to provide asylum to individuals migrating from their enemy’s 
country.  The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Receiving states will be more likely to provide asylum to individuals fleeing rival states 
compared to non-rival states.   
 
 As mentioned earlier, the United States government used to give preferential treatment to 
Cubans compared to Haitian migrants (Hathaway 2005). Prior to the most recent easing of 
relations between the United States and Cuba, Cubans were allowed free access to U.S. territory, 
unlike Haitians who were often detained in Guantanamo Bay (239).   If Haitians reach U.S. soil, 
Hathaway (2005) claims they are often ineligible to receive bond for their release, and have their 
claims processed under the “ ‘expedited removal’ procedure, rather than under the usual refugee 
status assessment rules” (240).  As the Guinean case also shows, it is often in the best interests of 
states to grant asylum to individuals from rival states in order to show the deficiencies of rival 
states.   
2.4.2 Alliances 
  In the international relations literature, alliances are formal commitments where “certain 
specific obligations are written out” (Morrow 2000, 64). Normally, alliances are formed through 
treaties.  States join and form alliances for different purposes; however, it is often done to further 
military goals, such as in the case of war. Most of the alliance literature focuses on defense pacts 
(Morrow 2000), and whether alliances can deter or promote conflict between alliance member 
and non-member states.  For example, Leeds (2003) argues that the specific alliances between 
states will either deter war or initiate. Kenwick, Vasquez, and Powers (2015) find that alliances 
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deter or promote aggression depending on the pre or post nuclear era.  Vasquez (1993) argues 
alliances actually increase the likelihood of war.  Despite the mixed findings regarding alliances 
and conflict, alliance formation and maintaining these agreement obligations come at a cost.  
These costs outweigh granting asylum to individuals from allied states.  Potential host states do 
not wish to lose their international support by admitting refugees from allies (Moorthy and 
Braithwate 2016).   
  Alliance formation is one of the central topics in international relations.  The literature 
describes the different reasons why states form alliances.  One line of research describes alliance 
formation as the result of balancing power between states.  For example, states will join alliances 
in order to prevent themselves from being dominated by stronger ones (Morgenthau, Thompson, 
and Clinton 2005; Waltz 1979). Or they may balance depending their level of perceived threat 
from other states (Walt 1987). States may also bandwagon, and align with the state instigating 
the threat.  Besides warding off potential enemies, joining an alliance has benefits, such as the 
possibility of increasing military capabilities (Waltz 1979).   
  However, joining and forming alliances also entails costs, because states often have to 
bargain between their autonomy and security (Altfeld 1984; Morrow 1991; 2000), “with security 
defined as the ability to preserve the status quo and autonomy defined as the freedom to pursue 
changes in the status quo” (Morrow 2000, 65).  Morrow mentions alliances force their costs on 
other states, if not, states would join alliances more freely (65).  States sometimes intervene on 
behalf of another state if that state is attacked.  If not, this can also entail costs.  Audience costs 
may lessen the cost of intervention if a state fails to uphold its commitment to intervene (Morrow 
2000).  Fearon (1997) argues if countries do not come to the aid of another state when they claim 
they would, it can tarnish their reputations.  According to Altfeld (1984), states also lose some 
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autonomy when they join alliances, because many alliances “tend to tie nations more broadly to 
each other’s positions on relevant issues so that it becomes difficult for either party to adopt 
policy stands too different from those of its ally” (Altfeld 1984, 526).   
  Cooperation between states is largely observable through the formation of alliances and 
the signing of treaties. Although states form alliances as a consequence for security concerns, 
states lose a portion of autonomy when they do so.  Once in an alliance, if states do not adhere to 
their commitments, this can also entail costs.  The fact that states are willing to lose portions of 
their autonomy to reap the benefits of alliances also suggests strong relations between other 
alliance member states.  Despite this fact, outside of Moorthy and Braithwaite (2016), the forced 
migration literature largely ignores how alliances may deter refugee status determination and 
refugee hosting from other member states, which may suggest omitted variable bias.  For 
example, the section on trade below briefly mentions strong political and economic ties between 
China and North Korea has made China adamant with granting asylum to North Koreans.  China 
and North Korea both signed the “Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship 
Treaty,” which states that necessary actions will be taken to oppose any country (or countries) if 
either China or North Korea is attacked.  China has been under scrutiny for its deportations of 
North Korean defectors (Kumar 2012). This leads me to my next hypothesis: 
 
H2:  States will be more restricted in providing refugee recognition to asylum seekers from a 
sending state, if both states belong to an alliance compared to dyads that are not in similar pacts.  
 
 Whether states join alliances for security reasons or other intentions, and whether they do 
so to bandwagon or balance, formal alliances entail costs. Alliances are one type of commitment, 
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often in the form of treaties.  If this theory is correct, and alliances affect refugee status granting 
especially among Convention signatory states, then perhaps certain treaties matter more over 
others.   The costs of alliance membership might far exceed granting refugee recognition to 
asylum-seekers from member states.  Doing so may tarnish relations.  As a result, we should 
expect to find that refugee hosting would be less likely in dyads that are in similar pacts, as the 
Chinese-North Korean case suggests.  Greater political and commercial relationships among 
states will decrease asylum rates.  It is not in the best interest of states to admit individuals have a 
fear of persecution from allies, or with those in which they are trying to restore relations with.  
For example, with the most recent refugee crisis, Russia has not provided asylum to Syrians. 
This is not surprising given the positive diplomatic relations between Vladimir Putin and Bashar 
al-Assad.  Both in 2012 and 2013, zero percent of Syrian asylum-seekers were recognized by 
Russia.23  In 2015, Russia granted permanent asylum to only two Syrians (Luhn 2016).  Similar 
to Western states during the Cold War, the Guinean case suggests that governments will be more 
enticed to provide asylum to individuals fleeing enemy states. While the quantity of refugees 
increase, the quality of hosting decreases. On the contrary, if relations begin to open, asylum 
granting will be more difficult.  The costs of granting asylum will be greater, because it may 
strain relations between states.  
 Most studies have not provided multi-country, quantitative analyses on how alliances and 
rivalries affect refugee hosting. Although, a recent study by Moorthy and Brathwaite (2016) 
analyze how alliances and rivals affect refugee-hosting numbers their study uses refugee stock 
																																																								23	According to UNHCR statistics database numbers.  The rate was calculated by the author based on the refugee 
recognition formula seen in the methodology chapter.  First instance government applications by Syrian refugees in 
2013 were 68 pending since the beginning of the year, 1073 applied, 0 recognized, and 710 rejected.  In 2012, there 
were 8 pending since the beginning of the year, 197 applied, 0 recognized, and 137 rejected.	
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numbers as opposed to the actual asylum rates for their dependent variable.  Their use of this 
variable, and why this study uses asylum rates instead is explained in further detail in Chapter 3. 
2.4.3 Trade 
 Similar to diplomatic relations, bilateral trade also measure relations between states.  
Distinguishing from diplomatic relations; however, trade normally signals strong commercial 
ties.  States may have good diplomatic relations, but poor levels of trade with one another.  
Similarly, trade relations between countries may exist despite poor diplomatic relations between 
them.  For example, the United States is Venezuela’s top export destination, and most important 
trading partner.  However, there is currently no U.S. ambassador to Venezuela, and relations 
between the two countries are strained.   
 Despite this, states often wish to preserve their economic ties with other states. The 
international conflict literature, for example, suggests that trade and economic interdependence 
often reduces the likelihood of states engaging in conflict and militarized disputes with one 
another  (Gartzke and Li 2003; Hegre, Oneal, and Russett 2010; Mansfield 1994; Oneal and 
Russett 1997, 1999a; Oneal et al 1996).24  Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) argue states that are 
part of the same preferential trading agreements (PTAs),25 and engage in high levels of trade, are 
less likely to engaging in disputes with one another.  Gains from commercial ties dissuade states 
from engaging in conflict.  Conflict puts economic gains at risk, and burdens other PTA 
members (776).  
																																																								24	This is not without debate, though. Some scholars argue interdependence promotes conflict.  See Gilpin, Robert.  
1987.  The Political Economy of International Relations.  Princeton:  Princeton University Press; Kranser, Stephen 
D.  1976.  “State Power and the Structure of International Trade.”  World Politics 28: 317-47; Barbieri, Katherine.  
1996.  “Economic Interdependence:  A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?”  Journal of Peace 
Research 33(1): 29-49. 
25 Preferential trade agreements are trading blocs or pacts where participating countries receive preferential access to 
certain products.	
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 One explanation that describes how trade affects conflict regards opportunity costs.   
Opportunity costs refer to the benefits lost when choosing one alternative over the other.   
Opportunity costs may decrease the likelihood of war (Polachek and Xiang 2010).  Similar to 
Mansfield and Pevehouse’s findings with PTAs, conflict lessens gains from trade  (Russett and 
Oneal 2001). In other words, the economic benefits that states gain from trade increase the costs 
of engaging in conflict with other states. Therefore, states will not engage in conflict with trading 
partners, because the commercial benefits dissuades states from doing so. States also do not wish 
to interrupt their trade flows due to conflict.  Increases in economic wealth provide states with 
the incentives to cooperate and oppose militarized disputes.  States wish to preserve their 
economic improvements. Countries will attempt to avoid anything that interrupts or halts 
economic gains from trading partners. 
  A similar line of argument may be made regarding how trade affects refugee status 
recognition rates. Bilateral trade increases the opportunity costs of granting refugee status, even 
for Convention signatory states.  In other words, although states signed the 1951 Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol, economic incentives are stronger than compliance to human rights treaties.  
Consequently, trade can deter potential host states from accepting asylum-seekers from trading 
partners.  Comparable to alliances, states do not wish to tarnish their relationship with their 
trading partners.  Therefore, potential host states will be hesitant to admit that individuals from 
trading partner states have a well-founded fear of persecution. Granting asylum may anger 
government leaders from the sending states, and compromise commercial trade agreements.  The 
potential costs acquired by trade loss are far greater than denying asylum.   
Rosenblum and Salehyan (2004) argue, “the instrumental goals of asylum enforcement 
are a function of diplomatic, security, and economic relations” (681). As result, this view 
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“assumes that asylum enforcement seeks to preserve good relations with allies (i.e. by rejecting 
their refugees), [and] to weaken opponents (i.e. by accepting refugees)” (681).  They find asylum 
enforcement during the post-Cold War years in the United States favored preventing 
undocumented immigration from trade partners (693), and argue the United States seeks to 
preserve their good relations with their trading partners (686).  
However, despite the fact bilateral trade may influence asylum enforcement, outside of 
Rosenblum and Salehyan (2004), most forced migration research ignores this variable and its 
potential effect on refugee status determination. As the conflict literature suggests, economic 
interdependence influences state policy choices.  Economic interdependence should also affect 
asylum policies.  Therefore, the omission of trade as a potential independent variable in the 
asylum literature is puzzling. Multi-country analyses have not thoroughly explored how bilateral 
trade affects asylum granting, although empirical cases support the theory.  For example, Mexico 
signed a free trade agreement with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador known as the 
“Mexico-Northern Triangle Free Trade Agreement” in 2001.26 In 2013, Mexico rejected 77.77 
percent of Guatemalan asylum claims at the first instance, and 52.5 percent in 2012.27 In the 
beginning of 2015, deportations from the Central America’s Northern Triangle in Mexico were 
up by 79 percent (Arce 2015).  Similar trends are observed in Asia.  Strong political and 
economic ties between China and North Korea often prevent China from granting asylum to 
North Koreans (Hathaway 2005, 242).  Nepal uses similar measures with Tibetans, often sending 
Buddhist monks and nuns back to China, where later many of them end up detained (Hathaway 
2005, 280).  Nepal’s strict stance on Tibetan asylum-seekers is probably due to increases in 																																																								26	Mexico is Guatemala’s second-largest import partner.  See the CIA’s World Factbook Guatemala Profile 
Economy Overview https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gt.htm 27	According to UNHCR statistics database numbers.  The rate was calculated based on the refugee recognition 
formula seen in the methodology section. Author’s own calculations.	
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commercial and political ties with China.   In the Middle East, the Yemeni government often 
treats Ethiopian migrants differently compared to migrants from Somalia (Betts 2013).  The 
Yemeni government, particularly under the Saleh regime, strived to improve economic and 
security relations with Ethiopia. As a result, authorities in Yemen expressed hostility towards 
Ethiopians arriving in Yemen, and often treated them more harshly compared to Somalis.   
 The international conflict literature argues that states engaged in more trade with one 
another have higher costs if they engage in conflict (Polachek and Seiglie 2006). Strong 
economic relations should also have similar effects with refugee status recognition. Opportunity 
costs from trade may deter asylum.  States wish to preserve their economic interests and relations 
with other states.  Thus, gains from trade outweigh the likelihood of positive refugee status 
determination.  As trade increases, the gains become greater, as the costs of granting asylum.  
Asylum may strain warm relations between states and jeopardize commercial interdependence. 
Thus, I argue the following:  
 
H3A: As trade increases between the receiving and sending state, the receiving state  will be more 
resistant in providing asylum to individuals from the sending  state. 
H3B:  Countries that trade with one another will be less likely to grant asylum to individuals 
from the sending state, compared to dyads that do not trade with one another.   
 
  Asylum rates should decrease when trade flows begin to increase.  These arguments also 
help to explain the economic determinants of asylum. As the international conflict literature 
shows, opportunity costs from trade can often decrease the likelihood of states engaging in 
militarized disputes with one another.  The cases of Nepal, China, and Yemen also denote the 
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likelihood that bilateral trade plays in preventing asylum. As a result, increases in trade reduce 
positive asylum rates.   
2.5 Domestic Politics  
 Refugee hosting and asylum rates are also a function of domestic politics.  It is easy to 
presume democracies may be more accommodating to refugees, and show greater concern to 
vulnerable populations, compared to autocratic states.  However, democracies may also exhibit 
stricter stances on both regular immigration and forced migration. Democracies have greater 
audience costs than autocracies.  Similarly, voters may show discontent with refugee 
populations, such as by deeming refugees as an economic burden or security threat.  As a result, 
democratic leaders bound by routine elections will be more likely to enforce harsher asylum 
policies, reducing refugee recognition rates.  In contrast, autocratic leaders may use refugee 
populations as an incentive to build greater international credibility. For example, for autocracies 
that have been criticized for human rights abuses at home, refugee hosting may offset this 
criticism. More so, autocratic leaders are able to host refugee populations without the threat of 
losing power during elections.   
 This section examines how regime-type and proximity to elections affects refugee 
hosting and asylum rates.  It argues that autocracies are more likely to welcome refugees 
compared to non-autocracies. Similarly, democracies are less likely to grant asylum compared to 
non-democracies.  Routine elections also prevent democracies from engaging in more open 
asylum, especially when voters have negative sentiments towards refugee populations. African 
countries in particular became more restricted with asylum as they shifted from one-party 
autocracies to multiparty democracies.  Proximity to elections also affects asylum rates.  
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Elections provide added pressure to reduce asylum.  Therefore, asylum rates will be lower 
overall during election years compared to non-election years.   
2.5.1 Regime-Type 
 Theoretically, we might assume democracies will engage in more open-door asylum 
policies compared to autocracies.  Liberal states are likely to engage in expansionist approaches 
towards “unwanted immigration,” because doing so is a characteristic of liberal ideals (Joppke 
1998).  However, democracies can hold restrictive approaches towards forced and voluntary 
migration.  Liberal stances on immigration can lead to disapproval among voters. Often, the 
public has negative views on immigration  (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Cornelius and 
Rosenblum 2005; Saggar 2003; Schlueter, Mueleman, and Davidov 2013).  For example, 
immigrants are sometimes considered to be an economic threat by the public.  Likewise, 
individuals view migration as a security, cultural, or political risk in host states (Ullah 2014).  
While individuals living in autocracies may be just as discontent with unwanted immigration, 
democratic leaders bear greater domestic audience costs due to routine elections.  As a result, 
greater levels of accountability and electoral constraints force democratic states to further restrict 
asylum policies towards refugees and asylum-seekers (Jacobsen 1996, 671). Furthermore, 
democratic governments may place restrictions on UNHCR agency workers in charge of 
overseeing asylum cases.  In retrospect, autocratic leaders might also view immigration and 
refugees just as negatively as their democratic counterparts.  However, if it is within the interests 
for autocratic leaders to host refugees, the lack of routine elections and domestic accountability 
will allow leaders to do so without any significant opposition.   
 In analyzing global migration flows, Breunig, Cao, Luedtke (2012) argue political 
leadership affects immigration (827).  Democratic elections place constraints on policy choices. 
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In democracies there is a push for border closures and control, as well as deportation measures 
due to public xenophobia (830).  Their results find strong support for democratic regimes 
blocking overall immigration entry, and being less accommodating towards immigration 
compared to autocracies.    However, Breunig, Cao, and Luedtke (2012) do not analyze asylum-
seeker or refugee flows.  Some argue there is a difference in public perception between regular 
migration and refugees where individuals are more sympathetic towards the latter.  Salehyan and 
Rosenblum (2008) observe U.S. asylum approval rates.  They argue asylum decisions are not 
“immune from non-humanitarian factors” (114).  However, they also claim the American public 
recognizes the importance of humanitarian factors, and are more sensitive to the plight of 
vulnerable people, dependent on the nature of immigration and asylum at the time (108).  Most 
importantly, “presidents do not enforce asylum policy unfettered, but are constrained in various 
ways by popular and congressional ‘principals’” (114).  Presidents may be under pressure to 
accept refugee populations or deny them.  
 In this context, it may be safe to assume that there are differences between how the public 
overall views immigration versus refugees.  In other words, while public opinion may lean 
towards strict policies on immigration, they might hold different opinions with refugees or other 
vulnerable migrants.  However, this is often not the case.  Pew Research archival polls found that 
the American public has not been particularly welcoming towards refugees (DeSilver 2015). Pew 
Research found 55% of those polled in 1958 disapproved of a plan to let 65,000 Hungarian 
refugees to come to the United States.  In regards to the Indochinese in 1979, 62% disapproved a 
plan of the U.S. government to admit 14,000 Indochinese a month.  Seventy-one percent of 
Americans disapproved of the U.S. allowing Cuban refugees to settle in 1980, but 66 % 
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approved of ethnic Albanians entering the country in 1999.  With the exception of the Kosovo 
conflict, Americans had disapproved of plans to let refugees into the United States by a majority.  
 Case studies have not only proven public hostility towards refugees, but have shown that 
democratization affected asylum policies especially in African states.  Rutinwa (1999) argues 
that democratization in Africa led government leaders to start taking public opinion into account 
when determining refugee policies.  For example, Tanzania had an “open door” policy, and 
hosted many refugees for decades.  However, Tanzania’s hospitality shifted towards more closed-
door, restrictive policies after the country democratized (Betts 2013; Milner 2009).  Tanzania 
even closed its border with Burundi in 1995.  Rutinwa (1999) claims Tanzania’s border closure 
was partly due to its transformation into a multiparty democracy.   
 On the contrary, autocratic leaders, and leaders without any political opposition, also 
affect the quantity of immigration (Breunig, Cao, Luedtka 2012, 827).  Milner (2009) remarks 
that despite a decline in donor commitments and growing concerns among the public with the 
refugee community in Guinea, the government generally engaged in open asylum policies.  The 
Guinean state’s policies were a result of the president’s monopoly of power “in the absence of 
any meaning political opposition” (160).28 Although refugees are often seen as a burden, 
autocratic states may use refugee hosting as a positive incentive.  Autocracies often must 
establish credibility at the international level, and refugee hosting may provide autocracies with 
such credibility.  For example, autocratic leaders with human rights abuse records may use 
refugee hosting in order to counterbalance neglecting human rights at home.   This leads to the 
following hypotheses:  
 																																																								28	It is important to note that since Milner’s publication, Guinea held their first democratic elections for the first 
time in over 50 years in 2010.	
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H4A:  Autocracies are more likely than non-autocracies to grant asylum.  
H4B: Democracies are less likely than non-democracies to grant asylum.  
H4C:  As levels of democratization increase in a state, asylum granting in that state will decrease.   
 
 When nations democratize, leaders must begin to take into account public opinion more 
seriously unlike in autocracies.  If autocracies believe refugee hosting provides benefits, they can 
often do so without the expense of substantial backlash from the public.  However, autocracies in 
particular should have greater incentives to host refugees and provide asylum compared to 
democracies.  Due to the negative views that voters have towards immigration and refugees, 
coupled with routine executive and legislative elections, democracies should be overall less 
likely to grant asylum and host refugees compared to non-democracies. Autocracies should be 
overall more likely to grant asylum compared to non-autocracies.   
2.5.2 Proximity to Elections 
 National elections also affect the pressure to implement more austere asylum policies, 
lower refugee recognition rates, and constrain international agencies, such as the UNHCR.   As 
the section on regime-type shows, voters often see migrants as threats, including refugees.  
Hopkins (2010) finds communities currently undergoing large immigration flows drive hostile 
political reactions to immigration.  Individuals often see migrants under a negative light, due to 
possible competition in the labor force.  Using the National Election Studies (NES) surveys, 
Scheve and Slaughter (2001) find low-skilled workers in particular are more likely to be opposed 
to immigration, because of potential economic threat.  Hopkins (2010) and Scheve and Slaughter 
(2001) show the importance of immigration policy preference by the public. And in light of 
recent events, immigration dominated most debates prior to the United Kingdom European 
	 43	
Union membership referendum. The cases of Tanzania and Kenya show that deportations and 
border closures often occurred around national elections.  Negative public sentiment on 
foreigners and refugees influence public leaders to pass more restrictive asylum policies, such as 
in Tanzania. More so, the Kenyan case exhibits how the president of Kenya exploited local 
grievances around election years against refugee populations in order to defend deportations. 
This section demonstrates how election cycles affect refugee populations. 
  The Burundian civil war in 1993 sent thousands of refugees and asylum-seekers to 
neighboring Tanzania and Rwanda.  Citing security concerns, Tanzania closed its border with 
Burundi in 1995 and in 1996. Tanzania, once one of the most generous refugee hosting nations in 
the region, became one of the most restricted.  According to a Human Rights Watch (1999) 
report it was easy for the Tanzanian government to make sweeping accusations against refugees 
for crimes in western Tanzania.  Although both Tanzanians and refugees committed crimes in the 
region, public opinion in Tanzania commonly depicted refugees as criminals and the root of 
insecurity in Tanzania. The Human Rights Watch report states some of these accusations were 
inconsistent, as many Burundians were also at risk of crime if they left their camps, due to rebel 
activity in Tanzania. However, accusations increased xenophobia, which provided the Tanzanian 
government justification for strict asylum policies (Human Rights Watch 1999).  Alongside these 
security concerns, border closures were also the result of Tanzania’s first multiparty elections in 
1995 (Loescher and Milner 2005, 34).  It is probable the Tanzanian government used public 
xenophobia and its first election cycle to close their borders, and round-up Burundian refugees 
due to public pressure. Elected officials in Tanzania want to remain in power, and when public 
opinion turned against the refugees, refugee policies displayed such sentiments (Veney 2004).   
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 In Kenya, the government rounded up urban refugees, many of who were Somalis, in 
August 1992 and 1993, as well as in July 1997 (Hyndman 2000).  The refugees were then 
transferred to refugee camps in remote areas of Kenya or around the border.  The Kenyan 
government wanted to protect central Kenya from a “Somali invasion,” and also prevented 
UNHCR from settling refugees in central Kenya (51).  Hyndman’s example does not particularly 
examine refugee recognition rates; however, constraints placed on UNHCR by the Kenyan 
government should be further analyzed.  It is probable the roundups may have been the result of 
Kenyan general elections. Kenya held elections in 1992 and 1993. For example, shortly after the 
Kenyan president’s (Daniel arap Moi) reelection in December 1992, he openly declared Somalis 
would be sent back to Somalia, a similar statement he made previously in August of that year 
(Hyndman 2000, 51-52).29  Kenya and Somalia have a long history of adverse relations, and Moi 
exploited the tensions of Kenyans prior and after his reelection.  For many years, refugees in 
Kenya had access to free health care and education, among other services, in contrast to the 
average Kenyan who does not.  The Kenyan government at the time used the grievances of 
Kenyans to their advantage in order to defend the deportation rounds (Loescher and Milner 2005, 
42).30 
Furthermore, a Human Rights Watch Report (2009) states the Kenyan government closed 
their border in 2007, began deporting Somalis back to Somalia, and detained new arrivals unless 
they paid a bribe.  The same report also mentions the Kenyan government forced the closure of 
an UNHCR registration center near the border.  Kenya went against both national and 
international law regarding refugees, breaching the principle of non-refoulement.  Somali 
																																																								
29 Daniel arap Moi served as Kenya’s president from 1978-2002. 
30 It is important to mention that currently the Kenyan government feels that it is under security threat by Somalis.  
In fact, there are recent talks about closing the Dadaab operation camps.  However, the argument still holds in that 
public opinion also affects asylum policies.	
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migrants do pose a security issue in Kenya; however, Kenya also held national elections in 
December 2007.  Roundups and deportations within proximity to national elections are not 
unique to only Tanzania and Kenya.  National elections provide strong incentives for government 
elites to implement harsher policies towards refugees and asylum-seekers.  In fact, they may 
even provide motives for governments to go against international laws and norms.  Proximity to 
elections may also lure governments to restrain UNHCR’s capacity to work.  The Kenyan case in 
particular displays how states restrict international agency workers around elections.  States are 
the main force behind international law, despite being regional and international convention 
signatories.   
The above discussions leads to the following hypothesis:  
 
H5. In the year of a national or executive election, overall asylum rates will be lower compared 
to non-election years. 
 
 Similar to autocratic leaders, democratic leaders wish to remain in power.  Elections put 
pressure on government elites to adhere public opinion.  In the case of refugees, public opinion is 
often negative, and government leaders, such as in Kenya, often exploit tensions to secure 
positive election results.  However, in order to satisfy voters and maintain power, it is expected 
that there will be lower asylum rates in election years compared to non-election years.  
2.6 Conclusion  
Most scholarly works have not quantitatively examined how politics drives refugee status 
granting.  The majority of the works presented in this chapter are case studies or regional 
focused.  In the case of trade, most forced migration studies have not examined how economic 
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interests between the host state and the sending state affect refugee status granting.  Rosenblum 
and Salehyan (2004) inspect how commercial interests affect asylum; however, their study only 
focuses on the United States.  Similar to Rosenblum and Salehyan (2004), this study also 
measures the log of total bilateral trade in the dyad across multiple countries. Most studies have 
also ignored how rivals and alliances affect refugee status granting.  A recent study by Moorthy 
and Braithwaite (2016) analyze how the relationship between the host and sending state affect a 
state’s willingness to host refugees depending on their country of origin.  While, their study 
examines the effect of these variables across a large temporal space (for the years 1951-2008) for 
directed-dyads, their dependent variable uses refugee stock numbers and not actual asylum rates.  
The next chapter explains why this variable is not an optimal choice. 
Regimes and their effects on asylum granting have not been thoroughly examined.  
Breunig, Cao, and Luedtke (2012) assess how regimes affect global migration movements.  
However, their study focuses on general migration and not forced migration.  More so, their 
study only analyzes migration for the 2000 round of census.  With regards to proximity of 
elections, research has not quantitatively investigated how elections may affect asylum rates.  
Some studies have researched how refugees or migration affect elections (Dustmann, Vasiljeva, 
and Damm 2016).  Similarly, last year’s Brexit vote implies that immigration was extremely 
salient in determining the referendum vote. However, it is just as imperative to study how 
elections may affect refugee recognition rates.  Most works describing how elections affect 
refugee hosting have been case studies. It is imperative to understand if these trends can be 
expanded across case studies.    
These works and empirical evidence suggest that domestic politics and bilateral relations 
between states do affect refugee hosting and asylum granting in states.  The following chapter 
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will describe the methodological approach to this study in detail.  Given the nature of the study 
and research questions, two things must be taken into account.  The first regards the directed-
dyad year unit of analysis.  As Chapter Three will describe, using the directed-dyad unit of 
analysis implies non-independence across cases.  Secondly, the dependent variable is a rate (later 
converted as a proportion). Both the unit of analysis and the dependent variable must be taken 
into consideration in the methodology.  Chapter Three will explain the variables chosen for the 
study, as well as describe in detail the reasoning behind choosing a fractional proportional model. 
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Chapter Three:  Research Design  
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
  The purpose of this study is to examine how politics affect state responses to forced 
migrants. Specifically, this research analyzes how the domestic politics of the host state, and its 
relations with the sending state, affect refugee recognition rates.  While asylum claims should be 
processed based on evidence and merits, empirical cases suggest that external factors also 
influence refugee status recognition as described in Chapter Two.  Therefore, this investigation 
seeks to examine if there are variations in asylum granting dependent on the domestic politics of 
the host state, and the bilateral relations between the sending and host states. This chapter 
describes the research design used to conduct the analysis for the hypotheses presented in the 
previous chapter.  In order to test the hypotheses, the data are gathered from all temporal and 
spatial domains possible.   
The following sections describe the research design in detail.  First, the chapter begins 
with the unit of analysis used in this study.  Because individuals can migrate from Country A to 
Country B, as well as from Country B to Country A, directed-dyad years are used.  Next, the 
chapter defines the variables used for the study beginning with the dependent variable.  In order 
to measure asylum rates, the main dependent variable of interest are refugee recognition rates.  
This rate measures the number of successful decisions (refugee status granted) in the dyad for 
that year.  Refugee recognition rates are also known as “Convention status,” meaning those 
individuals who are recognized as refugees under the 1951 Convention.  Additionally, the total 
recognition rates pools those who have Convention status and/or those who have protection on a 
humanitarian or temporary status, often known as “complementary protection.” While there is no 
explicit definition for complementary protection, it is generally used as a form of protection for 
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those who fall outside of the 1951 Convention framework.   Complementary and other forms of 
protection result in lower forms of protection and rights compared to full Convention status 
(McAdam 2006, 11).  More so, states sometimes prefer to provide other forms of protection for 
those that may qualify for refugee status in order to avoid the obligations they must undertake 
when providing Convention status (McAdam 2006, 3).  In analyzing asylum rates in Western 
Europe, Neumayer (2005a) finds that granting full-Convention status (refugee status 
recognition), and other forms of protection and Convention status (total recognition rates) vary, 
and lack convergence. While this dissertation does not examine complementary protection in the 
literature review, it is included as a separate dependent variable (“Total Recognition Rates”) for 
robustness checks in order to inspect if other forms of lesser protection are being granted instead 
of full Convention status.   Section 3.3.1 explains why rates are chosen as the main dependent 
variable, as opposed to the standard refugee stock variables. 
Next, the chapter describes the main independent variables of interest plus the control 
variables.  Finally, the chapter explains the estimating equation used for this study.  When 
choosing which regression to use in order to test the hypotheses, there were two things to 
consider.  First, the unit of analysis is directed-dyad year.  When directed dyad-years are used, 
statistical independence becomes jeopardized because the same dyad must be used twice.  
Second, the dependent variable is a rate, which means that it is bound between 0-100, or between 
zero and one as a proportion.  However, the values may also be equal to zero or one.  Therefore, 
this study incorporates the generalized estimating equation. Specifically, it utilizes the fractional 
response model (Papke and Wooldridge 1996).  The chapter concludes with a short summary. 
3.2 Unit of Analysis 
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 The unit of analysis is directed-dyad year where State i is the host state (the state which 
grants or denies asylum) and State j is the country of origin for asylum-seekers. Non-directed 
dyads have only one case per year, for example: 
United States Canada 2000 
 
However, a directed-dyad analysis will have two cases: 
 
United States Canada 2000 
Canada United States 2000 
 
 Directed-dyads allow for different outcomes in both directions (Bennett and Stam 2004, 
47).  For example, given that migrants can flow from the United States to Canada, and from 
Canada to the United States, directed-dyads are necessary for migration studies.  This study only 
includes dyads that have a history of asylum-seekers from Statej seeking asylum in Statei.  Since 
this research seeks to understand the political motives for granting asylum, this can only be 
analyzed if there is a history of individuals seeking asylum from Statej to Statei.  For example, 
according to the UNHCR database, no one from Uruguay applied for asylum in the United Arab 
Emirates during 2000-2013. Therefore, this dyad was excluded.  However, Uruguayans have 
applied for asylum across South America, Europe, and Oceania. If asylum-seekers from Statej 
applied at least once in Statei, these dyads were included in the analyses.31  
 Moore and Shellman (2007) examine what motivates refugees to seek refuge in one 
country versus another. The authors remind us that there are often two approaches to take when 
using directed-dyads. The researcher either includes all directed dyads or only relevant dyads 
																																																								31	As a form of robustness check, dyads in which there was only one year of movement from the sending to host 
state were dropped.  The results did not affect the significance or the directionality.  These results are provided in the 
appendices.   	
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(Moore and Shellman 2007, 819).32 Moore and Shellman (2007) also mention the work by 
Lemke and Reed (2001).  Lemke and Reed (2001) study the potential costs behind case 
selections.  They find possible measurement errors and selection bias when selecting cases in 
dyads; however, the errors and bias are “small and substantively unimportant” (141). They also 
“find little to no evidence that such error or bias leads to erroneous estimation” (Lemke and Reed 
2001, 140-141).   The recent work of Moorthy and Brathwaite (2016) include all possible dyads.  
As a result, Moorthy and Brathwaite’s data contain excessive zeros, because no refugees left the 
country or origin, or the host state did not receive refugees (8). In order to account for the 
excessive zeros, Moorthy and Brathwaite (2016) use a zero inflated binomial regression in order 
to distinguish between true and false zeros (8).33  However, as mentioned below in Section 3.3.1, 
this can be problematic.  UNHCR’s refugee data only includes values for countries that have a 
refugee population of at least one.  An unpublished paper by Marbach (2016) stresses that there 
is no way to distinguish in UNHCR’s database between missing values and a value of zero (7).  
Section 3.3.1 also explains that the dependent variable for this research is a rate; therefore, a 
value of zero means zero asylum cases were successful for that year. In other words, these cases 
were rejected. A value of zero therefore has meaning, and this research cannot pool both missing 
values and zeros together.  More so, including all dyads for this research will emphasize Maoz 
and Russett’s (1993) point of incorporating “irrelevant” dyads (627).  Furthermore, asylum-
seekers are individuals that request or apply for asylum.  This study investigates what are the 
political determinants of asylum granting.  Asylum cannot be granted or denied unless an 
																																																								32		In Moore and Shellman (2007), this regards directed-dyads where the country of origin produces refugees.  
Given their research question, their study includes all potential host countries in their sample.  However, they 
include country pairs if the sending state produces a refugee flow for that year in the second stage.  If the sending 
state did not produce any refugees in a given year, the country pairs were excluded.  See footnote seven on page 813 
and page 820 (Moore and Shellman (2007).  	33	Zero-inflated binomial regressions are used when there are two kinds of zeros-true and excessive.  
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individual applies for asylum first.  As a result, this study only includes dyads where there is a 
history of applying for asylum from Statej to Statei. In order to account for possible errors that 
may result in using dyads, this study uses a sandwich-type estimator as explained in Section 
3.6.2.   
  The analyses are done across the following five samples:  the full base model, host states 
that are signatories of 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol, non-signatory states, contiguous 
states, and non-contiguous states.  Host states that are signatories may be more likely to grant 
asylum compared to non-signatory states, because they may be more likely to adhere to treaties 
and international law.  However, some of the world’s important refugee populations are located 
in non-signatory states, such as in Asia and in the Middle East. Most individuals are likely to 
migrate to neighboring states. Figures 3 and 4 show that most of the world’s refugees are located 
in the Global South. Likewise, many individuals have sought asylum in non-contiguous states, 
particularly in wealthier host states, such as Afghan asylum-seekers in Australia. For these 
reasons, these extra four models are included in the study.  This is also further discussed in 
Section 3.6.1.  
3.3 Variables 
3.3.1 Dependent Variable:  Refugee Recognition Rates  
  To test the hypotheses, I perform statistical analysis of asylum rates from 2000-2013.  
The data are from the UNHCR’s population statistics for asylum-seekers and refugee status 
determination. UNHCR began providing data on asylum-seekers and refugee status 
determination in 2000. While there are data for 2014 and 2015, at the time of this writing, 
numerical values for the years are still missing in order to protect asylum-seekers’ anonymity. 
Therefore, the only years available are from 2000-2013.  The data contain figures regarding how 
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many individuals applied for asylum, how many applications are pending, the number of those 
that received Convention (positive decision) status, those that received protection status on a 
temporary or humanitarian basis, the number of rejections in the host state, and those that were 
“otherwise closed.”	The UNHCR population database breaks down decisions by first instance 
applications (FI), appeal, review, and others.34  UNHCR recommends pooling all procedure 
levels in order to calculate the refugee recognition rates (RRR) for that country.35  
The data also break down which entity analyzed the asylum cases—the government, 
UNHCR, or jointly.		This research analyzes all three cases in order to examine if politics drives 
asylum at the government level, and if it influences UNHCR’s asylum processes. Again, all 
entities were pooled together if necessary.36 There is no general consensus with regards to 
calculating refugee recognition rates.  However, UNHCR calculates refugee recognition rates by 
dividing the total number of asylum seekers granted full Convention status, by the total number 
of accepted (full Convention status and complementary status where applicable), and rejected 
cases.37 	
1  𝑅𝑅𝑅! = 𝐶𝑅!"!!!!𝐶𝑅!" + 𝐻𝑅!" + 𝑅𝐽!"!!!!  
Where CR is the number of refugees recognized under the 1951 Convention, HR is the number 
of asylum seekers granted refugee status on a temporary/humanitarian basis, and RJ denotes the 
																																																								
34 For a complete break down please refer to UNHCR’s population database at 
http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern.  And http://www.unhcr.org/42b0191c4.pdf pp. 73-75. For general 
glossary on asylum terms see http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Asylum_decision 35	Personal email exchange with UNHCR information officer, Htun Zaw Oo.	
36 In most states RSD is determined solely by states or UNHCR, or jointly if needed.  However, as mentioned in 
footnote 35, UNHCR recommends pooling all procedure levels and entities together if needed in order to analyze 
the refugee recognition rates that year in that dyad. 
37 Complementary protection refers to the obligation for states to protect individuals who do not necessarily fall 
under Convention status, but who are otherwise in need of protection for violation of human rights in their countries. 
of origins. 
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number of rejected cases.  C denotes the country of origin and y is the year of reference.38  
Similar to Neumayer (2005a), these rates measure the rate of successful decisions, not the rate of 
successful applications.  As Neumayer (2005a) notes, many asylum claims are not decided in the 
same year they are filed. The dependent variable “refugee recognition rate” (RRRijt) is defined as 
the percentage of individuals granted full refugee status recognition recognized under the 
Convention.  The refugee recognition rates were calculated based on UNHCR’s refugee 
recognition rate equation.  Because the dependent variable is a rate, it is bounded by zero and 
one hundred. The rate is then converted to a proportion, bounded by zero and one.   
This research also departs from works that use refugee stock variables as the dependent 
variable, such as the recent work analyzing alliances and rivalries by Moorthy and Braithwaite 
(2016).  Although UNHCR also breaks down refugee population numbers by dyads similar to 
refugee recognition data, existing yearly refugee population stock numbers do not capture flows 
of people. Another issue with this variable regards excessive zeros. Moorthy and Braithwaite 
(2016) claim that their refugee stock dependent variable produced excessive zeros, and opt for a 
zero-inflated negative binomial regression.  They claim that the disproportionate zeros are due to 
the sending state not producing any refugees in a given year, or because the host state did not 
receive them (8). However, there are criticisms with regards to zero values in refugee stock 
numbers from UNHCR.  An unpublished paper by Marbach (2016) specifically examines this 
issue. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data on refugee stock 
numbers do not report zeros and missing values. In other words, data are only provided if there is 
																																																								
38 See Chapter IV in UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2009 with reference to page 38. 
http://www.unhcr.org/4ce531e09.pdf and “Measuring Forced Displacement in Industrialized Countries: Data 
Sources, Methods and Challenges in Estimating Refugee and Asylum Seeker Numbers” by Khassoum Diallo, with 
reference to slide number 11. 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/meetings/egm/migrationegm06/DOC%2024%20UNHCR%20Kdiallo_NY_d
ec2006r.ppt 
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a refugee population of at least one in a host state in a given year.  As Marbach (2016) also 
stresses, this leaves researchers in a precarious situation where they must decide how to code 
missing values.  Researchers either code the missing refugee stock numbers as zeros or 
interpolate and extrapolate the missing values (Marbach 2016, 3).   
There are other issues with missing values with UNHCR’s refugee stock numbers.  
Marbach (2016) also claims that missing stock numbers are due to idiosyncratic reporting of 
UNHCR, especially during the Cold War years, which contain several missing values (19). 
While this study does not include the Cold War years, Moorthy and Braithwaite (2016)’s study 
of alliances and rivals on refugee hosting does. Moreover, as Marbach also stresses, there is no 
information on the forced migrants’ home countries before 1960. Moorthy and Braithwaite’s 
study begins in 1951. Therefore, we should be slightly skeptical with regards to the results of 
their study given the usage of the refugee stock numbers.  Due to these issues, this research uses 
asylum rates as the dependent variable.  Asylum rates better capture state interests than actual 
refugee population stock numbers. Also, a value of zero with asylum rates denote refugee status 
recognition rate of zero. The rates are specifically calculated based on equation 1 (and equation 2 
below).   
After calculating the rates for the dyads, often times the rates are depicted as “missing.”  
However, missing values for asylum rates are not necessarily missing. Rather, the numbers do 
not exist in order to calculate the rates. They are not real missing values. Therefore, standard 
approaches for undertaking missing values will not work. Specifically, this occurs when the only 
decisions made that year were “otherwise closed.”  In other words, the total decisions that year 
were neither granted nor denied status, but merely closed for other reasons (or still pending).  
Otherwise closed generally denotes no substantive decisions were made.  Otherwise closed is 
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also ambiguous in meaning. However, one example for “otherwise closed” regards if the 
migrants did not show up for their interviews (UNHCR 2007, 48).  This can also mean the 
migrants have left.  Therefore, these are not real missing values in that the values were not 
recorded, and thus, missing.  It is that the substantive decisions were not made and therefore, the 
decisions are not made for that year. However, because the dependent variable is a rate, we 
cannot code these “missing” values as zero. As mentioned earlier, asylum rates here give us the 
rate of “successful decisions.” As a result, a value of “zero” means no asylum granted, 
specifically, it means zero percent asylum granted.  Finally, because past year’s asylum rates 
may affect future years, the asylum rates are lagged for one year (t-1).  
3.3.2 Total Recognition Rates 
 This research will also include separate analysis for total recognition rates (TRRijt), which 
include both full refugee status protection and other forms of protection, often called 
“complementary protection.”  The rates are calculated similarly to the refugee recognition 
rates.39   
2  𝑇𝑅𝑅! = (𝐶𝑅!"!!!! + 𝐻𝑅!")𝐶𝑅!" + 𝐻𝑅!" + 𝑅𝐽!"!!!!  
Complementary protection regards forms of protection where individuals are at risk for human 
rights violations in their countries of origin; however, these individuals do not qualify as 
refugees with full Convention status. Therefore, these forms of protection do not afford 
individuals the same rights as full Convention status.  Complementary protection has also been 
on the rise (Dicker and Mansfield 2012), thus, it is imperative to also include total recognition 
rates. As mentioned at the introduction, this research does not particularly analyze the 
complementary protection. However, this study will also examine when total recognition rates 																																																								
39 Please reference footnote 38.  
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are more likely to be determined in order to see if lesser forms of protection are being 
implemented in lieu of full Convention status recognition.  Further analysis of the findings of 
total recognition rates will be discussed in Chapter Five.   
3.4 Independent Variables  
3.4.1 Bilateral Relations Rivals 
 The main independent variables for alliances and rivals regard the presence of rivalries 
and military alliances in the dyad.  I create a dummy variable if a rivalry exists in a dyad 
(RIVALRYijt).  Aligning with the recent research of Moorthy and Brathwaite (2016), this 
research uses data from Thompson and Dreyer (2011).40  Thompson and Dreyer (2011) define 
rival states as two states that “categorize each other as threatening competitors in international 
politics” (1).  Thompson and Dreyer (2011) then categorize rivals according to four types of 
issues (21).  Spatial issues regard states contesting territorial control.  In positional issues, states 
contest their influence over a regional or global system.  Ideological issues regard when states 
contest different belief systems.  Finally, states may impose on the affairs of other states to 
reduce threat, or influence the decisions of other states (Thompson and Dreyer 2011, 21). Values 
are available for years up to 2010.  Rivalry is coded as “one” if both states were rivals for the 
given years; however, this study does not distinguish between the four issues defined by 
Thompson and Dreyer (2011). It is hypothesized that the host state will be more likely to grant 
asylum to asylum-seekers from the sending state if a rivalry exists.  
3.4.2 Bilateral Relations Alliances 
																																																								
40 The rivalry data provided by Klein, Goertz, Diehl (2006) are only provided until 2001.  	
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I hypothesize that when host states41 and sending states have positive, friendly relations, 
the host state will be less likely to grant asylum to asylum-seekers from the sending state.  I 
construct a dummy variable coded as “one” if alliances are represented in the dyad in a given 
year (ALLIANCESijt).  However, similar to Moore and Shellman (2007) and Moorthy and 
Brathwaite (2016) non-aggression pacts were excluded.  Non-aggression pacts are dissimilar 
compared to other pacts (Moore and Shellman 2007). Non-aggression pacts pledge states not to 
use force with one another.  This is in contrast to neutrality pacts where signatories must refrain 
from supporting adversaries if an alliance member engages in military conflict with another state 
(Leeds 2003, 430). Nonaggression pacts do not necessarily yield to affinity between states. In 
order to obtain values across the largest temporal and spatial realm possible, the data are 
obtained from the Correlates of War Formal Alliances dataset (v4.1.) (Gibler 2009).42  
3.4.3 Bilateral Relations Log of Total Trade 
In order to explore if increases in trade lead to less asylum granting, I also include a 
variable with the log of total trade between the host and sending states (LOGTRADEijt). 
Similarly, the log of the total trade between two countries is also obtained by the Correlates of 
War Project Bilateral Trade dataset (v4.0).   The total trade values are obtained by adding both 
flow1 and flow2. The total trade values between two countries are obtained and then logged.  
3.4.4 Bilateral Relations Trade Exchange 
The second main independent variable for trade (EXCHANGEijt) is a dummy variable 
indicating if both states engaged in trade with one another.  The data are obtained from the 
Correlates of War Project Bilateral Trade dataset (v4.0) (Barbieri and Keshk 2016; Barbieri, 
																																																								41	Host states and country of asylum are used interchangeably, as well as with sending state and origin.   42	The Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions data (Leeds et al. 2002) covers years only until 2003.   
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Keshk, and Pollins 2009).43 The data are originally ordered as non-directed dyadic year, and was 
converted to directed dyad-year.   Trade flows are described as the imports from Country A to 
Country B (flow1), and imports from Country B to Country A (flow2) in current US millions of 
dollars.  However, not all dyads have imports from Country A to Country B and vice versa. 
There are occasions where only one state had imported to another state in a dyad.  Therefore, 
trade exchange was coded as “one” if both Country A and B in the dyad imported goods to one 
another.  Trade exchange was coded as “zero” if only one country in the dyad imported, or if 
none in the dyad imported.  It is hypothesized that countries that trade with one another will have 
lower asylum rates compared to those that do not.  Statei will be less likely to grant asylum to 
Statej if they are trading partners.  Values for trade data are available for years up to 2014. 
However, given the nature of the dependent variable, exchange data are available up until 2013.  
The general variable EXCHANGEijt is used in order to examine asylum rates are affected if the 
sending state is a trading partner of the host state.  
3.4.5 Domestic Politics: Regime-Type, Democratization, and Proximity to Elections in the 
Host State 
 
Variables measuring regime-type and democratization are obtained from Polity IV. This 
study uses Polity IV, because Polity includes measures of chief executive constraints (Marshall, 
Gurr, and Jaggers 2017) as opposed to Freedom House, which measures civil liberties. Given the 
research interests of this dissertation, Polity IV is used. Polity scores range from -10 to 10+ 
where a score of -10 to -6 denotes autocracies, and scores of +6 to +10 for democracies. 
Autocracies (AUTOCRACYit) are also coded as a binary variable if the host state’s Polity IV 
score is between -10 and -6.  This research does not analyze anocracies (those with a score of -5 
																																																								43	According to Barbieri and Keshk (2016), most of the data on bilateral trade are obtained by the International 
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS).  	
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and +5).44 Democracy (DEMOCRACYit) is coded as a binary variable if the host state’s Polity 
IV score is a 6+ or above. For levels of democratization (DEMOCRATIZATIONit), the variable 
will not be recoded.  An increase in a positive score should allow us to see if increases in 
democratization have an effect on refugee hosting. Years of an executive election are obtained 
from the World Bank’s database on political institutions.  The variable is a binary variable 
indicating if an executive election was held in that year (EXECit).   
3.5 Control Variables  
3.5.1 State of Origin in Conflict 
Other variables may explain asylum rates in a country of asylum.  Therefore, several 
control variables are included. There are also variables that must be controlled for on behalf of 
the sending state. This research controls for the country of origin being in civil conflict 
(CONFLICTjt). This can create a “push” factor, and create mass migration.   It is operationalized 
as “one” if the country of origin is experiencing intrastate conflict, and “zero” for otherwise.  
Data are obtained from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Version 4-2016) (Gleditsch et al 
2002; Melander, Petterson, Themnér 2016). 
3.5.2 Human Rights Records in Country of Origin 
In analyzing asylum enforcement in the United States, Rosenblum and Salehyan (2004) 
find that individuals from sending states with better human rights records were approved at a 
lower rate compared to individuals from states with worse human rights records.  Similar to 
Rosenblum and Salehyan (2004) this research controls for the level of human rights record in the 
sending state (POLITERRORjt) using the Political Terror Index (PTS).  
3.5.3 Number of Borders and Contiguity 																																																								
44 However, this study did attempt to include a separate variable for anocracies, but was excluded by Stata for 
collinearity.  Given that the study is concerned more with democracies and autocracies, anocracies are therefore 
omitted.   
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The total number of borders in the host state (NUMOFBORDERSit) may make states 
more likely to receive more refugees compared to others (Moorthy and Brathwaite 2016, 10). 
Similarly, this may also make host states more likely to grant asylum to more asylum-seekers 
compared to states that do not have as many borders.  Individuals often migrate to countries that 
border their own (Moorthy and Brathwaite 2016; Moore and Shellman 2007). For example, 
Figure 4 in Section 2.2 shows that Turkey hosted the most refugees in 2015, many of which 
came from Syria (İçduygu 2015).  Therefore, this research also controls for contiguous dyads 
(CONTIGUOUSijt). The total number of borders and contiguous states are derived from the 
Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity (v3.2) (Stinnett et al 2002).  Contiguous dyads are 
organized by land contiguity and water contiguity.  Land contiguity is “defined as the 
intersection of the homeland territory of the two states in the dyad either through a land boundary 
or a river” (Sinnett et al 2002, 62).  Water contiguity is divided by the following four categories: 
12, 24, 150, and 400 miles.  Because asylum-seekers and forced migrants often travel large 
distances, contiguity is coded as “one” if two states in the dyad share a land boundary of any of 
the four water contiguity categories.   
 3.5.4 Similar Religion 
Host states may be partial towards asylum-seekers that originate from states that share 
similar religions (RELIGIONijt).  In analyzing the case study of Yemen, Betts (2013) argues that 
Yemen’s response to forced migrants from Somalia contrasts to their response to migrants from 
Ethiopia.  Yemen’s response to Ethiopians is often met with xenophobia, in which its Muslim 
society also directs such xenophobia towards Ethiopian Coptic Christians (Betts 2013, 169).  
Currently, we are also witnessing similar dialogue in the West towards forced migrants and 
asylum-seekers from predominately Muslim nations.  During Europe’s migration crisis 
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Slovakia’s prime minister, Robert Fico claimed, “Islam has no place in Slovakia,” (Tharoor 
2016). President Trump’s executive order travel ban, which barred refugees and others from 
seven countries, proved controversial, as all seven countries were Muslim majority states.  
Currently, asylum-seeker data are not broken down by applicants’ religion.  Therefore, in order 
to control for religion, I create a dummy variable if two states share a similar religion. 
Specifically, it is coded as “one” if 50 % of both states’ populations identify with the same 
religion. The data is obtained from the Correlates of War World Religion Data (v1.1) (Maoz and 
Henderson 2013).  The numbers are given for every half-decade up until 2010. Numbers were 
then interpolated for missing years between 2000-2010, and extrapolated for 2011-2013.    
3.5.5 Economic Disparity 
Building off the work of Neumayer (2004, 2005b), who finds that some host states are 
more economically appealing than others for asylum-seekers, Moorthy and Brathwaite (2016) 
control for economic disparity by taking the logged difference between the GDP per capital of 
both the host and sending states. In a similar fashion, this research controls for economic 
disparities (LOGGEDGDPijt).  While 86% of refugees are in the developing world (UNHCR 
2016), asylum-seekers may also be attracted to countries that are wealthier than their home 
states.  Data are obtained from the World Bank, and are in constant numbers from 2010.   
3.5.6 Convention Signatory 
Host states that are Convention signatories (CONVENit) may be more likely to grant 
asylum compared to non-Convention signatories.  This is also a dummy variable coded if a host 
state signed either the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol. However, it should be noted that 
many Asian states are non-Convention states, but host important refugee populations.   
3.5.7 Colonial Ties 
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Countries may be partial towards asylum-seekers from states with colonial ties (Moorthy 
and Brathwaite 2016).  Neumayer (2004) found that colonial links made destinations more 
attractive. Moore and Shellman (2007) argue that colonial linkages provide less transaction costs 
and uncertainty to migrants compared to countries with no colonial linkages (818).  While 
destinations with colonial ties may seem more attractive to migrants, this research seeks to 
analyze if colonial links (COLONYijt) actually make host states more likely to provide asylum.  
Data are obtained from Hensel (2014).  
3.5.8 Refugee Population per Capita in Host State 
 The number of refugees per capital in the host state may affect the willingness to further 
grant asylum.  Host states with large refugee populations may grant asylum less compared to 
states with small refugee populations per capita.  Hosting large refugee populations can strain the 
host state from resources.  As a result, the study controls for the refugee population per capita in 
the host state (REFUGEEPOPit). The next section describes the methodology used in the study. 
3.6 Methodology 
 
3.6.1 Model 
 
The summary of the full base model is: 
RRRijt-1 = αt + β1(RIVALRYijt ) + β2 (ALLIANCESijt)+ β3(LOGTRADE)ijt + β4 (EXCHANGEijt)  
+ β5 (AUTOCRACYit) + β6 (DEMOCRACYit) + β7(DEMOCRATIZATIONit) + β8(EXECit) + β9 
(CONFLICTjt) + β10 (POLITERRORjt) + β11 (NUMOFBORDERSit) + β12(CONTIGUOUSijt) + 
β13(RELIGIONijt) + β14(LOGGEDGDPijt) + β15 (CONVENit)  + β16 (COLONYijt) + β17 
(REFUGEEPOPit) + εijt 
 
This study is done across the following five samples:  the full base model, signatory host 
states, non-signatory host states, contiguous dyads, and non-contiguous dyads.  As previously 
mentioned, signatory states may be more likely to grant asylum to asylum-seekers; however, 
many non-signatory states also host important refugee populations.  Individuals are more likely 
	 64	
to migrate to neighboring countries; therefore, it is important to also include dyads that are non-
contiguous in order further isolate the effects the independent variables may have on the 
dependent variables.  This will allow us to analyze the true strength of the base model.   
3.6.2 Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE)  
 
The data are time-series, cross-sectional (TSCS) with a directed-dyad year unit of 
analysis for 2000-2013. Because of the directed dyads, spatial and temporal correlations in the 
error terms are expected (Leeds 2003, 434).  Generalized Least Squares (GLS) are often used 
when there is correlation among error terms and possible heteroskedasticity.  Before, GLS was 
used with the Parks-Kmenta method in order to account for autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity.  However, Beck and Katz (1995) find that generalized least squares (GLS), 
especially when using the Parks method, may produce overconfident standard errors.  The 
authors recommend OLS with panel-correlated standards errors (PCSE).   In order to account for 
heteroskedasticity and correlation of residuals, Rosenblum and Salehyan (2004) use GLS with 
PCSE in their studying analyzing asylum enforcement in the United States. In contrast to 
Rosenblum and Salehyan (2004), this study uses directed-dyad year as previously mentioned.  
However, given that the dependent variable in this study is bound between zero and one, and also 
take the values of zero and one, these regressions are not appropriate for the study.   
Using directed-dyad years creates other methodological problems besides correlation in 
the error terms.  Because the same dyads are repeated and get counted twice in the dataset, this 
jeopardizes the assumption of statistical independence (Mitchell and Prins 2014, 191).  Using 
directed-dyad years as cases, then, rejects the assumption of the independence of cases (Bennett 
and Stam 2000; Leeds 2003; Mitchell and Prins 2014, 192).  In her study on military alliances 
and the likelihood of initiating militarized interstate disputes between dyads, Leeds (2003) 
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employs a generalized estimating equation (GEE) in order to account for her use of directed-
dyads, and the possibility of temporal and cross-sectional correlation.  Similarly, political 
scientists have utilized generalized estimating equations, particularly in international relations 
research (Bennett and Stam 2000; Leeds and Davis 1997; Mitchell and Prins 2014; Oneal and 
Russett 1999a; Oneal and Russett 1999b).   
Liang and Zeger (1986) first introduced the generalized estimating equation as extension 
of a generalized linear model (GLM).  However, GLM models assume independence among 
cases.  Despite its name, the GLM does not assume linearity in the traditional sense between the 
dependent and independent variables and are often assumed to be non-linear; however, it does 
assume linearity between the transformed response variable with regards to the link function and 
the independent variables (Penn State 2017).  Link functions will link the mean of the dependent 
variable to the linear term.  GLMs allow for a variety of different link functions and exponential 
families.  Because GLM does not assume a normal distribution, dependent variables can take 
other values besides continuous.  Thus, link functions must be fitted accordingly to the 
dependent variable (e.g. logit, probit, natural log, identity, etc).  The parameters can be estimated 
through maximum likelihood estimations (MLE).   
GLM can be applied to subjects with a single observation (Liang and Zeger 1986, 13).  
However, the problem arises when there are repeated observations for subjects in longitudinal 
studies, such as in the case of directed dyads.  In contrast to the GLM, the GEE does “not specify 
a form for the joint distribution” (Liang and Zeger 1986, 14), and is an estimating equation with 
weak assumptions regarding the joint distribution (14). Generalized estimating equations are 
used for population average effects as opposed to individual effects (or conditional approach). 
Therefore, generalized estimating equations use a marginal approach, and focus on marginal 
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expectations (Liang and Zeger 1986; Zeger, Liang, Albert 1988; Zorn 2001). GEE, therefore, 
does not require distributional assumptions, because the estimation of the population average 
requires few specifications, such as “the mean of the outcome given the covariates” as opposed 
to the whole joint distribution (Hubbard et. al 2010, 469).  As opposed to the GLM, GEE does 
not use maximum likelihood methods, and is thus a quasi-likelihood method.  Also, Zorn (2001) 
claims that the use of individual effects versus the population average effects is a substantive one 
(475). Using the example of the democratic peace, Zorn (2001) explains that a conditional 
approach would be more suitable in research that wishes to analyze if democratization affects a 
nation or pair of nations to go to war; however, using GEE would be more appropriate if the 
researcher wants to analyze the overall general effect of autocracies and democracies on 
engaging in military disputes (475).  Given the directed-dyad unit of analysis I also include a 
Huber-White sandwich estimator in order to account for possible heteroskedasticity (Huber 
1967; White 1980), and within-group error.  Therefore, this study also uses the Huber-White 
sandwich estimator clustered around dyads.   
3.7 Fractional Response Model (FRM) Fractional-Logit Model 
As previously mentioned, the generalized estimating equations allows for flexibility to 
estimate the dependent variable whether they are discrete, continuous, and categorical by 
specifying a link function to connect the mean of the response variable to the linear predictors.  
While the generalized estimating equation and the Huber-White sandwich estimator account for 
the methodological problems that are associated with directed dyads and within-cluster 
correlation, the structure of the dependent variable must also be taken into account. The 
dependent variable is a percentage, with values landing at zero and at 100 (later converted to a 
proportion).  One model for handling continuous proportions and percentage data is the beta 
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regression (Ferrari and Cribari-Neto 2004). However, observations in beta regressions cannot be 
found to equal zero or one, and must be 0 < y < 1 given the beta regression’s log-likelihood 
(Cribari-Neto and Zeileis 2010, 4; Smithson and Verkulien 2006, 58).  The log-likelihood for the 
beta regression includes log yi and log(1 - yi); therefore, y cannot take a value of 0 or 1.45 
Therefore, the beta regression cannot be used for this study. 
Papke and Wooldridge propose the fractional response model, a quasi-likelihood model 
for proportional data (Papke and Wooldridge 1996).  Papke and Wooldridge (1996) expand on 
the GLM with a binomial family and logit link function in order to account for values that lie on 
zero and one.   The fractional response model can overcome problems from other models.  
Standard OLS cannot guarantee that y will fall within the unit interval of [0,1] (Papke and 
Wooldridge 1996, 620).  Papke and Wooldridge (1996) state the common alternative is to 
include the “logs-odd ratio as a linear function” (620).  However, similar to the beta regression, 
log[y/(1 - y)] cannot be true if y equals zero or one (Papke and Wooldridge 1996, 620). Quasi-
likelihood estimations only require correct specifications of the model means (Wedderburn 
1974).  According to equation four in Papke and Wooldridge (1996, 621) the main assumption 
for the fractional logit estimation that for all i 𝛦 𝑦!| 𝒙𝒊 = 𝐺 𝒙𝒊𝜷  
where 𝐺 ∙  is a link function, (in this case, the logistic function exp(𝑧)/[1+ exp z ])46 that 
satisfies “0<𝐺 𝑧  <1 for all 𝑧 ∈ ℝ.”  Papke and Wooldridge claim that the above equation not 
only allows for yi to lie between the interval of zero and one it also allows for yi to take the 
																																																								45	See equation two in Cribari-Neto and Zeileis (2010) and equation four in Smithson and Verkuilen (2006).  46		See also page 575, equation 17.3 in Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2009.  Introductory Econometrics: A Modern 
Approach. Fourth Edition.	South-Western Cengage Learning: Mason.  
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values of zero and one (621).  Due to the dependent variable being a proportion, this dissertation 
uses the fractional response model.47   
3.8 Summary 
This chapter describes the research design for the dissertation study.  Given the questions 
and the unit of analysis, two methodological problems have to be taken into account.  First, 
several methodological problems arise through the use of directed-dyad years, such as non-
independence across observations, and the possibility of spatial and temporal correlations among 
error terms.  Therefore, the generalized estimating equation will be incorporated in the study. 
Second, the nature of the dependent variable as a proportion taking values of 0 ≤ y ≤ 1 allows for 
the fractional proportional model as a good fit.  This chapter also describes the nature of the 
dependent and independent variables used for the study. The next chapter will show the results 
found after the analyses.  However, given the model, and the dichotomous and continuous 
independent variables, standard regression coefficient tables will not suffice for describing the 
substantive effects.  Therefore, marginal effects will also be used to further analyze the results in 
Chapter Four.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								47	This was done in Stata by using the xtgee program in combination with the logit link, binomial family, alongside 
the Huber-White sandwich estimator.   
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Chapter Four: Results 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 The previous chapter describes the research design for this study.  As mentioned in the 
conclusion of Chapter Three, while a standard regression table will be provided for significance 
and directionality, it does not thoroughly explain substantive effects.  Therefore, the marginal 
effects of the results are also reported in this chapter.  It is important to note, however, that given 
the use of the generalized estimation equation with the fractional proportional response model, 
the marginal effects do not describe probabilities. For example, the results will not read,  “the 
probability of getting asylum is 4% in a democracy…” Instead, the marginal effects estimate the 
expected value.  As a result, these results will not describe the likelihood of an event happening, 
but rather, the average outcome.  For example, the marginal effects for binary variables, are 
described as asylum increasing or decreasing by x percentage points when the independent 
variable goes from zero to one.   
Marginal effects give an approximation of how the dependent variable increases or 
decreases after a unit change in the independent variable, and are presented on an additive scale 
(Buis 2010, 305).  It is for this reason why the effects on the dependent variable describe 
“percentage points” as opposed to “percent.”  With binary variables, the marginal effects 
measure discrete change. In this model, it analyzes how the expected value changes when the 
independent variable changes from zero to one.  In the example of democracies, when the 
variable democracy goes from zero to one, people receiving asylum increases by 4 percentage 
points.  On the contrary, the marginal effects of continuous variables measure instantaneous rates 
of change (Williams 2017a). For these variables, plots are better able to explain marginal effects 
(Williams 2017b).   
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This chapter will describe the findings and the results of the fractional response model.  
However, explanations of what these results imply, and further analyses of these results, are 
described in more detail in Chapter Five. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the 
variables. Table 2 presents the main findings of the effects of bilateral relations and domestic 
politics on refugee recognition rates.  Table 3 presents the results for the total recognition rates, 
which are the rates for Convention status and other others form of protection. As mentioned in 
Chapter Three, while the research is primarily interested in the refugee recognition rates, the total 
recognition rates are also analyzed in order to analyze if states are providing other forms of less 
protection in lieu of full refugee recognition rates (Convention status). Again, meaning and 
comparisons of these results will be explained in the next chapter. The chapter is then 
subsequently organized according to the hypotheses presented in Chapter Two.  The marginal 
effects for each hypothesis are presented accordingly in each section.  Tables for the marginal 
effects are presented for dichotomous independent variables. For continuous variables, tables do 
not provide an adequate visual representation of the findings. Therefore, graphs of the marginal 
effects for the continuous independent variables are presented instead. The results show overall 
support for rival dyads, bilateral trade, and democratization. The findings for democratic and 
autocratic host states, and alliances were contrary to what was hypothesized for most of the 
models with minor exceptions. In other words, the results show statistical significance, but the 
directionality was not as expected. The findings for the control variables are presented after. The 
chapter ends with a brief conclusion, and provides a table with a summary of findings. 
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4.2 Findings  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Max 
Dependent Variable      
Asylum Rates (RRR) 43868 .231 .340 0 1 
Combined (TRR) 44310 .294 .361 0 1 
Bilateral Variables      
      
Rivalry 99747 .00850 .0918 0 1 
Alliances 119418 .127 .333 0 1 
Logged trade 111584 3.265 3.636 -18.130 13.372 
Trade Exchange 120224 .830 .376 0 1 
Domestic Politics of Host State 
 
Autocracy 128546 .078 .268 0 1 
Democracy 128546 .764 .424 0 1 
Democratization 121636 6.229 5.501 -10 10 
Executive Election 115950 .109 .312 0 1 
Control Variables      
Conflict in sending 
state 
127033 .246 .430 0 1 
Political Terror in 
sending state 
128096 3.009 1.0504 1 5 
Total borders in host 
state 
127800 6.698 3.837 0 22 
Contiguous  127825 .076 .266 0 1 
Similar Religion 127801 .154 .361 0 1 
Logged GDP 
difference 
121048 -1.397 1.839 -6.256 5.033 
Host State Signatory 127197 .887 .316 0 1 
Sending state former 
colony 
127137 .0195 .138 0 1 
Log Refugee 
population / capita in 
host state 
126191 -.465 2.458 -9.165 6.0556 
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Table 2: The effects of bilateral relations and domestic politics on refugee recognition rates (t-1) 
 Base (Model 
1) 
Signatory 
(Model 2) 
Non-signatory 
(Model 3) 
Contiguous 
(Model 4) 
Non-
Contiguous 
(Model 5) 
Bilateral Variables 
      
Rivalry      .806*** 
(.177) 
     .899*** 
(.186) 
-.311 
(.475) 
    .749*** 
(.209) 
.476 
(.522) 
Alliances     .262*** 
(.0639) 
    .287*** 
(.0689) 
.0976 
(.217) 
   .281** 
(.125) 
   .259*** 
(.0736) 
Logged trade    -.0447*** 
(.00743) 
   -.0423*** 
(.00780) 
.0106 
(.0314) 
   -.156*** 
(.0291) 
   -.0340*** 
(.00778) 
Trade Exchange -.0430 
(.0638) 
-.0201 
(.0652) 
-.277 
(.263) 
.553 
(.390) 
-.0742 
(.0655) 
Domestic Politics of Host State 
Autocracy     -.522*** 
(.131) 
    -.914*** 
(.147) 
   .783*** 
(.281) 
-.0609 
(.316) 
   -.623*** 
(.149) 
Democracy .110 
(.118) 
.302** 
(.141) 
-.476** 
(.205) 
-.0565 
(.224) 
.173 
(.139) 
Democratization -.0604*** 
(.0118) 
-.103*** 
(.0135) 
.0492** 
(.0234) 
-.0190 
(.0257) 
-.0690*** 
(.0134) 
Executive 
Election 
-.0718* 
(.0374) 
-.0779** 
(.0381) 
-.0763 
(.237) 
-.00687 
(.0917) 
-.0822** 
(.0413) 
Control Variables 
Conflict in 
sending state 
.104*** 
(.0352) 
.0548 
(.0359) 
.527*** 
(.129) 
.00434 
(.132) 
.114*** 
(.0365) 
Political Terror 
in sending state 
Total borders in 
host state 
 .237*** 
(.0189) 
   -.0587*** 
(.00618) 
   .227*** 
(.0193) 
   -.0670*** 
(.00651) 
  .255*** 
 (.0848) 
.0237 
(.0270) 
.389*** 
(.0636) 
-.00212 
(.0197) 
 
.220*** 
(.0198) 
   -.0640*** 
(.00657) 
Contiguous .359*** 
(.0794) 
   .282*** 
(.0880) 
.503** 
(.207) 
_ _ 
Similar Religion .0402 
(.0640) 
.0366 
(.0714) 
.209 
(.158) 
-.0409 
(.129) 
.0661 
(.0740) 
Logged GDP 
difference 
    .0638*** 
(.0154) 
.0279 
(.0171) 
   .210*** 
(.0412) 
   .216*** 
(.0643) 
   .0511*** 
(.0162) 
Host State 
Signatory 
-.0219 
(.0789) 
_ _ -.409** 
(.201) 
.0261 
(.0877) 
Sending state 
former colony 
-.0421 
(.121) 
.000431 
(.121) 
-.192 
(.739) 
-.0865 
(.255) 
-.0651 
(.136) 
Log Refugee 
population 
/capita in host 
state 
-.0542*** 
(.00960) 
-.0542*** 
(.0113) 
-.0281 
(.0259) 
-.0133 
(.0244) 
  -.0639*** 
(.0105) 
Constant -1.103*** 
(.123) 
-.942*** 
(.114) 
-2.033*** 
(.430) 
-1.259** 
(.532) 
-1.0792*** 
(.131) 
N 28741 26999 1742 2445 26296 
Chi2 885.11*** 885.70*** 95.41*** 190.68*** 647.66*** 
Robust Standard errors for clustering around dyads in parenthesis ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
	 73	
Table 3: The effects of bilateral relations and domestic politics on total recognition rates (t-1) 
 Base (Model 
6) 
Signatory 
(Model 7) 
Non-signatory 
(Model 8) 
Contiguous 
(Model 9) 
Non-
Contiguous 
(Model 10) 
Bilateral Variables 
Rivalry       .611*** 
(.165) 
     .676*** 
(.174) 
-.228 
(.433) 
.571*** 
(.201) 
.250 
(.489) 
Alliances     .201*** 
(.0561) 
    .226*** 
(.0590) 
.0925 
(.216) 
.177 
(.116) 
.206*** 
(.0642) 
Logged trade     -.0518*** 
(.00657) 
-.0512*** 
(.00683) 
.00557 
(.0302) 
-.129*** 
(.0264) 
-.0444*** 
(.00687) 
Trade Exchange -.0304 
(.0596) 
-.0146 
(.0610) 
-.219 
(.255) 
.571 
(.395) 
-.0622 
(.0606) 
Domestic Politics of Host State 
Autocracy -.303*** 
(.116) 
-.607*** 
(.131) 
.759*** 
(.271) 
.00401 
(.268) 
-.362*** 
(.133) 
Democracy -.178* 
(.101) 
-.114 
(.119) 
-.423** 
(.196) 
-.255 
(.214) 
-.157 
(.116) 
Democratization -.0167 
(.0102) 
-.0405*** 
(.0116) 
.0456** 
(.0221) 
.00107 
(.0229) 
-.0185 
(.0115) 
Executive 
Election 
.000860 
(.0352) 
.00317 
(.0358) 
-.217 
(.232) 
.0527 
(.0942) 
-.00526 
(.0382) 
Control Variables 
Conflict in 
sending state 
    .132*** 
(.0322) 
    .0968*** 
(.0332) 
    .523*** 
(.121) 
.0681 
(.124) 
   .138*** 
(.0333) 
Political Terror 
in sending state 
.263*** 
(.0170) 
.259*** 
(.0174) 
.241*** 
(.0831) 
.401*** 
(.0606) 
.247*** 
(.0177) 
Total borders in 
host state 
-.0359*** 
(.00500) 
-.0404*** 
(.00515) 
.0280 
(.0278) 
-.00649 
(.0171) 
-.0376*** 
(.00527) 
Contiguous  .385*** 
(.0713) 
.313*** 
(.0766) 
.546** 
(.211) 
_ _ 
Similar Religion -.00230 
(.0583) 
.00134 
(.0638) 
.157 
(.159) 
-.0604 
(.126) 
.0187*** 
(.0666) 
Logged GDP 
difference 
.0230* 
(.0135) 
-.000208 
(.0145) 
.177*** 
(.0403) 
.182*** 
(.0614) 
.0138 
(.0141) 
Host State 
Signatory 
.0971 
(.0744) 
_ _ -.284 
(.196) 
.142* 
(.0820) 
Sending state 
former colony 
-.0228 
(.0970) 
-.00835 
(.0973) 
.0661 
(.700) 
.0921 
(.231) 
-.102 
(.105) 
Log Refugee 
population 
/capita in host 
state 
-.0129 
(.00857) 
-.00618 
(.00980) 
-.0260 
(.0248) 
.0129 
(.0232) 
-.0194** 
(.00927) 
Constant -1.233*** 
(.113) 
-1.000*** 
(.102) 
-1.966*** 
(.424) 
-1.258** 
(.513) 
-1.230*** 
(.119) 
N 28741 26999 1742 2445 26296 
Chi2 794.51*** 780.51*** 92.32*** 192.50** 573.43*** 
Robust Standard errors for clustering around dyads in parenthesis ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
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4.2.1 Rivals  
 
Hypothesis 1:  Receiving states will be more likely to provide asylum to individuals fleeing rival 
states compared to non-rival states.   
 
  It is hypothesized that the relationship between the host and sending state affects asylum 
rates.  The first hypothesis claims that asylum rates will be greater in rival dyads than in non-
rival dyads.  The base model found in Model 1, Table 2 finds strong support for this hypothesis.  
However, while the sign and statistical significance supports the first hypothesis, it tells us little 
about the substantive effects.  Therefore, the average marginal effects were calculated (Williams 
2012).  Marginal effects measure discrete changes with binary variables, and normally measure 
how predicted probabilities change when the variable shifts from 0 to 1 (Williams 2017a, 1).  
However, given the generalized estimating equation, the marginal effects do not measure 
predicted probabilities, but estimate the expected value.   
 According to Table 4 below, rival host states provide full Convention status to asylum-
seekers at around 14.8 percentage points more than non-rival host states. Table 5 finds that rival 
states provide full and complementary status 12.8 percentage points more than non-rival host 
states.  Overall, rival states provide full refugee status more than the full and complementary 
status. The results also found support for host states that are signatories of the Convention, and 
for contiguous dyads as seen by Model 2 and Model 4.  Table 4 shows that if the host state is a 
signatory of the 1951 Convention, and a rivalry exists between two states in a dyad, full 
Convention recognition rates increase by 16.4 percentage points compared to non-rival dyads, 
and asylum rates increase by 14.1 percentage points for full-Convention status and other forms 
of protection.  For contiguous dyads, refugee status rates increase by 14.8 percentage points, and 
total recognition rates increase by 11.9 percentage points.  The hypothesis was found to be not 
significant for non-signatory host states and for non-contiguous dyads.  
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 This study seeks to understand what are the political determinants of asylum granting.  
Therefore, one question this study seeks to investigate is what drives asylum granting? If 
refugees are often seen as a burden, or a security or cultural threat, what motivates states to take 
in asylum-seekers and grant refugee status recognition?  The results find support for the 
hypothesis that host states are more likely to grant asylum to individuals fleeing rival host states 
compared to non-rival host states.  The results support both the literature and empirical cases that 
refugee status granting is affected by the foreign policy goals of states and the nationality of 
asylum-seekers.  For example, Pakistan and Afghanistan have a difficult bilateral relationship.  
In 1947, Afghanistan was the only country to oppose Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations. 
Similar to Guinea’s leader who was keen on hosting Liberian rebels in hopes to overthrow 
Charles Taylor in Liberia, Pakistan has also hosted Afghan rebels fighting against the Afghan 
government, as well as the Mujahedeen during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Until 
recently, Pakistan has hosted millions of Afghan refugees.  The findings of this research support 
the case of Pakistan, among others, in which host governments provided asylum to individuals 
fleeing rival states. More so, it supports the literature that finds granting refugee status is often 
used as a political motive to undermine enemies.  The results also find support for contiguous 
dyads. This probably reflects the fact that many rivalries began from territorial or border 
disputes, and probably explains why there is no significance for non-contiguous rival states.  
Rival signatory host states are also more likely to grant asylum to individuals fleeing rival states.  
While states may meet their obligations in international law, these results show that foreign 
policy also matters with refugee status granting.  No statistical significance was found for non-
signatory rival states.  The lack of statistical significance may reflect on the fact that there are not 
too many non-signatory, rival states globally.  
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Table 4:  Marginal Effects of Rivalries on RRR  (expected values) 
Model Variable Margins Standard Error 
(Delta 
Method) 
Z-Value P > |z| 95 % 
Confidenc
e Interval 
Full-Model 
 
Rivalry .3480347 .0374304 9.30 0.000 .2746726  
-   
.4213969 
 No Rivalry  .200059 .0032391 61.76 0.000 .1937106 
-   
.2064075 
Signatory Rivalry .3600206 .0397117 9.07 0.000   .2821872  
-    
.437854 
 No Rivalry  .1951374 .0033175   58.82 0.000 .1886352  
-   
.2016396 
 
Contiguous  Rivalry .4484361 .0416967 10.75 0.000 .3667121 
-    
.5301601 
 No Rivalry  .2998974 .0123916 24.20 0.000   .2756103 
-    
.3241845 
 	
Table 5:  Marginal Effects of Rivalries on TRR (expected values) 
Model Variable Margins Standard Error 
(Delta 
Method) 
Z-Value P > |z| 95 % 
Confidenc
e Interval 
Full-Model Rivalry .3929499   .0374118 10.50 0.000   .319624  
-   
.4662757 
 No Rivalry  .2651509 .0033657 78.78 0.000   .2585543  
-   
.2717474 
Signatory Rivalry .4043743 .0398906 10.14 0.000 .3261901  
-   
.4825585 
 No Rivalry  .2626612 .0034516 76.10 0.000 .2558961  
-   
.2694263 
Contiguous  Rivalry .4675594 .0417864 11.19 0.000 .3856596 
-    
.5494591 
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(table cont.) 
 
      
 
 
No Rivalry  .3481964   .0124265 28.02 0.000 .3238408 
-     
.372552 
 
4.2.2 Alliances 
 
Hypothesis 2:  States will be more restricted in providing refugee recognition to asylum seekers 
from a sending state, if both states belong to an alliance compared to dyads that are not in similar 
pacts.  
 
 The findings in Model 1 show strong statistical significance; however, the directionality 
is not as anticipated.  The results in Model 1 find no support for hypothesis 2. According to 
Table 6, when the host state is in an alliance with the sending state, refugee recognition rates 
increase on average by 4 percentage points.  Similarly, the total recognition rates increase by 3.9 
percentage points in allied dyads compared to dyads that are not in an alliance.  The results in 
Model 2 show that refugee recognition rates increase in signatory host states that are in an 
alliance with the sending state.  According to Table 6, when the alliance variable goes from zero 
to one, the estimated expected value of receiving full Convention status for asylum-seekers 
increases by 4.5 percentage points.  The total recognition rates increase by 4.4 percentage points.    
 In contiguous states, the estimated expected value for receiving full recognition status (Model 4) 
in an allied host state is 5.1 percentage points.  The findings for Model 4 in Table 2 were found 
to be statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval level.  However, in allied, contiguous 
dyads the total recognition rates were found not to be significant as seen in Model 9.  Table 6 
shows that in non-contiguous dyads, the marginal effects of alliances increase refugee status 
recognition by 4.1 percentage points, and Table 7 shows that the total recognition rates increase 
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by 4 percentage points.  Results were not significant for non-signatory host states that are allies 
of sending states.  
 The findings for rival host and sending states support the literature and empirical cases. 
However, the results do not find support that host states will be less likely to grant asylum to 
individuals fleeing allied sending states.  Chapter Five will explain that the findings here support 
most of the results found in Moorthy and Braithwaite (2016).  Moorthy and Braithwaite (2016) 
also hypothesize that host states will be less likely to host refugees from allied sending states; 
however, most of their results did not find support for the argument. While statistically 
significant, the findings in Moorthy and Braithwaite (2016) also differ in directionality. In other 
words, refugee hosting increased in allied host states for most of their models.  One explanation 
for these findings may regard that individuals migrating to host states that are allies may have 
lower transaction costs (Moore and Shellman 2007). Similar to individuals fleeing sending states 
that were former colonies of the host state, allied states may have cultural or ethnic similarities, 
though it may not be as prominent as former colonies.  This may explain why allied host states 
provide asylum more on average compared to non-allied host states across most of the models in 
this study. 
Another reason for the findings may be due to the coding of the dependent variable.  This 
study, similar to Moorthy and Braithwaite (2016) and Moore and Shellman (2007), do not 
differentiate between alliances.  As previously mentioned, non-aggression alliances were not 
included. However, defense, entente, and neutral alliances were pooled together.  Future studies 
should investigate how different types of alliances may affect asylum rates.  For example, 
defense pacts are the strongest type of commitment in the Correlates of War dataset.  In this type 
of alliance, a state must come to the aid of another state if attacked by another party.  Defense 
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alliances have more at stake than other types of pacts.  Therefore, asylum rates may be reflected 
on the types of military treaties signed.  Based on this line of argument, we can expect that 
asylum granting will be less likely in dyads that are in defense pacts compared to other pacts.  
The cost of joining and maintaining commitment in defense pacts are greater than other pacts; 
therefore, these treaties outweigh maintaining commitment to international law, and admitting 
that individuals leaving states from military alliances have a fear of persecution in their home 
states.    
Table 6:  Marginal Effects of Alliances on RRR (expected values) 
Model Variable Margins Standard Error 
(Delta 
Method) 
Z-Value P > |z| 95 % 
Confidenc
e Interval 
Full-Model Alliance .2376189   .0098189 24.20 0.000 .2183741 
-    
.2568637 
 No Alliance .1957018 .0035478 55.16 0.000 .1887482 
-    
.2026554 
Signatory Alliance .2354762 .0104753 22.48 0.000   .2149449  
-   
.2560074 
 No Alliance .1902753   .0036407 52.26 0.000   .1831396  
-    
.197411 
 
Contiguous  Alliance .3378483 .0165759 20.38 0.000 .3053601 
-    
.3703364 
 No Alliance .2863871 .0163373   17.53 0.000 .2543665 
-    
.3184077 
Non-Contiguous  Alliance .2287076 .0115239 19.85 
 
0.000 
 
.2061212  
-    
.251294 
 No Alliance .1879556 .0035387 53.11 0.000 .1810199 
-    
.1948913 
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Table 7:  Marginal Effects of Alliances on TRR  (expected values) 
Model Variable Margins Standard Error 
(Delta 
Method) 
Z-Value P > |z| 95 % 
Confidenc
e Interval 
Full-Model Alliance .3001263 .0102767 29.20 0.000 .2799843  
-   
.3202682 
 No Alliance .2613351 .0036578   71.45 0.000 .254166  
-   
.2685042 
Signatory Alliance .3018226 .0108151 27.91 0.000   .2806254 
-    
.3230197 
 No Alliance .2582162 .003747 68.91 0.000   .2508722 
-    
.2655602  
Non-Contiguous  Alliance .2945319   .0120925 24.36 
 
0.000 
 
.2708311 
-    
.3182327 
 No Alliance .2548784 .0036766  0.000 .2476725 
-    
.2620843 
 
 
4.2.3 Trade 
 
Hypothesis 3A: As trade increases between the receiving and sending state, the receiving state 
will be more resistant in providing asylum to individuals from the sending  state. 
 
Hypothesis 3B:  Countries that trade with one another will be less likely to grant asylum to 
individuals from the sending state, compared to dyads that do not trade with one another.   
 
 There is strong, statistical significance for hypothesis 3A that posits as trade increases 
between the receiving and sending state, the receiving state will be more resistant in providing 
asylum to individuals from the sending state.  The findings in Model 1 in Table 2 show that full 
Convention status rates decrease as bilateral trade increases.  Similarly, asylum rates for full and 
other protection status decrease as trade increases (Table 3, Model 6).  For signatory states, as 
seen in Model 2, results find support for hypothesis 3A, as well as for total recognition rates 
(Table 3, Model 7). Level of trade decreases refugee recognition rates in contiguous states (Table 
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2, Model 4) as well as for total recognition rates (Table 3, Model 9). Levels of trade also 
decrease refugee status recognition rates in states that are non-contiguous (Table 2, Model 5), 
and similarly decrease as total recognition rates increase (Table 3, Model 10). 
As mentioned at the onset of the chapter, marginal effects are best explained with factor 
variables, such as with binary variables.  However, for continuous variables, the marginal effects 
are best visualized through plots (Royston 2013).  Figures 5 and 6 below show the marginal 
effects for the results. According to these figures, the greatest effects are seen with contiguous 
dyads.  Detailed explanations of these results will be further explained in Chapter 5.   However, 
none of the models find support for hypothesis 3B. The findings do not support the hypothesis 
that dyads that trade with one another will be less likely to grant asylum compared to dyads that 
do not trade with one another. 
The effect seen in Figure 5(c) is probably the result of contiguous states being more 
likely to trade with one another. As mentioned, individuals normally migrate first to host states 
within reach. Over increases in trade decrease refugee recognition slightly.  While the results 
support both empirical cases and literature that claim states wish to preserve commercial 
interests, studies should continue to analyze if commercial interests affect asylum rates given that 
not much research investigates the relationship between trade and asylum granting.  The model 
for non-signatory states is not significant. Many non-signatory states are authoritarian or 
politically unstable. Many of these states have major trading partner such as the United States or 
China. Therefore, the lack of statistical significance may be due to the fact that many individuals 
do not apply for asylum in non-signatory states, especially from major trading partners.    
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Figure 5 
 
 
Figure 6 
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4.3 Domestic Politics: Regime-Type 
4.3.1 Autocracies  
 
Hypothesis 4A:  Autocracies are more likely than non-autocracies to grant asylum.  
 The results find statistical significance, but no support for hypothesis 4A with the 
exception of non-signatory states.  Table 8 shows that full Convention recognition falls by 6.89 
percentage points in autocracies compared to non-autocratic states.  Recognition rates for full 
status and other protection in Table 9 decrease by 5.3 percentage points compared non-
autocracies. In autocracies that are signatory states, refugee recognition rates fall by 10.5 
percentage points, and total recognition rates fall by 9.8 percentage points.  However, the results 
found support for the model that isolates non-signatory host states.  For non-signatory states, 
refugee status recognition rates increase by 16.3 percentage points, and total recognition rates 
increase by 16.4 percentage points.  As seen in Model 5, when autocracies go from zero to one, 
full Convention status decreases by 7.7 percentage points in non-contiguous dyads. Refugee 
recognition status and other forms of protection decrease in autocracies compared to non-
autocracies by 6.2 percentage points in non-contiguous dyads.  No statistical significance was 
found for contiguous states.   
 Most of the results went opposite to what was expected, which may imply that 
autocracies are less likely to comply with international law. This is further emphasized in the 
signatory model where signatory, autocratic states grant asylum about ten percentage points on 
average less than non-autocratic signatory states. However, the findings show that non-signatory 
states grant asylum more on average than non-signatory, non-autocratic states.  Most non-
signatory, autocratic states are Gulf Arab states.  Most of these states have small refugee 
populations, and most asylum-seekers apply from other Gulf States or from Africa.  This may 
explain why non-signatory autocratic states grant refugee status recognition more than non-
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autocratic, non-signatory states.  Many individuals especially from other nations do not apply for 
asylum in these states. The exceptions were the non-signatory states of Libya and Syria. While 
Libya and Syria are not in the Gulf, theses states have normally hosted large refugee populations 
until recently. In the case of Libya, the government probably became more prone to host 
refugees overall when it began to reintegrate itself in the international community around 2006-
2007.  More so, Italy and the European Union provided monetary incentives for Libya to host 
refugees, and prevent migrants from leaving Libya to enter the European Union. Since Qaddafi’s 
fall, Libya went from a mainly refugee hosting nation to a migration transit state.   
Table 8:  Marginal Effects of Autocracies on RRR (expected values) 
Model Variable Margins Standard Error 
(Delta 
Method) 
Z-Value P > |z| 95 % 
Confidenc
e Interval 
Full-Model Autocracy .1370263 .0138982 9.86 0.000 .1097864 
-    
.1642662 
 Non-
Autocracy 
.2059805 .0034325   60.01 0.000 .199253  
-    
.212708 
Signatory Autocracy .0980364   .0115665 8.48 0.000 .0753665 
-    
.1207063 
 Non-
Autocracy 
.2031601 .0034875 58.25 0.000 .1963248 
-    
.2099954 
Non-Signatory Autocracy .4361095 .055565 7.85 0.000 .327204   
-  
.5450149 
 Non-
Autocracy 
.2726891 .014947 18.24   0.000 .2433936 
-    
.3019846 
Non-Contiguous  Autocracy .1186824 .0142561 8.33 
 
0.000 
 
.090741 
-    
.1466238 
 Non-
Autocracy 
.1962589 .0035035 56.02 0.000 .1893922 
-    
.2031256 
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Table 9:  Marginal Effects of Autocracies on TRR (expected values) 
Model Variable Margins Standard Error 
(Delta 
Method) 
Z-Value P > |z| 95 % 
Confidenc
e Interval 
Full-Model Autocracy .2159169 .0181649 11.89 0.000 .1803144 
- 
.2515194 
 Non-
Autocracy 
.2689493 .003515   76.51 0.000 .2620599 
-    
.2758386 
Signatory Autocracy .1704834 .0171553 9.94 0.000 .1368596  
-   
.2041072 
 Non-
Autocracy 
.268254 .0035836 74.86 0.000 .2612302 
-    
.2752777 
Non-Signatory Autocracy .4598822 .0545182 8.44 0.000 .3530285  
-   
.5667359 
 Non-
Autocracy 
.2957708 .0154664 19.12   0.000 .2654572 
-    
.3260843 
Non-Contiguous  Autocracy .1991723 .0199461 9.99 
 
0.000 
 
.1600786  
-   
.2382659 
 Non-
Autocracy 
.2609993 .0036186   72.13 0.000 
 
.2539069 
-    
.2680916 
       
 
4.3.2 Democracies  
Hypothesis 4B: Democracies are less likely than non-democracies to grant asylum.  
The unrestricted model (Model 1, Table 2) finds no support in that democracies grant 
refugee status less compared to non-democracies.  For democracies that are signatory states, the 
results show that as the binary variable goes from zero to one, full refugee recognition increases 
by 4.2 percentage points.  These results were found to be statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence interval. For democratic signatory states, recognition rates for full status and other 
forms of protection increase by 2.2 percentage points.  However, according to Table 2, Model 3, 
refugee status recognition rates decrease in democracies that are not signatory states.  These 
results were found to be significant at the 95% confidence level.  Table 10 demonstrates that 
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individuals receiving refugee recognition decrease by 9.1 percentage points in non-signatory 
states.  When democracies go from zero to one, refugee status and other forms of protection 
decrease by 8.5 percentage points.  Results were not significant for contiguous dyads and non-
contiguous states.  Overall, the results for this hypothesis did not find strong support for 
democracies granting asylum less than non-democracies.   
Democratic signatory states granted refugee status recognition more than non-democratic 
signatory states by about four percentage points. However, given that there are more 
democracies in the world compared to other regimes, and that the majority of states around the 
world are signatory states, these numbers should be greater.  Therefore, other factors affect 
refugee status recognition.  While some states do adhere to international law, based on these 
numbers, host states are persuaded (or not) by other influences.  Democratic non-signatory states 
grant asylum on average less that non-democratic states, which seems to align with the findings 
in the previous section that autocratic, non-signatory states grant asylum more on average than 
non-autocratic, non-signatory states.  Most democratic, non-signatory states are found in Asia.  
These states are more likely to grant asylum to other Asian states, but are less likely to grant 
asylum to other nationalities, such as African asylum-seekers.  More so, some Asian states have 
been accused of not providing asylum to individuals that qualify, and exploiting migrants for 
labor.   
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4.3.3 Democratization 
 
Hypothesis 4C:  As levels of democratization increase in a state, asylum granting in that state 
will decrease.   
 
As seen on Section 4.2.3 on trade, democratization is also a continuous variable.  
Therefore, Figure 7 and 8 plot the marginal effects for hypothesis 4C.  The unrestricted model 
(Model 1) finds support for hypothesis 4C. For signatory states, as democratization increases, 
refugee status recognition decreases.  Similar results were found for total recognition rates as 
seen in Figure 7(a); however, the results for the total recognition rates and democratization have 
Table 10:  Marginal Effects of Democracies on RRR (expected values) 
Model Variable Margins Standard Error 
(Delta 
Method) 
Z-Value P > |z| 95 % 
Confidenc
e Interval 
Signatory Democracy .2034985 .0046454 43.81 0.000   .1943936  
-   
.2126034              
 Non-
Democracy 
.1619264 .0149757 10.81 0.000   .1325747 
-    
.1912782 
Non-Signatory Democracy .2516658 .0217589 11.57 0.000 .2090192  
-   
.2943123 
 Non-
Democracy 
.3427377 .0251296   13.64 0.000 .2934846 
-    
.3919907 
Table 11:  Marginal Effects of Democracies on TRR (expected values) 
Model Variable Margins Standard Error 
(Delta 
Method) 
Z-Value P > |z| 95 % 
Confidenc
e Interval 
Signatory Democracy .2610939 .0044198 59.07 0.000  .2524313 
-    
.2697565 
 Non-
Democracy 
.2827619 .020663   13.68 0.000 .2422631 
-    
.3232606 
Non-Signatory Democracy .2778087 .0223412 12.43 0.000 .2340208 
-   
.3215965 
 Non-
Democracy 
.362594 .0249814 14.51 0.000 .3136314  
-   
.4115567 
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wide confidence level margins, and should be analyzed cautiously.  Opposite results were found 
for non-signatory states.  As levels of democratization increases, refugee recognition rates, as 
well as total recognition rates, for non-signatory states slightly increase. No statistical 
significance was found for contiguous dyads.  However, increases in democratization decrease 
refugee status rates in non-contiguous dyads.  Yet, the results were not significant for non-
contiguous dyads for full and other forms of protection.   
The results for most of the models support the literature and case studies that state as 
countries began to democratize, such as in the case of African states, host states became less 
willing to host refugees.  After democratization, government leaders and elites have to be more 
attuned to voters’ and public opinions.  Voters may often view migration, both voluntary and 
forced, as a threat.  Therefore, voters may be less likely to vote for leaders who are more pro-
immigration.  As in the case of Kenya, the President of Kenya exploited Kenyan grievances 
towards refugees, such as the Somalis, during elections.  However, these results seem somewhat 
contradictory given the results seen in the previous section.  As Chapter Five explains, this may 
be due to the coding of the regime-type variables.   
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Figure 7
 
Figure 8 
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4.3.4 Domestic Politics: Year of National Elections 
 
Hypothesis 5:  In the year of a national or executive election, overall asylum rates will be lower 
compared to non-election years. 
 
 The unrestricted sample finds minimal support for hypothesis 5, and no support in Model 
6 for total recognition rates.  In Model 2, when national elections are held in signatory host 
states, refugee recognition decreases by 1.1 percentage points compared to non-election years.  
In non-contiguous dyads (Model 5), refugee recognition rates fall by 1.2 percentage points.  The 
results were not statistically significant for non-signatory states and for contiguous dyads.  
Immigration was a salient issue in the recent UK referendum, in the presidential election of the 
United States, and across elections throughout the European Union.  However, it often takes 
some time for asylum policies to pass after national elections. This may explain why the results 
were only significantly minor during election years.   
 
Table 12:  Marginal Effects of Elections on RRR (expected values) 
Model Variable Margins Standard Error 
(Delta 
Method) 
Z-Value P > |z| 95 % 
Confidenc
e Interval 
Signatory Year of Nat. 
Elections 
Held 
.1862511   .0058489 31.84  0.000 .1747874  
-   
.1977147 
 No  nat. 
elections 
held that 
year 
.1975857 .003347 59.03 0.000 .1910256 
-    
.2041458 
Non-Contiguous  Year of Nat. 
Elections 
Held 
.1808333 .0062456 28.95 
 
0.000 
 
.1861643 
-    
.1994047 
 No  nat. 
elections 
held that 
year 
.1927845 .0033777 57.08 0.000 .1685922 
-    
.1930744 
 
4.4 Control Variables  
As expected, the full model for refugee recognition rates (Model 1) found strong support 
for asylum granting if asylum-seekers come from a sending state experiencing civil conflict, and 
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from states experiencing political terror. Refugee rates are also statistically significant and 
increase in contiguous dyads.  Full Convention status decreases in countries when refugee 
populations per capita increase, and in host states with more borders.  Asylum also increases in 
host states with a greater GDP difference from the sending state.  Total recognition rates increase 
(Model 6) if the sending state is experiencing civil conflict, high levels of terror, and in 
contiguous dyads. It decreases with increases in borders. The logged GDP was found to be not 
strongly statistically significant.   
In signatory states, refugee status rates (Model 2), decrease in host states with greater 
refugee populations.  Refugee status recognition is granted more when asylum seekers come 
from states with political terror.  Asylum decreases in states with more borders, but increases in 
contiguous states. In Model 7 for signatory host states, refugee status and other forms of 
protection increases in sending states experiencing political terror and in contiguous states.  Total 
recognition rates decrease as the number of borders increase.  In Model 3 for non-signatory 
states, refugee recognition rates increase if civil conflict is experienced in the sending states, if 
political terror is in the sending state, for contiguous states, and if the GDP is in the host state is 
greater compared to the sending state.  In Model 8 for non-signatory states total recognition rates 
increase for sending states in conflict, for those with political terror, in contiguous states, and if 
the GDP is greater in host states.   
For contiguous dyads as seen in Model 4 the only statistically significant variables regard 
political terror in the sending state, the logged GDP per capita, and if the host state is a signatory 
state. As political terror increases, refugee recognition rates increase.  Similarly, as the GDP gap 
widens between the sending and host states, refugee recognition rates increase. Asylum rates 
decrease in signatory, contiguous states.  Similar results were found for these control variables 
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with the total recognition rates in Model 9. However, there is no significance for signatory states.  
In Model 5 for non-contiguous dyads if the sending state is experiencing civil conflict, then 
refugee status rates increase.  The greater the log of refugees per capital, the less asylum is 
granted.  Refugee status recognition increases if the sending state is experiencing political terror.  
However, refugee status rates decrease as the number of borders increase.  The greater the GDP 
between the host and sending state, full Convention status increases.  In Model 10 with non-
contiguous dyads and total recognition rates, these rates increase if the host state is experiencing 
civil conflict, and has political terror. Total recognition rates increase if the host state is a 
signatory state, but it is only significant at the 90% confidence interval.  At the 95% confidence 
interval, the more refugees per capita in the host state, total refugee recognition rates decrease. 
As the number of borders increases, the total recognition rates decrease.   
4.5 Conclusion 
 
 The results find strong support for hypothesis 1, which claims that rival states provide 
refugee status rates more than non-rival dyads.  Similarly, the results find support for hypothesis 
3A. As trade increases in a dyad, refugee status rates decrease. Results also found support for 
hypothesis 4C, which states that as democratization increases, refugee status rates decrease.  
However, results did not support the hypotheses for regime-types.  For the most part, states 
provide more refugee status than the combined status.  However, in non-signatory autocratic 
states, refugee rates increase.  But in democratic, non-signatory states refugee status rates 
decrease.  Some of the results for the hypotheses are conflicting. For example, while most of the 
models did not find support that democracies are less likely than non-democracies to grant 
asylum, the results show that as democratization (Polity 2 scores) increase, refugee status rates 
decrease. The interpretations of these findings are further described in Chapter 5.     
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Table 13:  Summary of Findings for Refugee Recognition Rates 
Variable Model [ # ] Support? Statistical 
Significance  
Marginal 
Effects 
TRR =  
Rivals Base [1] Yes Yes 14.8 pp 
(increase) 
12.8 pp 
(increase) 
Rivals Signatory [2] Yes Yes 16.4 pp 
(increase) 
14.1 pp 
(increase) 
Rivals Contiguous 
[4] 
Yes Yes 14.8 pp 
(increase) 
11.9 pp 
(increase) 
Rivals Non-
Signatory [3] 
No No _ _ 
Rivals Non-
Contiguous[5] 
No No _ _ 
Alliances Base [1] No Yes 4 pp 
(increase)  
3.9 pp 
(increase) 
Alliances Signatory [2] No Yes 4.5 pp 
(increase) 
4.4 pp 
(increase) 
Alliances Contiguous 
[4] 
No Yes 5.1. pp 
(increase) 
(not 
significant) 
Alliances Non-
Contiguous[5] 
No Yes 4.1 pp 
(increase) 
4 pp 
(increase) 
Alliances Non-
Signatory[3] 
No No _ _ 
Bilateral Trade Base [1] Yes Yes decrease decrease  
Bilateral Trade Signatory[2] Yes Yes decrease decrease 
Bilateral Trade Contiguous[4] Yes Yes decrease decrease 
Bilateral Trade Non-
contiguous 
[5] 
Yes Yes decrease decrease 
Bilateral Trade Non-
Signatory[3] 
No No _ _ 
Trade Exchange No support 
/significance 
for any model 
    
Autocracies Base [1] No Yes 6.89 pp 
(decrease) 
5.3 pp 
(decrease) 
Autocracies Signatory [2] No Yes 10.5 pp 
(decrease) 
9.8 pp 
(decrease) 
Autocracies Non-
Signatory[3] 
Yes Yes 16.3 pp 
(increase) 
16.4 pp 
(increase) 
Autocracies Non-
contiguous[5] 
No Yes 7.7 
(decrease) 
6.2 
(decrease) 
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(Table 13 
continued) 
     
Autocracies Contiguous 
[4] 
No No _ _ 
Democracies Base [1] No No  _ _ 
Democracies Signatory [2] No Yes 4.2 pp 
(increase) 
2.2 pp 
(increase) 
Democracies Non-
signatory[3] 
Yes Yes 9.1 pp 
(decrease) 
8.5. pp 
(decrease) 
Democracies Contiguous 
[4] 
No No _ _ 
Democracies Non-
contiguous[5] 
No No _ _ 
Democratization Base [1] Yes Yes Decrease Decrease 
Democratization Signatory [2] Yes Yes Decrease Decrease 
Democratization Non-
contiguous[5] 
Yes Yes Decrease Decrease 
Democratization Non-
Signatory[3] 
No Yes Increase Increase 
Democratization Contiguous 
[4] 
No No  _ _ 
Elections Signatory [2] Yes Yes 1.1 pp 
(decrease) 
_ 
Elections Non-
contiguous[5] 
Yes Yes 1.2 pp 
(decrease) 
_ 
Elections Base [1] Yes Yes, very 
minimal  
_ _ 
Elections Contiguous 
[4] 
No No _ _ 
Elections Non-
Signatory[3] 
No No _ _ 
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Chapter Five: Discussion 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
 What explains the variations in refugee status granting among states? How is refugee 
status determined? The purpose of the study is to analyze if politics affect refugee status granting 
to asylum-seekers.  In order to accomplish this goal, the research provides quantitative analyses 
across all temporal and spatial cases possible. This study finds that rival host states grant refugee 
status recognition rates greater than non-rival host states.  It also finds that asylum rates decrease 
as bilateral trade increases.  Most of the models show that the more democratic a state becomes, 
the less asylum is granted. However, the results also find that democracies in general grant 
asylum slightly more than non-democracies, and autocracies grant asylum less compared to non-
autocracies. While the results did not find support for all hypotheses, this study concludes that on 
average, politics and commercial relations between states affect refugee recognition rates.  It 
supports the conclusions drawn by Betts (2013) that elite interests drive state responses to forced 
migrants.  Equally, it supports the findings of Neumayer (2005a) and Rosenblum and Salehyan 
(2004) that origin-specific recognition rates vary across host states.   
This chapter discusses the results and findings from Chapter Four in more detail.  Some 
of the hypotheses found no support. Some of these hypotheses found statistical significance, but 
contrary to what was expected. However, this study finds that on most occasions, state interests 
drive or deny compliance. Chapter Five begins with the interpretation of the findings based on 
the hypotheses. It discusses possible explanations of the results. Some of these results seem 
inconsistent, particularly with the domestic politics variables. The chapter then proceeds to 
comment on signatory host states.  While the majority of states are signatories of the 1951 and 
the 1967 Protocol, most of the results find that even after controlling for signatory states, 
	 96	
political and economic relations affect refugee status granting. This suggests that while states 
adhere to their international obligations, political motives also affect refugee status granting.  
Finally, the significance of the study and implications for future research are described. 
5.2 Discussion and Interpretation of Findings  
 
5.2.1 Bilateral Relations: Rivals 
 
One of the motivations of this study is to understand what drives asylum granting.  Often 
times, refugees are seen as a burden on the host state. Therefore, it is imperative to inquire what 
motivates states to grant refugee status to asylum-seekers. Section 2.4 describes the role of 
bilateral relations between the asylum and sending states, and its effect on asylum granting.  The 
foreign policy goals of countries impact refugee recognition rates for asylum-seekers. Refugee 
status granting acknowledges the individual cannot live safely in his or her country of origin.  
Granting asylum may create unfavorable relations with the sending state. However, rivals states 
often use such opportunities to weaken the opposition state.  
Interstate rivalry is often investigated within international relations literature, especially 
in research revolving around conflict.  However, most international relations research has 
ignored the role that rivalries play with refugee hosting and asylum granting. With the exception 
of the work by Moorthy and Brathwaite (2016), little to no studies have incorporated a large-N 
analysis to date.  Despite this, most empirical cases find support for the role that rivalries play in 
accepting asylum-seekers.  Chapter Two commented on the rivalry between Lansana Conté of 
Guinea, Liberia’s Charles Taylor, and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone.  Lansana 
Conté was keen on hosting refugees fleeing Liberia and Sierra Leone.  Moreover, Guinea 
provided the Liberian rebels fighting against Charles Taylor a safe haven in its refugee camps. In 
a similar fashion, the United States and other Western states were more likely to grant asylum to 
	 97	
those fleeing rival Communist states during the Cold War.  For example, the Reagan 
administration showed partiality to those fleeing the leftist governments of Cuba and Nicaragua 
compared to those fleeing El Salvador, Guatemala, and Haiti (Rosenblum and Salehyan 2004, 
684). Despite the fact that many of these individuals were forced to flee for more or less the 
same reasons, the United States gave different preferences for refugee status granting depending 
on the nationalities of asylum-seekers.  A 1982 memo from the Central American Refugee 
Center in Washington, quoted in Teitelbaum (1984, 439), stated the United States was the only 
nation who did not recognize El Salvadorians as legal refugees. The memo claimed there were 
two reasons for doing so.  First, the United States government supported the El Salvadorian 
regime, and did not want to communicate to the international community that the El Salvadorian 
government engaged in human rights abuses (Teitelbaum 1984, 439). Second, the memo stated 
American refusal to provide refugee recognition to El Salvadorian asylum-seekers was also done 
in order to suppress possible opposition to American foreign policy in El Salvador. In other 
words, undocumented individuals would be less likely to speak up against the United States’ role 
in El Salvador’s politics (Teitelbaum 1984, 439).  Acknowledging that individuals have a well-
founded fear of persecution also accepts that these individuals have a moral right to oppose their 
home state’s regime (Weiner 1992, 106). This may also jeopardize relations between states.  
Therefore, it was first hypothesized that receiving states will grant asylum to individuals fleeing 
rival states compared to non-rival states.  The hypothesis is supported in the full model, among 
contiguous dyads, and among host states that were signatories of the 1951 Convention.  In these 
models, full recognition rates were greater than total recognition rates (often by three or more 
percentage points), suggesting that rival states indeed offer greater levels of refugee status 
compared to non-rival states.  The findings suggest that interstate rivalry motivates states to grant 
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refugee status to these asylum seekers. The full base model shows that individuals receiving 
asylum increases by 14.8 percentage points in rival dyads compared to non-rivals. The results 
support the findings in Moorthy and Brathwaite (2016), and align with case studies that claim 
states use refugees to undermine rival states.   
The findings for contiguous dyads are not surprising, given that many conflicts among 
states are due to border issues. Similar to the base model, refugee status increases by 14.8 
percentage points in rival contiguous dyads. Refugees also tend to migrate to neighboring states 
first (Moorthy and Brathwaite 2016; Moore and Shellman 2007), which can thus increase rivalry 
among contiguous dyads.  For example, Figure 4 in Section 2.2 shows Turkey hosted the 
majority of refugees in 2015.  As Moorthy and Brathwaite (2016) mention, Turkey has been 
particularly outspoken against the Syrian regime. Specifically, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has 
vocally expressed discontent with Bashar al-Assad. Similarly, in Eastern Africa, a recent article 
in The Christian Science Monitor mentions Ethiopia’s generous hosting of refugees from its 
border rival, Eritrea (Jeffery 2017). The article discusses that cultural and religious similarities 
may explain Ethiopia’s generosity, but Ethiopia also believes that hosting Eritrean refugees will 
enhance regional stability. While this claim is not necessarily false, there may be another 
strategic reason, which is to undermine the rival Eritrean regime.  Ethiopia and Eritrea fought 
against one another in a border war between 1998 and 2000.  Since then, their bilateral relations 
have been adversarial.  Ethiopia has given refuge to Eritrean opposition groups hoping to top 
Eritrea’s leader, Isaias Afwerki.  Similarly, Ethiopia consistently accused Eritrea of supporting 
Ethiopian rebels (Al Jazeera 2012).  While it is possible that Ethiopia’s hosting of Eritrea 
refugees are based on altruism, given their history and hosting of rebels, it is somewhat 
questionable. Other reasons may influence Ethiopia’s hosting of Eritrean refugees.   
	 99	
Signatory rival states grant refugee status recognition more compared to non-rival 
signatory host states by 16.4 percentage points.  The results are not significant in non-signatory 
host states.  One reason for this explanation may be due to the fact that most states are 
signatories of the refugee convention. Also, many non-signatories do not have many rivals. 
However, the results are also not significant in non-contiguous dyads. This is in contrast to the 
recent findings from Moorthy and Braithwaite (2016)’s study. Moorthy and Brathwaite (2016) 
find refugee population numbers increase in rival host states for both contiguous and non-
contiguous dyads.  Their study analyzes the variables of interests between 1951 and 2008; 
therefore, it encompasses a larger temporal space. Currently, there are few rivals occurring 
between non-contiguous states.  Most of these rival symmetries are between major powers, or 
with one minor and one major power. Many rival states are found within geographical proximity 
to one another.  Most of the empirical evidences suggested in Chapter Two claims that rivals are 
more likely to host refugees from adversary states.  However, many of these states share a 
border. Territorial disputes often lead to conflict (Huth 2000).  While it seems somewhat 
optimistic to suggest that signatory host states grant asylum to asylum-seekers from rival states, 
the protection rights for these refugees may be neglected.  This is further explained below in 
Section 5.3, which provides a commentary on signatory host states.  
Refugees increasingly became manipulated between superpowers during the Cold War in 
order to enhance state interests. As thousands, and sometimes millions, of individuals fled to 
escape violence and persecution, these individuals were often manipulated as a result of the 
geopolitics between super and regional powers (Stedman and Tanner 2003). Currently, refugees 
and other migrants are also manipulated due to the bilateral relations between the sending and 
host states. In the case of Angola, Congolese migrants are constantly deported in waves back to 
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the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Betts 2013). Many Congolese also suffer extreme human 
rights abuses in Angola.  Most Congolese in Angola support the Angolan party, União Nacional 
para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), the opposition party to Angola’s ruling party 
since 1975, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola – Partido do Trabalho (MPLA). The 
treatment of Congolese migrants in Angola portrays that even today, incentives and state 
interests affect how host states treat forced migrants. The results from this study find support for 
the role that host states play in granting refugee status recognition to asylum-seekers from rival 
states for current, post-Cold War years.  This suggests that rivalries still influence asylum 
granting. While refugees may be perceived as a burden on the host state, states are willing to 
grant refugee status recognition to asylum-seekers and bare the costs of doing so if it may 
potentially undermine their rivals.   
5.2.2 Bilateral Relations: Alliances 
States are more likely to grant asylum to asylum-seekers from adversarial countries, 
because the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.  In a similar line of logic, the second 
hypothesis suggests that states will be more restricted in providing refugee recognition to 
asylum-seekers from a sending state, if both states belong to an alliance compared to dyads that 
are not in similar pacts. First, host states in a similar alliance with the sending state may share an 
affinity towards the sending state’s government. Second, Section 2.4.2 explains that states often 
endure costs when they join military alliances.  If there were no costs to joining an alliance, 
states would do so more freely (Morrow 2000, 65).  When states join an alliance, they may lose a 
part of their autonomy when they do so.  If states do not uphold their part of the treaty, such as 
refusing to intervene when another state in the alliance is attacked, these states will undergo 
large, reputational costs.  Similar to rival dyads, with the exception of Moorthy and Brathwaite 
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(2016), most forced migration studies overlook the role that alliances have with accepting or 
denying asylum-seekers.   
Chapter Four illustrates that the research finds statistical significance across most models 
for refugee recognition rates, but no significance was found for host states that are non-
signatories.  However, the directionality of the findings was not as expected.  The results suggest 
that refugee status actually increases among alliances. The expected value for alliances granting 
full refugee status compared to non-alliances were quite low, around 4 – 5 percentage points, 
compared to 14 – 16 percentage points for rivals versus non-rivals.  The results in this study do 
not currently support empirical cases that claim asylum seekers from allied states have been 
denied asylum.  The results find that refugee status recognition increases by 4 percentage points 
in the base model and in non-contiguous dyads.  In signatory host states, refugee recognition 
rates increase by 4.5 percentage points.  Refugee recognition rates increase by 5.1 percentage 
points in contiguous dyads.   
The outcomes of this research also align with most of the findings of Moorthy and 
Brathwaite’s study.  Moorthy and Brathwaite (2016) find that, contrary to their expectations, 
refugee stock numbers increase among dyads that are alliances with the exception of contiguous 
dyads.  In contiguous allied dyads, refugee stock numbers actually decrease in their model.  
Moorthy and Brathwaite (2016) claim one explanation for this regards that there may be “less 
political opposition to refugees originating from distant allied states” (13).  Also, host states may 
be able to turn individuals more efficiently at the border compared to those fleeing from non-
contiguous states (Moorthy and Brathwaite 2016, 14). However, the findings in this research 
overall do not support Moorthy and Brathwaite (2016)’s findings that allied, contiguous dyads 
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are more likely to have less refugees.  This research found that refugee recognition rates in 
contiguous dyads increase by 5 percentage points. 
One explanation for the different findings with contiguous dyads in this research 
compared to Moorthy and Brathwaite’s study may regard the use of different dependent 
variables.  The use of the refugee stock variables in their study may be capturing the effect of 
individuals being turned away at the border in allied states. However, the refugee recognition 
rates regard the rate of successful decisions for those who applied for asylum.  Therefore, one 
explanation may be that denying asylum is more difficult than denying individuals entry into the 
border. States can prevent individuals from entering their borders. When an individual applies for 
asylum, his or her application must be reviewed. Depending on the host state, asylum 
applications often go through multiple channels.  Therefore, while asylum officers and other 
workers can deny asylum, it may be slightly more difficult to do so compared to denying an 
individual entry through a border.  More so, UNHCR’s refugee stock variables claim the 
individual is a refugee, or in “refugee like-situations,” which excludes asylum-seekers.  In other 
words, if the individual can only apply for asylum in the host state, denying he or she entry into 
the country will prevent the individual from applying for asylum in the first place. (In the case of 
countries like the United States, individuals can apply for asylum in their host country or in the 
United States. Therefore, this is assuming that the individual did not apply for asylum once the 
individual left his or her country of origin). Given that most forced migrants flee to bordering 
states, this may explain why contiguous allies grant asylum more than the other models, and why 
the findings do not align with Moorthy and Braithwaite (2016)’s results that refugee stock 
variables decrease in allied, contiguous states.  
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Another explanation may be that the number of applicants applying for asylum is greater 
in contiguous host states compared to non-contiguous states.  As previously mentioned, 
individuals often flee to neighboring states.  Individuals that escape to states that are further in 
terms of mileage have to spend more money in transit, buying multiple passports, and other 
expenses. The results in this research find that refugee status recognition rates increase about ten 
percentage points more on average in contiguous dyads compared to non-contiguous dyads may 
be capturing the fact that there might be more applications on average in contiguous host states 
than non-contiguous states.  
With regards to the overall findings, another explanation provided by Moorthy and 
Braithwaite regards these conclusions “may be capturing broader migration patterns” (14). For 
example, the authors claim that increases in the refugee variable for non-contiguous states may 
overlap with the fact that refugees will migrate to popular Western state destinations.  In fact, 
most of the models in this study found that asylum increases in host states with greater GDP 
differences from the sending state.   
Moore and Shellman (2007) also explored why refugees seek asylum in certain countries 
over others.  They analyzed if dyadic military alliances increase or decrease refugee flows into 
the host state.  They argue that military alliances can either attract or repel refugees.  On the one 
hand, alliances can repel refugee flows from allied sending states given their possible affinity for 
the sending state’s regime.  On the other hand, allied host states may attract refugees to seek 
asylum there, due to low transaction costs and familiarity with the host state (similar to states 
with colonial ties, but not as pronounced) (Moore and Shellman 2007, 817).  Their findings 
suggest that host states in a military alliance with the sending state slightly decrease the number 
of refugees from allied states.  However, the base model in this study and the complete model in 
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Moorthy and Braithwate (2016) do not align with Moore and Shellman (2007)’s results regarding 
allied dyads.  This suggests that the findings with rival and allied dyads warrant further analysis.   
Chapter Three explains the complications revolving around use of the refugee stock 
variables, and why the use of rates better tests the hypotheses for this research.  The differences 
between the findings in this study and the recent study by Moorthy and Braithwaite (2016) 
suggest that different uses of different dependent variables will yield to diverse results.  
Therefore, future studies should continue to analyze how allies and rivals affect asylum rates.  
Furthermore, the significance of alliances should also be studied.  Neither this study, nor 
Moorthy and Brathwaite (2016), differentiate between the different types of alliances.  However, 
both this study and Moorthy and Brathwaite (2016) exclude non-aggression pacts, as mentioned 
in Chapter Three.  Future studies should differentiate between the types of military treaties 
signed between the host and sending states.  For example, in the Correlates of War Formal 
Alliances Dataset, there are four kinds of commitments—defense, neutrality, non-aggression, 
and entente.  The defense pact is the highest type of commitment where allies are committed to 
come to the aid of another member state if attacked.  In entente pacts, members must consult 
with one another in times of crisis.  Neutral and non-aggression pacts mean member states 
pledge to remain neutral or withhold force.  Therefore, future studies should explore how 
specific types of commitments affect asylum granting.  If, as empirical evidence suggests, host 
states in alliances do not want to jeopardize their pacts with the sending states, then future 
studies should examine how different kinds of pacts affect asylum granting. For example, in 
exploring militarized dispute initiations, Leeds (2003) finds that the type of alliance commitment 
will affect whether militarized disputes will occur.  Specifically, she finds that defense pacts are 
less likely to initiate disputes, while neutral and offensive pacts make militarized disputes more 
	 105	
likely.  In other words, the likelihood of militarized disputes between two states depends on the 
type of commitment and the kind of treaty signed between the dyad. The specific content of the 
treaty determines the probability of conflict.  In a similar fashion, the type of treaties signed 
could explain whether asylum granting will be more or less likely.  If defense pacts are the 
greatest type of commitment, then perchance, dyads that have signed these types of treaties have 
more at stake, which may not be limited to studies on militarized disputes. Therefore, it should 
be expected that host states that signed this particular agreement will be less likely to grant 
asylum to individuals from the sending state, compared to neutral and entente pacts.  However, 
overall, the findings suggest that rival dyads grant asylum more than non-rival dyads by double-
digit percentage points.  The percentage points for these findings exceeded the findings for 
alliances that granted asylum 5 percentage points more on average than non-allied dyads. 
Therefore, future studies should also continue to examine the role that rivalries and alliances play 
in asylum granting.  
5.2.3 Bilateral Relations: Trade 
Based on the literature in Section 2.4.3, it is hypothesized that states that trade with one 
another will grant asylum less compared to dyads that do not trade with one another.  It was also 
hypothesized that increases in bilateral trade will decrease refugee status recognition rates. States 
normally want to preserve their economic ties with other states.  The opportunity costs of trade 
are often analyzed within the international conflict literature.  As Section 2.4.3 explains, the 
economic benefits that states gain from trading with other states increases the costs of engaging 
in conflict.  Bilateral trade may also increase the costs of granting asylum to forced migrants 
from trading partner states. Similar to alliances and rival dyads, states do not want to tarnish their 
reputation with the sending state by granting asylum to asylum-seekers from states with 
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economic interests. More so, commercial ties between states may motivate host states to prevent 
granting refugee status recognition to potential dissidents.  
The results in Chapter Four found no support for hypothesis 3B. There is no support for 
the claim that countries that trade with one another will be less likely to grant asylum to 
individuals from the sending state, compared to dyads that do not trade with one another.  Oddly, 
though, the results found support for hypothesis 3A that claims when bilateral trade between the 
host and sending states increases, asylum granting to these asylum-seekers decreases.  Perhaps a 
reason for such conflicting results regards the exchange variable (EXCHANGEijt) is coded as “1” 
if both states trade with one another. Sometimes, the scale is tilted in commercial and economic 
relationships. A state may be dependent on a certain country (or countries) for goods, although 
this state does not export equally as much to these states.  Therefore, future refugee studies 
should examine the amount of trade the refugee sending state imports into the host state, and 
how this amount affects refugee status granting. For example, if the potential host state is an 
import-dependent country, then perhaps the host state will be less likely to grant asylum to 
migrants who come from states that import heavily into the host state.  
However, despite the results found with the exchange variable, Chapter Four 
demonstrates commercial interests between states affect refugee recognition rates. These results 
support the international relations literature observed in Chapter Two, which argues that trade 
between states normally prevents states from engaging in conflict with one another.  While the 
dissertation does not examine conflict, it supports this set of literature insofar that it emphasizes 
that states often do not want to jeopardize their commercial agreements. In the case of granting 
asylum, states do not seek to risk their commercial interests.  Therefore, as trade between two 
countries increase, these host states grant refugee status less to individuals from the sending 
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state. These results also support the international relations literature that argues trade affects the 
likelihood of conflict initiation insofar that states do not wish to jeopardize their commercial 
agreements, and thus do not engage in conflict. Similarly, states do not seek to risk their 
commercial interests, and thus, are less likely to grant refugee status rates to these asylum-
seekers. Doing so is to admit that these individuals are being persecuted in their home state, and 
this may threaten commercial relations with the sending states. This variable offers promising 
avenues for future research. 
The results also show support for the unrestricted model, for signatory host states, 
contiguous dyads, and for non-contiguous dyads.  However, according to Figures 5c and 6c in 
Chapter Four, the greatest effect trade has on refugee recognition rates is among contiguous 
dyads, much more than non-contiguous dyads. States often trade with neighboring states.  For 
example, Chapter Two mentions that Mexico signed a trade agreement with the Central 
American Northern Triangle (Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala). Likewise, deportations in 
Mexico have risen; the majority of these deported individuals come from the Northern Triangle.  
As stated, forced migrants generally migrate to neighboring states.  Therefore, the model may be 
capturing this effect. Similar effects have been found with Thailand and (what was then) Burma 
(now Myanmar). Hyndman (2001) argues that bilateral economic relations between Thailand and 
Burma affected protection for Burmese refugees in Thailand at the time of her writing. She 
maintains that as economic integration with Thailand progressed, protection for Burmese 
refugees became more negotiable (Hyndman 2001, 39).  For many years, the Burmese suffered 
human rights abuses, and are either internally displaced, or have fled to other nations, such as to 
surrounding Asian states.  At the time of Hyndman’s article, Thailand was Burma’s main 
investor (currently it is China).  Hyndman claims that Thai investment in Burma declined in 
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1995 after the Burmese government accused Thailand of hosting Burmese dissidents.  When 
relations began to improve around 1997, the Thai government anxiously sought to rid Burmese 
refugees around its border after infrastructure plans were made with Burma (Hyndman 2001, 
43).   
These results also support the model analyzing only signatory host states.  While the 
effects are not as strong, the results showed a consistent decline that as trade increased, refugee 
status decreased. This is cause for concern, because the results propose that commercial interests 
affect refugee status granting even for states that signed the 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protocol.  As mentioned earlier, with the exception of Rosenblum and Salehyan (2004), studies 
have not thoroughly examined how bilateral trade affects asylum granting.  Therefore, future 
research should continue to examine how commercial interests affect asylum granting, in 
particular with regards to bilateral relations where the host state is import-dependent. Hyndman 
(2001) stresses that economic cooperation between states not only changes the meaning and 
values of political borders, but also the meaning and values of migrants (39).  Therefore, refugee 
studies and forced migration research should continue to examine how commercial interests 
between states affect refugee recognition rates.   
5.2.4 Regime-Type: Autocracies  
Although refugees may be viewed as a burden in the host state, government elites in 
autocratic states may use refugee populations in order to enhance state interests without the 
constraints of routine elections and voters. For example, it was mentioned that autocracies must 
often establish credibility with the international community.  Thus, hosting refugees can allow 
autocratic states to improve their reputation within the international sphere.  It was hypothesized 
that autocracies will grant refugee status to asylum-seekers more than non-autocratic regimes.  
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The findings did not support the hypothesis.  Autocracies provide refugee status recognition less 
on average compared to non-autocracies.   In the unrestricted base model, refugee status 
recognition falls by almost 7 percentage points compared to non-autocracies.  However, in the 
same model, refugee status and other forms of protection falls by less than 5 percentage points 
compared to non-autocracies.  Therefore, one explanation could be that autocratic states 
compared to non-autocratic countries may be providing other forms of lesser protection in lieu of 
full Convention status.   
However, the findings for autocratic regimes and non-autocratic regimes are particularly 
interesting when we compare the results for signatory states and non-signatory states. In 
autocratic states that are signatories of the Convention, refugee status recognition rates fall by 
10.5 percentage points on average. However, in non-signatory states refugee status rates increase 
by 16 percentage points compared to non-autocratic states. The hypothesis is supported in the 
model for non-signatory host states.  Given these findings, these numbers were further examined.  
As noted before, because of the limitations of the number of years used, there are not too many 
autocratic regimes in the world.  Most of these regimes are found in the Middle East, particularly 
in the Arabian Gulf States. Other autocracies are found in Asia and in Africa. 
In terms of the number of autocratic states, about half of autocracies in the dataset were 
non-signatory states and about half were signatory states.  With the exception of Cuba, Laos, and 
Uzbekistan, most non-signatory, autocratic states are found in the Arabian Gulf.  Cuba hosts a 
small refugee population, averaging less than 10 refugees per every 100,000 inhabitants.  More 
so, not too many individuals apply for asylum in Cuba.  However, most individuals applying for 
asylum arrive from Ethiopia, Eritrea, and currently Syria.  Most of these individuals were 
recognized as refugees.  Libya is also a non-signatory, autocratic state (coded as such until 2011) 
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that hosts around 176 refugees per 100,000 inhabitants between 2000 and 2013.  Most 
individuals seeking asylum in Libya originate from the African continent.  Most of these asylum-
seekers originate from Liberia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Iraq.  There 
are also large amounts of Eritreans applying for asylum in Libya.  For the most part, asylum-
seekers have been granted refugee status recognition with steady increases after 2006.  In 2006, 
the United States removed Libya from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.  According to 
Human Rights Watch, Libya’s reintegration into the international community quickened around 
2007, though Libya still participates in grave human rights infractions (Human Rights Watch 
2008).  Around 2007, Libya also began to increase economic liberalization such as by allowing 
foreign banks to place branches in Libya (El-Amir 2007).  Therefore, one explanation in the case 
of Libya could regard Libya’s cooperation with refugees began around the time the country 
reintegrated back into the international community despite not being a signatory state.  However, 
Libya is a case that should continue to be monitored given its role during current refugee crisis. 
Most forced migrants cross into Libya prior to arriving in Europe. Libya is seen as the gateway 
to Europe. However, Libya has also been accused of hosting refugees in extremely harsh 
conditions.  Therefore, while Libya also hosts refugees, it often comes at a price with refugees 
being kept in cruel conditions. Around the time Libya reintegrated into the international 
community, the European Union also enticed Muammar Qaddafi to begin cooperating with 
European governments, such as Italy, to prevent migrants from crossing into Europe.  Therefore, 
Libya’s asylum granting might be reflective of these events.  However, given that the dataset 
ends in 2013, these numbers do not reflect the current migrant crisis and leaves much to be 
missing from the story. Given Libya’s current shift to a transit state and an anocracy, research on 
autocratic non-signatory states should continue in order to examine if autocratic, non-signatory 
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states continue to grant asylum more on average compared to non-autocratic, non-signatory 
states.   
Syria is another autocratic, non-signatory state.  Between 2006 and 2011, Syria hosted 
well over one million refugees.  Despite the gradual decline of its refugee population, in 2013 
there were 4884 thousand refugees per 100,000 inhabitants in Syria (though, it is assumed these 
numbers have dramatically declined).  While individuals applying for asylum come from many 
different states, the majority are from Somalia (with about over 90 % of individuals receiving 
refugee recognition since 2007) and Iraq. Several hundred people from the Sudan have applied 
for asylum in Syria; however, less than 50 % of Sudanese individuals receive refugee status 
recognition in Syria for most years in the dataset.  It is not clear as to why this is the case. There 
is currently not much to be said with regards to Syrian and Sudanese bilateral relations. 
However, an article by the New York Times claims that the Sudan sold arms to Qatar to then 
distribute to Syrian rebels (Chivers and Schmitt 2013).  While it may be the case that the 
Sudanese government wishes to overthrow the Syrian regime, this arms deal may just be 
reflective of the current economic crisis looming in the Sudan. However, Syria’s hesitancy with 
granting refugee status to Sudanese may be due to Syria’s suspicion that the Sudan desires to 
over throw the Syrian government.  Many individuals from Iran have applied for asylum in 
Syria, but less than half are granted (with the exception in 2006 when 80% of Persians were 
granted asylum in Syria). This is unsurprising given that Iran and Syria are allies.  However, 
Syria has been quite hospitable towards asylum-seekers from Afghanistan and African states.  In 
fact, Syria has always been particularly generous towards Somali refugees since the 1990s.  
Upon closer inspection, many of Syria’s refugee population are from Iraq with numbers often 
reaching over one million. In 2013, about 50 % of Iraqi asylum-seekers were granted asylum; 
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however, in previous years, the asylum rate for Iraqis averaged around 20% with the exception 
of 2004 where almost 60% of Iraqis received refugee status recognition. These numbers may 
reflect the improved bilateral relations between Iraq and Syria (where before relations were more 
tense). However, it should be noted that these numbers are based on the asylum-seeker database. 
Syria has always hosted Iraqi refugees, and was vocally opposed to the United States invasion of 
Iraq. Therefore, another reason why such asylum numbers seem low for Iraqi asylum-seekers 
may be due to the fact that Syria hosted many Iraqis, often topping over one million. Both Syria 
and Iraq are mostly Sunni Muslims, though, many Iraqi Shi’a also settled in Syria.  While Syria 
may have been selective in granting asylum to certain nationalities, it has hosted many other 
refugee populations. However, given the current crisis in Syria, many Iraqis and other former 
refugees, have also fled alongside Syrians.  
Repressive Gulf states host small refugee populations.  In the case of Saudi Arabia, 
individuals from only a handful of states apply for asylum, and often the number of individuals 
applying for asylum in Saudi Arabia from a given origin state reaches less than 100 applicants.  
Most individuals who receive asylum in Saudi Arabia come from African states or other Arab 
nations.  One explanation for why non-signatory autocracies grant asylum more than non-
autocratic, non-signatories, could be that many individuals do not apply for asylum in these 
states. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the state’s refugee recognition rates could reflect the lack of 
individuals applying for asylum in the first place.   
Similarly, the government of Qatar is a hereditary monarchy with Sharia law as its form 
of legislation.  Polity IV scores Qatar as a -10, the lowest score on the scale.  Qatar is neither a 
signatory of the 1951 Convention nor the 1967 Protocol. According to UNHCR, Qatar’s total 
refugee population is less than 100 individuals, with the exception of 2013 when its total refugee 
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population was at 130.  Qatar’s population is around two million, and has a low refugee 
population per capita.  Qatar has often granted asylum to Iraqis; however, this may soon change 
given their improvement in diplomatic relations with Iraq.  Similar to Saudi Arabia, not too 
many individuals from only from a handful of states apply for asylum in Qatar.  Other states in 
the Gulf, such as Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman also have small refugee 
populations.  It is still unclear as to why non-signatory autocratic states grant asylum more than 
non-signatory, non-autocratic states.  However, it could be because not too many individuals 
apply for asylum in autocratic states in the first place. Therefore, given the low rate of 
individuals applying for asylum, these states may be more likely to grant asylum. Also, most 
individuals only come from a handful of nations, such as surrounding Arab nations or from 
African states such as Somalia and other East African States. In the case of the Gulf States, most 
of these host states are open to hosting other Muslim refugees. Similarly, states like Syria were 
against the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Therefore, the Syrian government was more prone to host 
hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees until the recent civil war in Syria. Eritrea is also a 
repressive state with about 100 refugees per 100,000 inhabitants.  The majority of these refugees 
are from Somalia and Ethiopia.  Eritrea generally grants refugee status recognition, but most 
individuals applying for asylum in Eritrea come from a small handful of sending states. 
What we can conclude from these analyses is that while autocratic, non-signatory states 
are more likely to grant asylum, these numbers are based upon a small handful of sending states.  
Moreover, most of these states are located in the Gulf, and are more likely to grant asylum to 
individuals from surrounding areas.  This might be one explanation as to why non-signatory 
autocratic states are more likely to grant refugee status recognition compared to non-signatory 
non-autocratic states.  
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On the contrary, signatory autocratic states grant asylum less on average compared to 
signatory, non-autocratic states.  The refugee recognition rates fell by an average of 10 
percentage points, and the total recognition rates fell by 9.8 percentage points for autocratic 
states that were signatories of the refugee convention.  Whereas the majority of non-signatory 
autocratic states are in the Gulf region, signatory autocratic states vary geographically.  Belarus 
is a signatory state, often known as the last dictatorship in Europe.  Overall, according to the 
dataset, Belarus contains several observations where refugee recognition rates are found at zero 
percent.   In other cases, other forms of protection were provided instead of refugee status 
recognition.  In Belarus, Iraqi asylum-seekers were often granted other forms of protection 
instead of refugee status recognition. With the exception of 2012, most of the asylum rates for 
Iraqis were at zero percent.   
According to the same dataset, Azerbaijan was hospitable towards Afghan and Russian 
asylum-seekers (and often times towards Iraqis), but barely provided any asylum towards 
Pakistani asylum-seekers. The latter is probably due to Azerbaijan and Pakistan being alliances 
with generally good diplomatic relations.  Azerbaijan averaged about 33 percent refugee status 
recognition for Iranians. Morocco was also an autocracy, and recently has been coded as an 
anocracy in Polity IV.  However, the government of Morocco is often defined as repressive and 
authoritarian.  Morocco is a signatory of both the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol.  
Recently, Morocco, as well as Algeria, was criticized for their refusal to aid Syrian asylum-
seekers who were stranded at the Moroccan-Algerian border. Humans Rights Watch also 
condemned Morocco for its treatment of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa (Human Rights 
Watch 2014).  According to UNHCR’s dataset, Morocco is more likely to grant asylum for 
asylum seekers from Sierra Leone and Senegal.   However, in several cases, Morocco neither 
	 115	
granted refugee status recognition, nor complementary protection. For example, with the 
exception of 2012, Morocco did not grant any refugee recognition to individuals from the 
Gambia.  Similar rates were found for individuals fleeing Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Mali, and 
Nigeria.  While these refugee recognition rates were not found at zero percent, the numbers were 
quite low averaging around one percent despite hundreds of Nigerians applying for asylum in 
Morocco. Human rights abuses are especially well documented in Nigeria, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, 
and in the Gambia under Yahya Jammeh.  Morocco granted asylum to those leaving the Congo 
and the Democratic of the Congo; however, these numbers fluctuate. Refugee recognition rates 
were greater in some years over others.   
What we can conclude from these cases is that non-signatory autocratic states grant 
asylum more on average compared to non-signatory non-autocracies. However, signatory 
autocracies grant asylum less overall compared to signatory non-autocracies.  The first case may 
very well reflect that not too many individuals apply for asylum in non-signatory autocratic 
states. As stated earlier, many of these states are Gulf Arab states.  Many of these authoritarian 
states host small refugee populations. With the exception of Syria, many of these individuals 
applying for asylum in the Gulf come from predominantly Muslim majority nations.  However, 
in the case of signatory autocracies, these states are not confined to only one geographic region.  
Autocratic signatory states grant refugee status recognition about 10.5 percentage points less 
than non-autocratic signatory states, and about 9.8 percentage points less for the combined 
statuses.  Given these results, perhaps repressive regimes are indeed less likely to comply with 
international treaties. As mentioned earlier, Morocco and Algeria were both internationally 
condemned for keeping Syrian asylum-seekers stranded along their border in 2017. It is against 
Morocco’s international obligations to do so. More so, according to Human Rights Watch, two 
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of these individuals were in advance stages of pregnancy (Human Rights Watch 2017). The 
Human Rights Watch (2017) report states that such treatment of the pregnant women migrants 
may also be a violation of Moroccan law. Therefore, while the migration and refugee literature 
still debates whether democracies are more welcoming towards migrants compared to other 
regimes, the findings of this research conclude that the debate continues.  It may also be the case 
that autocracies are more likely to perhaps grant lesser forms of protection compared to 
Convention status recognition given that signatory autocracies grant refugee status recognition 
less compared to other forms of protection. 
Why are signatory, autocratic states less likely to adhere to the Refugee Convention? 
Why did these states sign the treaty in the first place? In the cases of Algeria and Morocco, 
Algeria signed the 1951 Convention in 1963, and the 1967 Protocol in 1967.  Morocco signed 
the 1951 Convention in 1956 and the 1967 Protocol in 1971.  Perhaps these states, as many other 
signatory states, did not foresee the dramatic change in forced migration patterns beginning in 
the 1990s.  After the Cold War, many individuals were displaced.  Similarly, in recent times, 
more and more people are becoming displaced, but also for much longer periods of time given 
the changes in forced migration patterns.  While many individuals are forced to flee because of 
generalized violence and persecution, others are forced to leave because of climate change or 
state failure.  Therefore, not only are the patterns of forced migration changing, but also the 
nature of forced migration. Given this, autocratic states may be less willing to adhere to the 
obligations set upon them by the refugee convention.  Besides for reasons mentioned where 
migrants may often be seen as a threat to the host state, some signatory autocratic states may also 
not have the financial resources to host refugees.  In the case of recent signatories such as 
Azerbaijan and Belarus, these states probably signed the refugee convention in order to maintain 
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some credibility within the international community.  However, they often do not oblige to their 
commitments probably for the same reasons mentioned above.   
There is no statistical significance for autocratic contiguous states; however, non-
contiguous autocratic states granted asylum less overall. Given these conclusions, and the 
differences between the refugee recognition rates and the total recognition rates, research that 
focuses on complementary status granting should examine if there are generalized trends with 
autocracies granting lesser forms of protection. Perhaps these results will be clearer in the future 
as more years are available in UNHCR’s population database.   
5.2.5 Regime-Type: Democracies 
Given their liberal ideals, it is often assumed that democracies will provide more open-
door immigration and asylum policies compared to non-democracies.  However, democracies 
may also be equally as restricted towards immigration.   Breunig, Cao, Luedtke (2012) find 
democracies often block immigration entry compared to autocracies.  Refugees and immigration 
are consistently a salient issue in the current geopolitical climate in the West.  Voters may view 
immigration and asylum granting with disapproval.  They may see migration as an economic or 
cultural threat.  Therefore, democratic leaders bare greater audience costs due to routine 
elections.  It was hypothesized that democracies are less likely than non-democracies to grant 
asylum.   
The results in Chapter 4 show there is no statistical significance with the unrestricted 
model for democratic host states. Similarly, there is no statistical significance for contiguous 
dyads and non-contiguous dyads. However, non-signatory democratic states grant asylum less 
than non-signatory, non-democratic states on average.  On the contrary, for democratic signatory 
states, refugee status recognition increases by 4 percentage points compared to non-democracies. 
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Similarly, convention and other forms of protection increase by two percentage points for 
democratic, signatory host states. These results seem to support the notion that democracies are 
more welcoming towards migrants compared to non-democracies.  However, there are more 
democracies in the world compared to non-democracies, and most states are signatory states. 
Therefore, increases in refugee status rates by four percentage points compared to non-
democracies are not terribly high. Support for the hypothesis is found with non-signatory host 
states. In non-signatory, democratic states refugee status recognition rates decrease by 9 
percentage points compared to non-democratic, non-signatory states. This is also in contrast to 
non-signatory autocratic states that find refugee status recognition rates in this model actually 
increase by 16 percentage points. These results were further investigated. 
 Most non-signatory, democratic states are found in Asia.  Some of these states host 
important refugee populations, with the prime example being India and the Tibetan refugee 
community. However, the average rate of asylum granting falls by 9.1 percentage points on 
average. While India has hosted the Tibetan government in exile, given that the country’s 
population is over one billion, India’s refugee population per capital numbers are small--around 
15 refugees per every 100,000 inhabitants. India’s small refugee population per capita is 
probably the result of its overpopulation. However, India has also granted asylum to other 
asylum-seekers such as to those from Somalia, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, and 
Myanmar. Nonetheless, the international community has criticized India for its treatment of 
Myanmar refugees, particularly the Rohingya, and for taking a stance of mere tolerance for these 
refugees (Ramzy 2015). The Rohingya are Muslim and considered stateless in Myanmar. Many 
Rohingya live in harsh conditions within the slums of Delhi (Zargar 2017). However, India has 
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not been too keen on granting asylum to other asylum-seekers, particularly to those from other 
African states.  
Pakistan went from being an autocratic regime to a democratic regime beginning around 
2010 in the dataset according to Polity IV. In 2010, the 18th Amendment to Pakistan’s 
Constitution passed, which turned Pakistan into a parliamentary republic.  However, their 
refugee population numbers have been more or less the same, altering between 800 and over 
1,000 refugees per 100,000 individuals despite their regime change. Pakistan has generally 
granted asylum to individuals fleeing Somalia, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq. Most of the refugees 
in Pakistan are from Afghanistan, toppling well over 1,000,000. Yet, these numbers recently 
changed. Pakistan, once one of the most generous host nations for Afghan refugees, forced 
hundreds of thousands of Afghans back to Afghanistan between 2016 and 2017.  Many young 
individuals forced back to Afghanistan were actually born in Pakistan to Afghan parents.  While 
it is unclear with regards to the motives of the recent Afghan crackdown, it may be due to the 
combination of Pakistan’s transition to a parliamentary system and security concerns. These 
security concerns became further instigated after the 2014 Peshawar school massacre, in which 
two Afghans also took part in the incident. As shown in Chapter Two, as of mid-2015 Pakistan 
has hosted most of the world’s refugees. However, given the recent events in Pakistan, we should 
continue to monitor Pakistan as these refugee numbers may dwindle in the future.  
Nepal is also a non-signatory, democratic regime that has generally granted asylum to 
individuals feeling Somalia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Pakistan, and Myanmar.48 However, according to the 
dataset, Nepal has not normally granted asylum to other states.  In fact, while it has hosted 
refugees from the Bhutan, according to UNHCR’s dataset on asylum-seekers, Nepal barely 
																																																								48	Nepal was coded as a democracy by Polity IV in 2000 and 2001, and again between 2006 and 2013.  
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granted refugee status recognition to hundreds of individuals fleeing the Bhutan in recent years. 
Between 2000 and 2013 Nepal averaged zero percent in granting refugee status recognition to 
those fleeing Bhutan; however, it granted other forms of lesser protection, averaging around 88.9 
% between 2000 and 2013.  Bhutan is known for persecuting ethnic and religious minorities, 
especially its Christian population.   
Thailand is coded as a democracy between 2000 and 2005, and again between 2011 and 
2013.  The country had a political crisis between 2005 and 2006 with a coup d’état in 2006. 
Thailand also had a political crisis between 2013 and 2014, with another coup d’état in 2014. 
Although the dataset does not cover 2014, the junta, The National Council for Peace and Order, 
has since ruled Thailand.  Individuals from an array of different sending states apply for asylum 
in Thailand.  For the most part, Thailand has typically granted asylum to individuals fleeing 
Somalia, Israel, China, Afghanistan, Iraq, Myanmar, and other regions. Thailand has been more 
likely to deny asylum to individuals leaving most African states, however.  Thailand hosts 
mostly Myanmar refugees. With the exception of between 2005 and 2007, where Thailand 
granted mostly complementary protection, Thailand granted refugee status recognition to over 
half of applicants applying for asylum from Myanmar.   
Similar to Thailand, Malaysia hosts mostly refugees from Myanmar. Malaysia is also a 
non-signatory state, but is coded as a democracy between 2008 and 2013.  Overall, both Thailand 
and Malaysia receive the largest number of asylum-seekers in the region (McConnahie 2014). 
Most Asian states, despite hosting a fair amount of refugees and despite not being signatory 
states, have often been criticized for their treatment of asylum-seekers and refugees.  Both 
Thailand and Malaysia do not have domestic legislation for protection and refugee status 
recognition, and have been handled through a variety of different methods in order to control 
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migration (McConnahie 2014, 630).  According to McConnahie (2014), Thailand also uses 
undocumented migrants as a source of cheap labor, many of whom should probably qualify for 
full Convention status (630). In Malaysia, immigrants that do not have refugee status often live 
in fear of detention, but there seems to be improvement in recent years and increases in 
negotiations between Malaysia and allowing UNHCR to work in the country (McConnahie 2014, 
630). This suggests that while democracies may provide asylum more than non-democracies, in 
the case of non-signatory states, human rights violations towards refugees and other migrants 
exist in these states. Moreover, McConnahie (2014) finds that many individuals who qualify for 
refugee status in these host states do not receive it. An article published in The Economist 
mentioned Thailand’s human rights abuses towards undocumented immigrants who have been 
exploited for labor (The Economist 2013).  The article states most of these immigrants come 
from Bangladesh, Myanmar, Laos, Philippines, Cambodia, and other states.  For example, with 
the exception of a few years, it is often the case that more than half of Cambodians who apply for 
asylum in Thailand do not receive refugee status recognition despite the fact that Cambodia has 
been ruled by Hun Sen, a former Khmer Rogue commander, since 1985.  
Similar to autocratic regimes, the findings of non-signatory democratic regimes do not 
tell us the whole story, and will perhaps benefit from a mixed methods approach.  While there 
are not many non-signatory states overall, these states were found to be less likely to grant 
refugee status compared to non-democracies, findings that were opposite to autocratic regimes.  
However, it is interesting to note that the majority of non-signatory democratic states were found 
in Asia, and the majority of non-signatory autocratic regimes were found mostly in the Middle 
East. However, while many of these Asian non-signatory states are defined as democracies, 
many of them are in the low end of the Polity scale (with score around a 6). Similarly, between 
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2000 and 2013, several of these states have fluctuated between democratic and anocratic regimes 
during this time period. The “highest” on the Polity IV scale for non-signatory states was India 
scoring a +9. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches with regional focuses will probably 
suit studies on non-signatory, democratic regimes, because most non-signatory democratic and 
autocratic regimes are found within particular regions. Many of these host states grant asylum, 
but also deny asylum to asylum-seekers that are probably deserving of Convention status 
recognition.  Non-signatory democratic states also seem to provide asylum more towards other 
Asian states, but are less likely to provide asylum to many individuals fleeing Africa with minor 
exceptions. The results of non-signatory democratic states granting asylum less on average than 
non-democratic non-signatory states is also probably capturing the effect that not many 
individuals apply for asylum in non-signatory autocratic countries.  Similarly, non-signatory 
anocracies are not generally attractive to asylum-seekers. However, as mentioned, it is also the 
case that many non-signatory Asian states are more likely to exploit migrants for labor. While 
signatory democracies provide refugee status recognition more on average compared non-
democracies by 4 percentage points, these numbers are not too high given that most of the 
world’s regimes are democracies, and most states are signatory states.  We should expect these 
numbers to be greater.  This suggests that while signatory democracies grant asylum more on 
average, other factors influence refugee status recognition rates in these as well.  Figure four in 
Chapter Two shows that the majority of the world’s refugee populations are not hosted in 
democratic states.  Section 5.3 provides a commentary on signatory states.   
5.2.6 Regime-Type: Democratization 
 As stated in the previous section, democratic leaders often have greater audience costs 
compared to non-democratic leaders. Often, voters see migration, both forced and voluntary, as 
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economic and cultural threats, and express their discontent through routine elections by voting 
pro-immigration and asylum supporters out.  In Section 2.5.1, the case of Tanzania states the 
country once had an open-door policy towards refugees, especially for other African refugees. 
However, Tanzania became more resistant in hosting refugees as the country began to 
democratize. Therefore, it was hypothesized that as levels of democratization increase in a host 
state, asylum rates in that state will decrease. The results are supported for the base model, 
signatory host states, and non-signatory states.  No statistical significance is found for contiguous 
states. However, increases in democratization slightly increased asylum rates for non-signatory 
host states. The findings for this hypothesis are perplexing given the results for autocracies and 
democracies.  At first glance, it seems almost contradictory. Therefore, it is imperative to 
thoroughly analyze these results. In the previous hypothesis, refugee status increased for 
autocratic non-signatory states, but decreased for democratic non-signatory states.  
As mentioned, autocracies and democracies were coded based on Polity IV scale where a 
score of between +6 and +10 is coded as a democracy and -10 and -6 was coded as an autocracy. 
Polity measures for electoral constraints on government leaders compared to Freedom House, 
which instead measures civil liberties. Although Polity IV is not a perfect measure for regime-
type, how Polity IV measures regimes is appropriate for this study compared to Freedom House. 
However, this research did not analyze a regime type known as “anocracy” which is often coded 
between -5 and +5.  These regimes are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic. Anocracies 
contain both democratic and autocratic characteristics, and are often unstable.  Therefore, 
refugee and forced migration studies will probably benefit from analyzing regimes in transition, 
and anocratic states.  In Chapter 2, research that analyzed forced migration and democratization 
are qualitative or case studies mainly focused on African states.  The research cited in Chapter 2 
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show that as African states became more democratic, refugee host states became more resistant 
in accommodating refugee populations, and often engage in mass deportations, especially around 
election years.   
However, as mentioned, the dataset is limited and asylum rates are not provided during 
the Cold War years when most African states began to transition to democratic regimes.  The 
true effect of regimes in transition will greatly benefit refugee studies research if asylum rates 
were provided for years before 2000.  Nevertheless, one explanation regarding the differences 
between democratization and the regime-type variables may be the result of pooling the scales in 
autocracies and democracies, and leaving the scale unrestricted for democratization.  In the case 
of non-signatory states, refugee status recognition in autocracies increased on average, and 
decreased on average for non-signatory democratic states. In contrast, refugee status recognitions 
increased in non-signatory states as democratization increases.  However, after further analysis 
within the data, there were only a handful of non-signatory states in which Polity IV scores 
increase over time.  One such case is Pakistan.  In 2000 and 2001 Polity IV designated Pakistan a 
score of -6, an autocracy, and between 2002 and 2006 Pakistan scored a -5. Pakistan then 
received a score of +2 in 2007, and +5 in 2008 and 2009. Between 2002 and 2009, Pakistan was 
considered to be an anocracy under Polity, and was coded as a democracy between 2010 and 
2012 with a score of +6, and in 2013 with a score of +7.  For the years provided in the dataset, 
Pakistan’s Polity score consistently increased.  For some cases, asylum rates increased alongside 
Polity’s score.  With Iranian asylum-seekers, refugee status recognition rates consistently 
increased between 2009 and 2013.  Asylum rates for Iraqi asylum-seekers increased in Pakistan 
around 2006, and similarly for Somali asylum-seekers around 2005. According to UNHCR’s 
asylum-seeker database, there were over 12,000 Afghan asylum-seekers pending asylum status, 
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with an extra 2380 asylum-seekers applying for refugee status in 2004. In 2004, less than 4 % of 
Afghan asylum-seekers received refugee recognition. Refugee recognition rates begin to 
dramatically increase for Afghans around 2007 and in 2011. For the most part, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan have frosty relations.   However, as previously mentioned, Pakistan began mass 
deportations of Afghans in recent years. Pakistan amended its constitution in 2010 and became a 
parliamentary system. Therefore, while the data may claim that increases in democratization for 
this non-signatory state also increased asylum rates for Afghans, due to the current wave of mass 
deportations, this particular case should continue to be monitored in the future.   
Despite the non-signatory states, most of the models support the hypothesis that increases 
in democratization lead to less asylum granting.  It supports past qualitative works that suggest 
less democratic states were more likely to provide asylum, and asylum rates decrease as states 
began to democratize.  These results also add to the international relations debate that coding for 
regime-types often seems more complicated (see for example, Munck and Verkuilen 2002; 
Plümper and Neumayer 2010; Treier and Jackman 2008).  However, the overall results support 
the literature that claimed that as states democratize, they become less likely to grant asylum. 
Future studies should continue to focus on how regime types, or regimes in transition, differ in 
asylum granting particularly in comparison to signatory and non-signatory host states.   
5.2.7 Elections 
Similar to the literature on regime-type, immigration and asylum can be frequently seen 
as a contested issue with voters.  Voters may see foreigners and refugees as threats.  The cases of 
Kenya and Tanzania not only demonstrate that asylum policies changed from relatively open-
door to hostile during democratization, but that tightening of border security and deportations 
often occurred around national and executive elections.  Negative public sentiment around 
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immigration can entice democratic leaders to implement austere asylum policies.  In recent 
events, immigration and the refugee crisis were salient issues during Brexit and the U.S. 
Presidential election. These issues continue to be significant topics throughout most European 
elections.  Both autocratic and democratic leaders wish to remain in power.  However, routine 
elections place added pressure on democratic government elites to be more aware of public 
opinion.  Therefore, it was hypothesized in Section 2.5.2 that in the year of an executive election, 
overall asylum rates will be lower compared to non-election years in order to please voters.   
The results found very minimal support for the hypothesis that national elections affect 
refugee status rates.  The results show an average of a one percentage point decrease in refugee 
status rates during election years in signatory states, and around a one percentage point decrease 
for non-contiguous states.  There may be a couple of explanations for why the results exhibit 
little to no support.  Most of the empirical cases in Section 2.5.2 mention how waves of 
deportations occurred during elections years. Therefore, future studies should continue to use 
directed dyads, but incorporate refugee stock variables instead.  It is possible that changes in 
actual asylum policies would not happen the year of the election, but perhaps the following year 
or thereafter.  In the case of the United States, national elections were held in November, but 
U.S. Presidents are not inaugurated until January of the following year.  The recent travel ban in 
the United States, which incorporates individuals from mostly predominately Muslim nations, 
first occurred a few weeks after inauguration in January of the following year.  Moreover, if 
some individuals from these nations affected by the U.S. travel ban hoped to apply once in the 
United States, they were prevented from doing so in the first place, and probably would have to 
apply for asylum in their home country. The asylum-seeker dataset contains figures for 
individuals that already applied for asylum.  It is for these reasons why the refugee stock 
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variable, albeit imperfect, will better suit this hypothesis.  The asylum-seeker dataset only 
contains figures for individuals that actually applied for asylum.  If they were prevented from 
applying for asylum, the dataset will not capture these figures.   
Quantitative work should analyze how changes in presidential terms affect asylum rates 
as a whole, and will probably be better suited if all asylum rates were pooled through the use of 
country year as the unit of analysis. Another avenue for future studies should examine how 
changes in executive leadership changes asylum rates between allied and rival countries.  For 
example, the Obama administration clamped down on Cuban asylum policies once diplomatic 
relations began to improve.  It is uncertain whether the Trump administration will reverse 
Obama’s policies on Cuban immigration; however, the current administration is still in its onset. 
Therefore, while executive elections may not affect actual asylum rates themselves, the changes 
in administrations in democratic states might.     
5.3 Commentary on Signatory States 
The introduction of this dissertation also asked, “Are treaties merely scraps of paper, or 
do they influence state behavior? Or do interests effect behavior?” Some of the results in the 
models for signatory host states are cause for concern. In the case of trade, signatory host states 
grant asylum less as trade increases with the sending states.  Commercial interests affect the 
willingness of signatory states to provide refugee status, as well as for both refugee status and 
other forms of protection.  The gradual decline of asylum and other forms of humanitarian 
protection by signatory states found with some of the models is also worrisome.   
One of the biggest topics in international relations and human rights literature regards 
whether treaties do or do not influence state behavior.  Often, the evidence suggests that human 
rights treaties do not improve a state’s human rights records. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) 
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find no evidence that ratifying UN human rights treaties improve human rights (1401).  
Hathaway (2002) claims that placing external pressure on states can entice them to commit to 
human rights commitments such as by ratifying human rights treaties; however, these treaties are 
only minimally monitored and enforced at best (2020). She suggests that the UN and regional 
organizations could not only work to enhance monitoring, but also provide assistance so that 
these countries could adhere to better human rights and treaty obligations (Hathaway 2002, 
2025). However, international enforcement is rather weak, and often do not go beyond naming 
and shaming (Hill 2010, 1162).  Naming and shaming may work to entice repressive 
governments to improve their human rights records, but it is not consistent.  Hafner-Burton 
(2008) looks at the relationship between international naming and shaming and human rights 
practices in 145 countries between 1975 and 2000.  Hafner-Burton (2008) finds that while there 
are some instances where naming and shaming forced governments to improve their human 
rights records, there were also instances where naming and shaming did not do so.  In fact, in 
some instances, naming and shaming made states more repressive.  Hafner-Burton claims certain 
types of naming and shaming may prevent states from taking action to lessen repression.  
While Hafner-Burton’s research analyzes human rights infractions done by states to their 
own citizens, the findings may be extended in light of recent events regarding the plight of 
refugees.  Around September 2015, during the climax of the refugee crisis in Europe, the 
Hungarian government was named and shamed by foreign media and governments due to their 
treatment of asylum-seekers and forced migrants, and their pushbacks against migrants and 
asylum-seekers attempting to enter through their southern border with Serbia.  However, despite 
such naming and shaming, Hungary built a barrier on its border with Croatia and Serbia.  Not 
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only does this prove that naming and shaming may not go far, but that state interests go farther 
than adhering to human rights accords.  
The refugee case is an interesting one, and proves to be a challenging line of research 
especially for human rights scholars.  Compliance with human rights treaties is difficult, but 
more so in the refugee case.  Refugees are individuals that have left their home countries, and are 
often not citizens of the host state.  Therefore, it is difficult to entice states to comply with 
hosting individuals that are not citizens of the state, and may come from different cultural and 
religious backgrounds.  The nature of geopolitics was different when the 1951 Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol were enacted. The original drafters of the Convention did not anticipate 
refugee crises to expand beyond Europe. In fact, they expected the UN refugee agency to only 
last about three years (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). The organization was not created to look 
towards the future, because it anticipated protecting only refugees at the time, and not so much as 
offering protection for future cases (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 81).  This makes implementing 
obligations to the Convention especially difficult.  The discussions in the above findings cause 
worry, particularly in models for signatory host states only.   
In this study rival signatory host states granted the most asylum. This seems to imply that 
while some states adhere to their international obligations, other political factors matter. Chapter 
One in Section 1.2 asked what are the protection gaps found with asylum implementation, 
meaning how do states enact their obligations under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol? 
Also, what incentives drive refugee hosting? Section 2.4.1 mentions the case of Guinea.  
Throughout the 1990s, the Guinean government hosted refugees fleeing conflict in neighboring 
Liberia and Sierra Leone. Rivals of the Guinean government were the Liberian dictator, Charles 
Taylor, and the Sierra Leone guerilla unit, the Revolutionary United Front.  As Section 2.4.1 
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emphasizes, human rights were violated when Guinea hosted Liberian rebel groups in camps, 
and forced Liberian refugees to transfer arms across the border.  Guinea is both a Convention 
signatory and a signatory of the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa.  These findings and the cases mentioned imply 
that despite host states are signatories of refugee convention treaties, refugees are often used as 
political pawns. While these states host refuges and grant asylum, they may be guilty of several 
human rights infractions, and states essentially do not adhere to all of their obligations according 
to the Convention.   
Democratic signatory states provide asylum about 4 percentage points more on average 
than non-democratic signatory states.  However, as mentioned, given that the majority of states 
between 2000 and 2013 are both democratic and signatory states, asylum granting should be 
greater. As Figures 3 and 4 highlight, most of the world’s refugees are confined to a few small 
states.  More so, as democratization increases, asylum rates decrease even among signatory host 
states. Autocratic non-signatory host states provided more asylum on average compared to non-
autocratic, non-signatory host states. This emphasizes that special interests affect asylum, 
especially when many autocratic, non-signatory states host refugees from a few, select countries. 
These findings align with studies, such as Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) and Hafner-Burton 
(2008) who claim that human rights treaties do not improve human rights records.  This is 
especially the case with the 1951 Convention that is supposed to protect individuals who have 
been forced to flee their home states, and are not citizens of the host state.   
5.4 Significance of Study 
 The preliminary results of the research find support that politics affects refugee status 
granting for asylum-seekers. Refugee status rates are not only based on altruism or generosity, 
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but rather, elite interests as affect refugee status granting.  This is significant for both 
international relations and human rights research.  Chapter One stresses that international 
relations research has rarely analyzed how politics drive or deny asylum rates across countries.  
This study is a first attempt.  The results and the findings imply that international relations 
scholars should continue to study the macro-level effects on state responses to forced migrants. 
Equally, this research will also continue to benefit from regional case studies as well given the 
results. However, it should be assumed that in the future, data on refugee recognition rates will 
be more sophisticated.  Therefore, scholars should also continue to run large-N quantitative 
analyses.  The study also has significance for human rights research, particularly studies that 
investigate the effects that treaties have on state behavior.  Human rights treaties may not be 
enough to entice positive changes in state behavior.  Consequently, human rights research should 
continue to focus on the ways states can adhere to human rights protections outside of treaties.   
5.5 Implications for Future Research and Conclusion 
 The results propose several implications for future research.   Future studies, particularly 
policy research, should examine the role that rival host states have on refugee protection 
measures, and evaluate how refugee rights are maintained in the host states. Another avenue for 
future research mentioned in Section 5.2.2 regards how military alliances affect refugee status 
granting. Studies should explore the nature of the actual military treaties that were signed 
between the host and the sending state. This can be done at the quantitative level by recoding 
variables according to the respective treaties or at the qualitative level.  A mixed-methods 
approach will also better serve this research question. Case studies could further hone in detail 
the nature of the military alliances signed between host and sending states, and how this affects 
refugee-hosting trends in the host state. 
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 Future research should also explore how commercial interests affect refugee status 
granting. One approach may inspect how refugee rates are affected in import dependent host 
states.  Due to such dependencies, host states may be less likely to grant refugee status 
recognition to individuals fleeing states that import important resources, such as oil and natural 
gas.  With regards to domestic politics, the findings are still unclear.  In this case, case studies or 
region specific studies will provide better clarification with respect to how regimes affect asylum 
rates and refugee hosting.  Furthermore, as more data are gathered on asylum rates in the future, 
perhaps it will provide a clearer picture with regards to how democracies, autocracies, and even 
anocracies, implement asylum policies differently.  
Goldsmith and Posner (2005) claim states often act rationally in order to maximize their 
interests.  Cases revolving around refugees prove no different. Evaluating state responses to 
refugees are critical.  Since refugee hosting is not motivated solely on philanthropic affairs, it is 
imperative to understand the political reasons behind state reactions towards forced migrants. In 
other words, it is equally imperative to understand what are the non-humanitarian and political 
factors that influence refugee hosting and asylum rates.  Despite the fact that similar interest-
based arguments have been made before, it is crucial to examine if the argument holds across 
countries.  Doing so will allow us to see if there are generalized asylum trends across countries. 
Understanding the motives behind state intentions can also help in the status of refugees.  
Therefore, this work has implications at the policy level. For example, refugee camps have often 
been used as haven for rebel organizations and recruitment, and as a result, presence of refugees 
can increase civil conflict in both the host country and the country of origin (Salehyan and 
Gleditsch 2006).  When refugees are not integrated into society, and maintained in camps that 
are often unregulated or lack security, conflict is more likely to increase.  Additionally, the 
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authors point out that in the case of refugees feeling Mozambique into neighboring Malawi 
during the 1980s, conflict was avoided in Malawi. Mozambicans were incorporated into 
Malawian society, particularly with regard to economic activity, such as through employment 
and owning land.  Aiding in the statuses of refugees not only helps the refugees themselves, but 
the host and country of origin, and helps to maintain regional stability. Regional instability 
essentially has global repercussions, particularly with regards to the international political 
economy and regional security.  Unfortunately, in the chessboard of geopolitics, refugees and 
asylum-seekers are nothing more than political pawns, often used strategically among states 
dependent on its relation with the sending state, as well among their relations with the 
international community.  
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Appendices  
Appendix A: The effects of bilateral relations and domestic politics on refugee recognition rates (t-1). Cases 
Dropped with Only One Year of Movement. 
 Base (Model 1) Signatory (Model 
2) 
Non-signatory 
(Model 3) 
Contiguous 
(Model 4) 
Non-
Contiguous 
(Model 5) 
Bilateral Variables 
Trade Exchange -.0386 
 (.0649) 
-.0163 
(.0662) 
-.273 
 (.267) 
.557 
(.391) 
-.0707 
(.0666) 
Logged trade      -.0416*** 
   (.00753) 
   -.0390*** 
 (.00791) 
.00994 
(.0318) 
  -.156*** 
(.0291) 
   -.0303*** 
(.00790) 
Rivalry      .798*** 
 (.178) 
   .894*** 
(.186) 
-.367 
(.482) 
    .739*** 
(.209) 
.477 
(.522) 
Alliances    .241*** 
 (.0645) 
   .274*** 
(.0698) 
.0377 
(.217) 
   .264** 
(.125) 
   .235*** 
(.0746) 
Domestic Politics of Host State    
Democratization    -.0559*** 
 (.0119) 
   -.0984*** 
(.0136) 
   .0541** 
(.0238) 
-.0198 
  (.0258) 
   -.0632*** 
(.0137) 
Executive Election -.0814** 
(.0376) 
   -.0871** 
(.0383) 
-.0818 
(.238) 
-.00253 
 (.0916) 
-.0946** 
(.0416) 
Democracy .0732 
(.119) 
.252* 
(.144) 
-.479** 
(.207) 
-.0496 
 (.223) 
.126 
(.141) 
Autocracy     -.492*** 
(.134) 
    -.885*** 
(.149) 
    .863*** 
(.290) 
-.0643 
 (.317) 
   -.586*** 
 (.152) 
Control Variables    
Conflict in sending 
state 
   .100*** 
(.0353) 
.0523 
(.036) 
    .515*** 
(.129) 
.00298 
(.132) 
   .111*** 
(.0365) 
Political Terror in 
sending state 
   .236*** 
(.0190) 
 
   .226*** 
(.0193) 
    .233*** 
(.0869) 
   .387*** 
(.0636) 
   .218*** 
(.0199) 
Total borders in host 
state 
   -.0597*** 
(.00624) 
   -.0674*** 
(.00655) 
.0140 
(.0281) 
-.000293 
(.0197) 
   -.0654*** 
(.00665) 
Contiguous    .376*** 
(.0796) 
   .307*** 
(.0883) 
  .511** 
(.206) 
_ _ 
Similar Religion .0296 
(.0650) 
.0190 
(.0726) 
  .266* 
(.160) 
-.0605 
(.130) 
.059 
(.0754) 
Logged GDP 
difference 
   .0628*** 
(.0160) 
 
.0225 
(.0175) 
    .244*** 
(.0433) 
   .223*** 
(.0650) 
   .0492*** 
(.0167) 
Host State Signatory -.0802 
(.0795) 
_ _   -.432** 
(.202) 
-.0423 
(.0884) 
Sending state former 
colony 
-.0447 
(.121) 
-.00190 
(.121) 
-.310 
(.724) 
-.0978 
(.255) 
-.0724 
(.137) 
Log Refugee 
population /capita in 
host state 
   -.0558*** 
(.00978) 
   -.0566*** 
(.0115) 
-.0303 
(.0265) 
-.0143 
(.0244) 
   -.0663*** 
(.0107) 
Constant    -1.054*** 
(.125) 
   -.957*** 
(.116) 
   -1.835*** 
(.449) 
  -1.224** 
(.532) 
 
 -1.0228*** 
(.133) 
N 28467 26771 1696 2433 26034 
Chi2     861.43***      856.61***     95.63*** 188.44***   622.42*** 
Robust Standard errors for clustering around dyads in parenthesis ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
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Appendix B: The effects of bilateral relations and domestic politics on total recognition rates (t-1). Cases 
Dropped with Only One Year of Movement. 
 Base (Model 1) Signatory (Model 
2) 
Non-signatory 
(Model 3) 
Contiguous 
(Model 4) 
Non-
Contiguous 
(Model 5) 
Bilateral Variables 
Trade Exchange -.0230 
(.0603) 
         -.00514 
(.0618) 
-.299 
(.260) 
.575 
(.395) 
-.0559 
(.0615) 
Logged trade -.0492*** 
(.00665) 
  -.0486*** 
  (.00691) 
.0165 
  (.0308)   
 
 -.129*** 
(.0265)  
 
   -.0414*** 
(.00696)    
 
Rivalry  .602*** 
(.165) 
   .671*** 
(.175) 
-.299 
(.441) 
   .561***     
(.201) 
.249 
(.491) 
Alliances .183*** 
(.0565) 
  .213***   
  (.0594) 
.0342 
(.216) 
 .161   
(.116) 
   .186***   
  (.0647) 
Domestic Politics of Host State    
Democratization -.0115 
(.0102) 
 
   -.0352*** 
(.0117) 
  .0535**    
(.0227) 
.000268 
(.0230) 
  -.0117 
   (.0116) 
 
Executive Election -.00978 
(.0354) 
 
 -.00760   
(.0360) 
-.203 
(.232)  
.0574 
(.0941) 
-.0186 
(.0385) 
Democracy -.228** 
(.102) 
 
-.175 
(.1204) 
 -.448** 
(.198) 
-.248 
(.214) 
.221* 
(.117) 
Autocracy -.276** 
(.118) 
  -.579***    
(.133) 
   .850*** 
(.282)     
 
.00220 
(.269) 
 -.330** 
(.136)   
 
Control Variables    
Conflict in sending 
state 
   .128*** 
(.0323) 
    .0938*** 
(.0333) 
.502 
(.121) 
.0661 
(.124) 
 
   .133*** 
(.0334)    
 
Political Terror in 
sending state 
   .263*** 
(.0171)   
   .259*** 
(.0174) 
 
.243*** 
(.0852) 
 
   .398*** 
(.0605) 
   .248*** 
(.0178)    
 
Total borders in host 
state 
   -.0367*** 
(.00504) 
 -.0408***   
(.00517) 
.0151 
(.0294)  
-.00496 
 (.0171) 
   -.0386*** 
(.00531) 
Contiguous     .399***   
(.0715) 
  .331***  
(.0769) 
  .544** 
(.212) 
 
_ _ 
Similar Religion -.00594 
(.0591) 
-.00950 
(.0647) 
  .241 
(.162) 
-.0783 
 (.126) 
.0194 
(.0676) 
Logged GDP 
difference 
 .0232 
(.0138) 
-.00298 
(.0148) 
   .206*** 
(.0427) 
   .190*** 
(.0620) 
.0135    
(.0144) 
Host State Signatory .0623 
(.0753) 
_ _ -.306 
(.198) 
.102 
(.0830) 
Sending state former 
colony 
-.0239 
(.0971) 
-.00955 
(.0974) 
 -.0631 
 (.689) 
.0823 
(.230) 
-.108 
(.106) 
Log Refugee 
population /capita in 
host state 
-.0131 
(.00870) 
 -.00762 
  (.00991) 
 
   .206*** 
(.0427) 
.0119 
(.0233) 
-.0199** 
(.00943) 
Constant      -1.207*** 
(.115) 
  -1.0103*** 
(.103) 
   -1.818***  
(.446) 
   -1.219*** 
(.513)   
    -1.201*** 
(.121) 
N 28467            26771 1684 2433 26034 
Chi2     770.07***      752.26***        92.25***    189.96**    549.08***   
Robust Standard errors for clustering around dyads in parenthesis ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
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